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After the new
social democracy
Social welfare for the
twenty-first century
TONY FITZPATRICK
Social democracy has made a political comeback in recent years,
especially under the influence of the Third Way. However, not
everyone is convinced that this ‘new social democracy’ is the best
means of reviving the Left’s social project. This book explains why
and offers an alternative approach.
Bringing together a range of social and political theories After the
new social democracy engages with some of the most important
contemporary debates regarding the present direction and future
of the Left. Drawing upon egalitarian, feminist and environmental
ideas it proposes that the social democratic tradition can be
renewed but only if the dominance of conservative ideas is
challenged more effectively. It explores a number of issues with
this aim in mind, including justice, the state, democracy, welfare
reform, new technologies, future generations and the new
genetics.
Employing a lively and authoritative style After the new social
democracy offers a distinctive contribution to political ideas. It will
appeal to all of those interested in politics, philosophy, social policy
and social studies.
Tony Fitzpatrick is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Sociology and Social
Policy, University of Nottingham.
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A couple of years ago I was feeling pretty pleased with myself (the word
is ‘smug’) at having published quite a few pieces of work, in a range of
subjects, while barely out of short trousers (believe me, in academic years
I’m still being bottle-fed). ‘Do you know what you ought to do’, I mused
on one particular ego-fuelled day, ‘you ought to publish a compilation’.
What a sad sight. A young, handsome, eligible lecturer swanning around,
imagining that society is awaiting his Greatest Hits collection. Not even
the fact that academic books barely register on publishers’ sale charts
could stop me (they are usually only read by friends and family, and even
they moan when you don’t give them a discount). The world urgently
needed my help and my help was what it was going to bloody well get.
Fortunately, time and sobriety intervened – as time and sobriety have an
irritating habit of doing – and the plan changed, as people to whom I
described the original version began to inch away from me with eyes
averted, so most of what follows is new. Inevitably, parts of my ego creep
back into the following pages, perhaps as compensation for the fact that
writing is a lonely business, but mainly because when addressing the con-
temporary state of social democracy, and trying to point out where you
think it’s going wrong, some soapbox oratory is impossible to avoid.
But hopefully the egoism does not get in the way of the book’s main
purpose: to make connections. The world is a frightening place at the
moment (though when was it not?) filled with people who seem to
imagine that what it is really missing is another set of fundamentalist
dogmas. Having won the war against communism, for instance, it turns
out that many anti-communists have yet to win the war against them-
selves. Yet there are many out there who are working for something dif-
ferent, for something more humane, and although not everyone who
belongs to this group can or should be placed under the heading of social
democracy, this isn’t a bad heading from which to start. So this isn’t a
Preface and 
acknowledgements
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manifesto either but it is, hopefully, an attempt at dialogue which dis-
cerns, amid the clamour of the asylums within which we insist on living,
some voices of sanity.
Many thanks to the usual suspects, Chris Pierson and Hartley Dean, who
gave valuable feedback on the draft manuscript.
Chapter 3 is a revision of two earlier pieces of work: ‘New Agendas for
Criminology and Social Policy’, Social Policy and Administration 35(2)
(2001) and ‘Critical Theory, Information Society and Surveillance Tech-
nologies’, Information, Communication and Society 5(3) (2002). I am grateful
to Blackwell and Routledge, respectively, for permission to use these.
Chapter 7 is also a revision of two earlier pieces of work: ‘Dis/Count-
ing the Future’, Social Policy Review 13 (2001), edited by Rob Sykes, Cath
Bochel and Nick Ellison, and ‘Making Welfare for Future Generations’,
Social Policy and Administration 35(5) (2001). I am grateful to Policy Press
and Blackwell, respectively, for permission to use these.
Chapter 8 is a revised version of ‘Before The Cradle: New Genetics,
Biopolicy And Regulated Eugenics’, Journal of Social Policy 30(4) (2001).
Reprinted with permission of Cambridge University Press.
The rest of the book was written between February and May 2002
during a semester’s study leave and my thanks go to the School of Soci-
ology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham, for that opportunity.
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Introduction
I cannot now remember what else I did that day. I must either have
pressed on into town to my office or else bought something for lunch and
returned home to work. I do recall how beautiful the day was that mid-
morning. How the pavements yawned and stretched under a sun clam-
bering eagerly towards its dive into the windless blue sea of a sky. As if
the light that precedes it had been scattered across the visible world,
making it brighter than ever before. I also remember that the walk to the
school took less than 10 minutes, or almost 18 years, whichever you prefer.
And then that night. With millions of others into the dizzy dark hours,
stunned witnesses to our impact upon each other’s lives.
And what of the journey away from that school, once the ballot boxes
had been rewarehoused and the children’s desks returned? For that day
has certainly joined the backward procession of memories. Of other days,
when dark cars rolled towards Buckingham Palace, when industrial com-
munities were transformed into museums of themselves, when social ties
faded behind the very individuals they bind together, when an elderly
women stood in Downing Street and tears drained finally down a face
that must have seen, but never acknowledged, the tears of others. But
what else? We no longer have recourse to that old standby, ‘the jury is still
out’. In fact the jury returned long ago and its members have been beat-
ing each other up ever since. For the thing about New Labour is that 
it has both fulfilled expectations and betrayed them. It has fulfilled the
expectations we had and betrayed the expectations we should have 
had. New Labour succeeded and failed because our expectations of it, 
and it of us, were always too low. And if you want to understand 
why New Labour became so popular and so disliked you have to under-
stand the lack of trust in ourselves that those low expectations have
engendered.
But this is not a book about New Labour. Blair and Co. have an impor-
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2 After the new social democracy
tant walk-on part, but are then killed off before the first act is over. It is a
book about the new social democracy (NSD) of which New Labour has
been perhaps the best but by no means the only representative. More
specifically, it is a book about imagining a social democratic future that
diverts from the NSD, about how we can raise our expectations once again
and so learn to trust each other more.
Social democracy refers to the attempt to bring capitalist economies
under some form of collective control using statist and gradualist reforms
that work from within the framework of liberal democracy. Describing the
aspirations of the Left it has united both socially-minded liberals and
liberal-minded socialists, despite disagreements about the nature, speed
and direction of reform that have often divided these groups. By the 1920s
and 1930s social democracy had become the main alternative on the Left
to Marxism and Communism (which is not to claim that it remained un-
influenced by either), marginalising those who preferred anarchist, syn-
dicalist and associative alternatives. Achieving its high-water mark in the
quarter century following World War Two, social democracy had been
placed on the defensive by the 1980s and 1990s, yet the exact nature of
that crisis, and the solutions to it, differ depending upon the historical
story that we tell ourselves.
Unfortunately, histories of social democracy are often simplified to
reflect the prejudices of the present. The NSD’s story goes something like
this. Social democracy emerged in the late nineteenth century out of the
international workers’ movement as a reformist alternative to revolu-
tionary socialism. Although initially dedicated to the replacement of
socialism with capitalism, social democrats realised that for this to happen
capitalism would first have to be saved from itself and made to work
better. Hence the enthusiasm from the 1930s onwards for Keynesian eco-
nomics which, in addition to nationalisation and state welfare, came to
characterise the politics of social democratic governments after the war.
During its heyday, most social democrats came to realise that the aspira-
tion for a society substantially different from capitalism was an unrealis-
tic dream and so social democrats dedicated themselves to maintaining a
form of socialised capitalism. But with the eventual demise of social
democratic governments, the resurgence of the Right and a series of eco-
nomic and sociocultural changes, social democrats have had to rethink
their commitment to Keynesianism, nationalisation and state welfare.
Social democracy is therefore a history of decline. Revolutionary Marxism
was replaced by a reformist socialism, which was replaced in turn by the
desire for a socialised capitalism, and now the aim of socialising capital-
ism has also died. Therefore, the only way to save what it left of social
democratic aspirations is by abandoning Keynesianism, nationalisation
and state welfare. Enter the NSD.
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This is the story told by those such as Giddens (1998), Dell (2000), Plant
(2002) and hints of it can even be heard in Sassoon (1996) and Moschonas
(2002). The problem with it is that it tells only one part of the tale. For
although the term itself was not conceptualised until the 1870s, signifi-
cant elements of social democracy predate that period, whether within 
the trade unions and burgeoning workers’ movement or on the Left 
of the bourgeois liberal movement. So, if social democracy is not a 
dilution of Marxist Communism, if they share a contemporaneous devel-
opment, then the history of social democracy is not one of decline but, 
as with most ideologies, much more complex than this. And what the
defenders of the NSD downplay, when they are not omitting it altogether,
is the history of capitalism over the last century or more, for if we are 
to interpret history in terms of either ascent or decline, then it makes as
much sense to talk about the decline of capitalism in the century follow-
ing the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The so-called decline of
social democracy might also be written as the decline of capitalism to a
point where it would not have been recognisable to its eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century forebears. More accurately, we should think of social
democratic history as a complex evolution rather than as either an ascent
or decline.
Ah, say new social democrats, but this only takes the story to the 1980s
at best. The resurgence of market capitalism since then means that social
democratic traditions have lost their former relevance. So whether the
decline is measured in generations or decades there has been a recent decline
to which the NSD is the only viable response.
Yet what this argument conveniently does is to resurrect the deter-
minism which has usually been employed to caricature Marxism (and
which Marxists have often used as caricatures of themselves). If the resur-
gence of market capitalism was and is inevitable, then what are the laws
of history which will make the future an endless reflection of the present?
New social democrats are understandably silent on this point. But what
really gives the lie to their argument is that this insistence on inevitabil-
ity (‘There Is No Alternative’) used to be deployed by conservatives – and
often still is, of course – against any form of social democracy. So if the
NSD really is a viable option then the resurgence of market capitalism
must be political rather than deterministic, i.e. the result of social forces
mobilising for ideological ends within particular, conjunctural circum-
stances, and if it is political, then although the NSD is one viable option it
is not necessarily the only one.
However, the new social democrat has an additional argument. Even
if the NSD is not the only option it is nonetheless the best given the
immense problems that we face. Would today’s socially excluded really
thank us for spending time, energy and resources building radicalism for
Introduction 3
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4 After the new social democracy
tomorrow? This question deserves an answer by presenting those to the
Left of the NSD with a considerable challenge and it is this challenge with
which the present book is concerned.
Although my conclusions will hopefully be based upon sturdier foun-
dations, part of the answer lies in the current crisis of the NSD itself. In
the 18 months following New Labour’s 1997 victory, social democratic
parties swept to power across Europe to an extent never seen before – by
1999, 12 out of 15 EU member states were governed either wholly or par-
tially by social democrats. Given the tortuous slowness of academic pub-
lishing (apart from Manchester University Press, obviously), it is only
fairly recently that I have finished reading books and articles celebrating
this and heralding a brave new dawn for the Centre-Left. Unfortunately,
by the time of writing (summer 2002), this situation had reversed with
only New Labour looking particularly secure within Europe. Now
because the electoral successes were not a victory for the NSD alone (see
Chapter 4), despite some of the wilder claims made at the time, the elec-
toral reverse undoubtedly holds lessons for all social democrats, old and
new. Nevertheless, because the NSD was presented as the only possible
future for the Centre-Left, and because its main strength was its apparent
popularity, then recent events will hopefully produce some soul search-
ing among new social democrats and raise questions not only about
whether it is the only available option, but also about whether it really is
the best.
But let me reiterate, the arguments of this book do not rise or fall
depending upon political contingencies. For all I know, by the time you
are reading this the electoral situation will have reversed again. It matters
little since the long-term significance of the political fortunes of the NSD
and any social democratic alternative can only be properly assessed once
we understand the relative strengths and weaknesses of the relevant
ideas. In short, we should not confuse psephology for philosophy.1 Our
objective is therefore to address the following two questions: ‘does the
intellectual case for the NSD bear scrutiny?’ and ‘what kind of alternative
to the NSD can be imagined?’. The relevance of the second question obvi-
ously depends upon our answer to the first, but I have already indicated
above why I think the second question deserves to be asked. To answer
these questions we will be working from within the idiom of political phi-
losophy and social theory as they relate to the subject of social policy.
What we will not be doing is reviewing the full range of possible Centre-
Left alternatives to the NSD (market socialism, stakeholding, etc.). Some
of these make an appearance in the following pages, but what you are
going to find is an attempt to summarise the key elements of an approach
that I believe is essential to the future viability of social democracy. Nor
will we be sketching a blueprint of an alternative welfare state. I will make
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occasional recommendations in this respect, but our principal concern is
with the theoretical underpinnings of policy alternatives to the NSD.
Let me add that I consider the presenting of alternatives as essential to
theoretical labour. Unfortunately, when considering philosophical prob-
lems and puzzles of one form or another, even most political philosophers
are content to remain at an abstract level, reluctant to get their social hands
dirty. It is as if debating institutional reform is either to sully the purity
of philosophical endeavour or to invoke the kind of utopian, system-
building that has now surely been discredited. To this extent I agree 
with David Miller (1999: x) when he complains that Rawlsian and post-
Rawlsian ideas come across as detached from the social environments
they are presumably meant to improve. Many social philosophers 
have come to resemble chefs who devise recipes, but are content to let
others actually cook the food. Equally, I am also frustrated with non-
philosophical polemics that consist of little more than menus for reform:
lists of policies and prescriptions that often seem reasonable in them-
selves, but frequently adopt a take-it-or-leave-it approach. Here, the chef
expects you to swallow the menu without sampling any of the meals for
yourself. This book therefore steers a course somewhere between these
two approaches.
One consequence is that although we cover lots of theoretical ground,
we sometimes need to stray away from it. Chapter 4 is particularly guilty
in this respect. But before crying ‘where the hell is the theory?’, as you
will be tempted to do from time to time, please remember that in order
to present a philosophical alternative to the NSD, but one which is still
recognisably social democratic, we have to draw upon resources that are
non-philosophical as well.
Finally, let me say something more about my basic ethical and social
beliefs. In its synthesis of economic prosperity, political participation,
social justice and cultural maturity, social democratic capitalism repre-
sents the best form of society that humans have yet managed to create for
themselves. I make this claim with some feeling of ambivalence. I regret
that we have not done better than social democracy and hope that we yet
will.2 But, despite its failings, social democracy offers the best opportunity
for the progressive future for which many of us still yearn, especially in
the face of a political Right that, across both Europe and America, appears
to be more rabid than ever. A sense of ambiguity therefore pervades the
book. We must both defend social democracy and criticise it, consolidate
and improve it. This has been the professed aim of new social democrats
also but, by accepting many of conservatism’s assumptions (inclusion
does not require equality, we possess what we deserve to possess, social
problems are individualistic in origin and solution, the poor are morally
and socially different from the norm, coercion is good), the NSD sends us
Introduction 5
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in the wrong direction. We must therefore set our sights on the best exam-
ples that European social democracy has to offer, though here too we will
see that the recent picture is ambiguous. European social democracy has
made some concessions to the conservative hegemony that prevails at the
global level (due largely to American influence), concessions that have
driven some but by no means all into the arms of NSD. Therefore, rein-
vigorating social democracy means resisting the sirens of the NSD and
finding ways in the face of conservatism to revive the 200-year old project
of creating a better society for all rather than (as the current orthodoxy
demands) a wealthier economy for the lucky. Our ultimate task then is to
answer the following question: how can social democracy be rejuvenated?
Part I of the book deals primarily with the NSD. Chapter 1 offers a
summary and critique of the NSD, treating New Labour as the best exem-
plar of these ideas. It argues that while it is simplistic to equate New
Labour with conservatism, due to the continuing influence upon it of Left
values and concepts, it fails to break away substantially from the conser-
vative hegemony. The NSD therefore reinforces the grip of the mainstream
upon the political imagination, a grip that excludes a much broader range
of ideas, perspectives and values, with potentially dangerous repercus-
sions for us all. However, the chapter spots a potential within the main-
stream for genuinely radical alternatives if the simplistic narratives of the
NSD can be successfully challenged.
In Chapters 2 and 3 we examine some of the main criticisms of New
Labour in greater depth. Chapter 2 proposes that New Labour favours a
combination of ‘weak equality’ and ‘strong reciprocity’ and I contrast this
with an alternative vision of distributive justice and social citizenship. We
then spend Chapter 3 exploring some of the implications of New Labour’s
preference, namely the extent to which it derives from and perpetuates
what I call the ‘security state’. The security state has not replaced the
welfare state, but it has transformed the discourse of rights into duties,
equality into inclusion and collective problems into individual pathologies.
This transformation is illustrated through an analysis of New Labour’s
approach towards Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).
Chapter 4 widens our focus beyond New Labour and the NSD and con-
cludes that social democratic traditions across Europe are more robust
than either has allowed for. The NSD represents an important strand in
recent Centre-Left developments, but it is simplistic to imagine that the
‘old’ social democracy has been discredited. That said, social democracy
undoubtedly faces some real challenges in adapting to a post-industrial
and global economy. Yet it is premature to imagine that such adaptation
requires social democrats to abandon egalitarianism and to prod as many
people as possible into the service economy. This kind of productivist
TZPIN  4/25/2005  4:47 PM  Page 6
approach may create as many problems as it solves and Chapter 4 ends
by proposing that social democrats should explore the prospects for post-
productivism.
It is this conjunction of social democracy and post-productivism that 
is here termed ‘ecowelfare’ and Part II sets out to trace the main param-
eters of ecowelfare ideas. Chapter 5 contrasts productivism with post-
productivism and shows that while the latter does not abandon the 
aims of increases in growth, productivity and well-being, it does recon-
textualise them in terms of what are called ‘reproductive values’, values
that refer to the ecological and social conditions of a productive economy,
conditions which that economy is increasingly unable to replenish. Eco-
nomic practice therefore has to be assessed in terms of reproductivity and
labour has to refer less to waged work and more to the kind of emotional
and ecological labour that economic orthodoxies continue to neglect.
Ecowelfare therefore guides social democracy in the direction of a post-
employment society.
Chapter 6 provides a clearer overview of ecowelfare as referring us to
three principles: first, the alternative version of distributive justice that
was provided in Chapter 2; second, the principles of ‘attention’, by which
I mean both recognition and care; finally, the principle of sustainability.
The chapter defends a simple model of ecowelfare and suggests that the
social theory of ecowelfare consists of an analysis of the links between
these three principles.
These links are therefore examined over the next three chapters, not
comprehensively but as a platform for further reflection. Chapter 7 inves-
tigates the principles of sustainability and distributive justice by outlin-
ing a theory of intergenerational justice and discussing some of the key
issues to which this debate gives rise. It concludes that the ultimate con-
flict is less between present generations and future ones and more
between those who would and those who would not favour a more equi-
table distribution of natural and social resources. Intergenerational justice
therefore engenders a series of radical welfare reforms that have as many
implications for ourselves as for the future.
In Chapter 8 we turn to the principles of sustainability and attention
by studying the new genetics. Here I argue for a multidimensional con-
ception of human nature where the maintenance of diversity through
social solutions (rather than technological fixes) should be the priority.
However, we are also obliged to prevent harm whenever it is possible and
desirable to do so. This obligation, plus the fact that we cannot disinvent
biotechnology, means that we have to make some difficult decisions
regarding therapeutic and reproductive genetics. Such decisions have
already begun to tax governments and Chapter 8 argues for a ‘regulated
eugenics’ as an alternative to the ‘laissez-faire eugenics’ of the free market
Introduction 7
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8 After the new social democracy
and to a hands-off approach that tries to avoid these difficult decisions
altogether.
Chapter 9 brings together the principles of attention and distributive
justice and argues for a ‘welfare democracy’, i.e. a system of deliberative
democracy within which discursive debate occupies a much greater role
in the operation of welfare services. Welfare democracy represents an
egalitarian alternative to conservatism (and the NSD) by empowering
individuals as members of a political community rather than as members
of consumer markets. It means that a more creative interface is required
between parliamentary and non-parliamentary spheres of politics and
between social movements and social democratic parties. The chapter
ends by concluding that both associative and deliberative approaches are
essential to a new politics of equality.
Notes
1 That said, the political urgency of our philosophising certainly changes with the
electoral wind and, as I write, those winds have shifted considerably and alarm-
ingly in recent months. The Centre-Left is in trouble not only in countries like
France and Germany, but also in countries that are represented in Chapter 4 as
archetypes of social democracy: Denmark, Netherlands and Norway. The analy-
sis contained in this book is therefore set against the background that prevailed
before this crisis, i.e. before the ascendancy of the far Right and the falling 
popularity of the Left in 2002. I will have more to say about the current situa-
tion in the concluding chapter and why I think that the ideas expressed in this
book can assist the Left in fighting back.
2 I place to one side the question of whether the social democracy I will be arguing
for is capable of eventually leading us beyond capitalism. As I argue elsewhere,
it is less important to imagine a post-capitalist society than it is to think through
the kind of radical reforms that might gradually take us away from where we
are (Fitzpatrick with Caldwell, 2001).
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1The long march back
If Eric Hobsbawm (1994) is right and the twentieth century effectively
ended in 1991, then the new millennium was considerably less new by
the time we were popping the corks, the balloons and, most importantly,
the aspirin. And if he is also correct to portray the last century as the ‘age
of extremes’, then where does this leave us? Have we become wise enough
to avoid the mistakes of the past or have we simply been experiencing the
interregnum before the emergence of new forms of extremism? Tony
Giddens (1994) had the foresight to recognise that these alternatives are
not necessarily exclusive, that reflexivity and fundamentalism are both
coherent responses to the risks of our ‘second modernity’ (Beck, 1992;
Beck et al., 1994). This ambivalence has characterised the post-communist
years, with the globalisation of deregulated markets, consumer values
and western power being accompanied, first, by the mobilisation of social
movements opposing corporate capitalism and then by the globalisation
of insecurity, fear and revenge (Mouzelis, 2001).
Yet is Giddens (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001) also correct to suppose that the
NSD is the best means of charting a way through this landscape of con-
fusion and ambiguity? Possibly, if we accept the following reasoning. All
attempts to construct ideal societies have failed. The state utopias of the
Left have led either to totalitarianism or to a crippling backlash of tax-
payers, consumers and capital markets; the market utopias of the Right
have led to social exclusion and civic decline. Therefore, we should not
only attach ourselves to the political Centre, but also seek to radicalise
that Centre by evading the conceptual barriers between Left and Right,
public and private, state and market, justice and efficiency, security and
flexibility, equality and freedom. It is this radicalisation that Giddens
refers to as the NSD.1 By transcending these dichotomies – rather than
simply trading off between them – we provide ourselves with an alter-
native not only to the ‘Old Left’ and ‘New Right’, but also to the siren
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12 After the new social democracy
calls of nationalist, ethnic and religious fundamentalists. For if we can find
a way to negotiate the risks and hazards of this second modernity, through
the emotional and cultural empowerment of reflexive citizens, then we
can better resist the nihilistic certainties of the ‘new extremisms’.
This is a powerful and compelling narrative but does it stand up to
scrutiny? The purpose of this book is to engage with key features of 
the NSD in order to answer that question and to suggest why and how
more radical alternatives can be developed. The aim of Part I is to 
criticise those key features in order to help us towards an outline of an
alternative social philosophy in Part II, one that I shall term ‘ecosocial
welfare’ or ‘ecowelfare’ for short. We begin in this first chapter by review-
ing the main principles, justifications of and main objections to the NSD.
Some of the following objections are then pursued at greater length in
Chapters 2–4 as a means of setting us up for the arguments in Part II.
New Labour
A political ideology is a constellation of ‘nodes’ (ideas, principles and con-
cepts) which establish a set of relations between one another that are con-
stantly evolving, due to the theoretical developments of that ideology’s
supporters and its critics, and to changing circumstances both in society
and in other ideological formations. The NSD undoubtedly constitutes
such an ideology. It contains (a) a critique of existing society, (b) an impres-
sion of a better one and (c) an explanation of how to get from (a) to (b)
(Ball and Dagger, 1991). Yet the core components of the NSD are by no
means unique to itself. Instead, it borrows its primary values and princi-
ples from established ideologies but rearranges them in such a way that
a distinctive ideological position emerges nevertheless. This not only
makes the NSD what Freeden (1996) calls a ‘thin’ ideology, in that its
nodes are not peculiar to itself, but means that the relational network
linking its core components is in an accelerated state of flux, given the
nature of the NSD’s intervention into our social conjuncture. Indeed, some
have argued that pragmatism and populism are the key features of 
the NSD (Powell, 2000) and that it is little more than a practice in search
of a few philosophical trimmings that hardly constitute an ideology. 
While agreeing that the NSD lacks the focus and robustness of liberalism,
socialism, feminism, etc., its possession of (a), (b) and (c) means that 
pragmatism is not its only feature.
And yet this pragmatism is perhaps the main problem with which we
have to wrestle. How do we distil what new social democrats say and do
into a coherent series of ideas? Do we treat the NSD merely as a political
programme? Is the NSD merely a rhetorical device that governments have
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employed in trying to square various circles? How do we name some-
thing as NSD in the first place? All of these questions are relevant, but my
solution is to take the line of least resistance and examine the NSD in what
arguably remains its purest form, that of Tony Blair’s post-1994 Labour
Party and the ideas which have been deployed to both motivate and
justify its approach. For whereas other ideologies cannot be reduced to
the actions and pronouncements of political parties, it is the very thinness
of the NSD which allows us to organise our analysis around the actions
and discourse of political parties. And although there are certainly other
recent governments which may qualify for the label – principally in the
USA, Netherlands and Germany, as well as several countries in the South-
ern Hemisphere (Gledhill, 2001), especially New Zealand – it is in the UK
that the NSD, and associated terms such as the ‘Third Way’, have been
applied most often and most consistently.2,3 Of course, this solution is not
ideal, as it might be said that, as with any ideology, the NSD has no pure
form, for even within New Labour the influence of old social democracy
has still been visible.
So for our purposes the first question we need to ask, ‘what is the
NSD?’, can be reformulated as ‘what is new about “New Labour”?’, a
question that requires to plot the party on the political graph. Once we
have addressed this question we should be in a position to outline the
NSD’s key principles and features (cf. Buckler, 2000).
First, let us dispense with two claims. The first claim is that there is no
such thing as New Labour, i.e. that the party under Blair has been just as
socialist/conservative (delete according to taste) as the Labour Parties 
of Attlee, Wilson, etc.; the second is that New Labour bears absolutely no
relation to what preceded it. Both of these claims ignore the nature of 
ideology and the fact that the networks which relate nodes together 
are constantly evolving, as are the principles and concepts themselves.
The first claim underestimates the scale of that evolution, whereas the
second claim overestimates it by neglecting the continuities between pre-
sent and past. Once we reject these claims we are left with the following
six interpretations:
1 The party has frequently described itself as applying traditional
values in a new context. What has changed are not the basic beliefs
and ideals, but the social and economic environment within which
they have to be realised, necessitating radically new policy instru-
ments, practices and institutions. New Labour is new because the
times are new and not the goals to be achieved (Mandelson and
Liddle, 1996; Blair, 1998; cf. Blair and Schroder, 1999; Hombach, 2000).
2 Some academic commentators agree and go on to regard the conti-
nuities as outweighing the discontinuities (Rubinstein, 2000; Larkin,
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2001; Allender, 2001). However, contrary to its self-image, the Labour
Party has never been particularly radical (except when out of power)
because it has always had to appeal to middle-class voters and ensure
that international capital is not scared away by the prospects of a
Labour Government. Social democracy has always been a politics of
‘catch up’, of adaptation to economic and social developments, and
so New Labour is not really that new, despite the undoubted weak-
nesses of traditional social democracy.
3 However, these views have been disputed by those such as Driver
and Martell (1998, 2000, 2001; cf. Coates, 2001) who insist that what
has changed is not simply the means that the party employs, but the
ends that it attempts to achieve. What is new about New Labour are
underlying values and principles that are substantially different from
those held prior to Blair’s ascendancy. As such, New Labour is neither
a social democratic party, as this has been traditionally conceived, but
nor does it represent Thatcherism Mark II, since it retains an anti-
Thatcherite emphasis. Instead, its politics are the politics of post-
Thatcherism, i.e. an adaptation to the society and economy which
Thatcherism engineered, and which involves a substantial leap to the
Right, though with some tilting back towards the Left, albeit a Left
that rejects socialism and embraces the market economy.
4 Others go further and insist that New Labour is effectively a kind of
‘Left Thatcherism’ in that it has accepted almost all of the radical
Right agenda and has merely used the vocabulary of the Centre-
Left to justify this surrender (Marxism Today, 1998; Mouffe, 2000; 
Heffernan, 2000; Callinicos, 2001).
5 Others have wondered whether New Labour is forming a Left version
of Christian Democracy (Marquand, 1998). Having flourished across
Europe, Christian Democracy is broadly on the Centre-Right,
embodying the idea of a social market where everyone is able to 
participate in the market economy regardless of social background.
Capitalism can be humanised through welfare institutions, strong
families and strong communities without the need for large-scale
upheaval. Although never really taking hold in Britain (though the
paternalistic conservatism that Thatcher swept away might be con-
strued in similar terms), New Labour could be thought of as a com-
promise between social and Christian Democracy (cf. Huntington 
and Bale, 2002).
6 Another interpretation suggests that New Labour is a reinvention of
‘new liberalism’ (Beer, 2001; cf. Freeden, 1999; Stears and White, 2001).
New Liberalism flourished at the end of the nineteenth century and
represented a shift away from classic liberalism in its recognition that
individuals are socially interdependent. But because this interdepen-
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dency is undermined by economic injustice, state action is required
to rectify the flaws of capitalism, though a state which is still 
limited in scope and ambition lest the spaces of individual liberty be
undermined. New liberalism had all but vanished by the First World
War, after which British politics was dominated by a damaging stand-
off between conservatism and socialism. But with the eventual 
discrediting of socialism, the way was open for a rejuvenation of 
new liberal ideas in the form of a social democratic politics that 
has divested itself of socialist myths. This is an interpretation 
which appeals to many within New Labour, convinced by David 
Marquand’s (1991) contention that conservatism has dominated
British politics because progressives of the Centre and the 
Left allowed themselves to be divided throughout the twentieth
century, as the latter yearned for a post-capitalist society that the
former always knew to be illusory.
Which of these interpretations should we prefer? In fact, I do not think
we can identify any of them as exclusively right or wrong, as each helps
to temper the potential excesses of the others. The attempt to weave the
above interpretations together looks something like this. New Labour has
reconfigured rather than abandoned many of its previous beliefs and
values (1), i.e. it has altered the relational network between principles
rather than jettisoning old principles for new ones. This means that we
should not lose sight of the historical continuities (2) and acknowledge
that the Labour Party has usually been forced to play catch-up. However,
whereas from the 1950s to the 1980s the party was always readapting to
a consensus that it had initially shaped between 1945 and 1950, by the
1990s the Keynesian agenda had been dispelled by the Right and so 
the politics of catch-up led to the most substantial Rightward revision in
the party’s history (Bara and Budge, 2001). Therefore, its reconfiguration
was one of ends and not just means (3), so that its relational network came
to resemble many aspects of Thatcherism (4) though this accommodation
has been moderated by a paternalistic belief in the common good (5). So
the party has abandoned all but the most harmless and general references
to socialism, meaning that aspects of late nineteenth-century liberalism
have been reinvented (6).
If this narrative is convincing then what does it tell us not just about
New Labour, but about the NSD? First, it tells us that three conditions
seem to be required for the NSD to have emerged:
• The Right must have adopted significant elements of both free market
liberalism and social authoritarianism in its political programme 
(a combination which I will now refer to throughout this book as 
‘conservatism’).4
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• The Right must be in the ascendancy, constituting an actual or 
potential threat to the existing political settlement.
• The Centre-Left movement must lack confidence in itself, be divided
and/or social democracy must lack any real social and institutional
roots to the point where it is unable or unwilling to resist the 
hegemonic formation of a new settlement, a settlement to which it
eventually adapts its traditions and values.
Obviously, this is no more than an hypothesis which extrapolates from
the UK’s experience and considerable research would be needed to assess
the extent to which it applies to other examples of the NSD around the
world. Nevertheless, the hypothesis suggests a second point. The ascen-
dancy of a conservative agenda is only a necessary condition for a shift
in the ideological spectrum. Even where this ascendancy is visible, it may
nevertheless fail to alter the existing settlement if the Centre-Left holds
firm and does not feel the need to dilute social democratic politics. I will
return to this argument in Chapter 4, but the final point is this. The NSD
is not merely an accommodation to conservatism, but a means by which
the radical Right’s agenda is socially and economically embedded to a
degree that the Right could not manage on its own. As Heffernan (2000:
175) puts it, ‘. . . the conservative agenda underpinning the politics of
Thatcherism may even be strengthened by Labour in office: a “Nixon 
goes to China” syndrome, one which marks the abnegation of the social
democratic project’.
Therefore, the principles of New Labour and the NSD are not just a
reconfiguration of the relational network of social democratic principles,
but a means by which conservative concepts and values are embedded
across the ideological spectrum, further colonising the repertoires and
domains of the social field. What continue to be recognisable Centre-Left
concepts are given a conservative content that inhabits and converts the
space long populated by what, as a signature of this colonisation, 
comes to be designated as ‘old social democracy’ (and ‘Old Labour’). 
The NSD is not equivalent to conservatism, but it is a conduit for conser-
vatism: ‘social democracy, even when it is neoliberalized, is not neoliberal’
(Moschonas, 2002: 173). So, NSD principles are unremarkable in them-
selves. What is remarkable is the process to which they are being 
subject, due to the adaptive strategies of social democrats within a con-
servative context, a process which not only reconfigures those principles,
but further embeds the radical Right hegemony that first impelled it. 
In short, what is new about the NSD is not so much the Rightward lurch
of social democracy, but the ‘social democratisation’ of conservatism, i.e.
the way in which, with the Centre ground having been dragged towards
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the Right, market liberalism and social authoritarianism have been 
given a Centre-Left voice. What we will need to decide by the end of this
chapter is whether this social democratisation represents a new politics 
or whether it is little more than a sophisticated surrender to the Right’s
hegemony.
However, this account is to anticipate the critique that is pursued later
on in this chapter and throughout Part I. Before examining it in more
detail we obviously have to appreciate the NSD’s basic principles, again
using New Labour as our exemplar.
Principles and justifications
The NSD is based upon five key principles: community, meritocracy, 
reciprocity, inclusion, pragmatism. Note that this section and the next –
which presents the main objections to the NSD – are only intended to
outline the main arguments that have emerged from the debate. The aim
is simply to establish a framework that will be elaborated upon over the
course of the next three chapters.
Community
Many commentators have noted the attachment of New Labour to com-
munity (Lund, 1999; Heron, 2001). At its crudest New Labour represents
community as a third way between the attachments of the Old Left to 
collectivism and of the New Right to individualism, with the former 
being criticised for ignoring civil society and the latter for reducing civil
society to the blind interactions of economic exchange (Blair, 1998;
Giddens, 1998: 78–89). Community is offered as a virtue in obvious oppo-
sition to Thatcher’s proclamation that ‘there is no such thing as society,
only individuals and families’, but avoids treating ‘the social’ as an
abstract quality that abandons reference to the local and the private. Com-
munity therefore emphasises both the lived relations of family, neigh-
bourhood and civic attachment, but also the broader social relations that
make individuals interdependent and through which we express a need
for ontological solidarity and belonging.
Because community is a notoriously vague, contested and all-purpose
concept, there was an initial interest shown by New Labour in commu-
nitarianism, the political philosophy arguing that communal relations
(Gemeinschaft) are constitutive of who we are and what we do, rather 
than being the contingent, ephemeral properties imagined by liberalism
(Etzioni, 1994; Fitzpatrick, 2001a: 81–4). The attraction of communitarian-
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ism was that it enabled New Labour to define community as distin-
guishable from the state and the market, while allowing it to develop an
economics that utilises both the public and private spheres. Subsequently,
New Labour has made more reference to ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 2000)
and ‘stakeholding’, each term signifying the interactive, associative 
networks through which we participate in society and contribute to the
enhancement of ‘human capital’ (skills, qualifications, employability),
trust and bonds of cooperation. The essential intention though is to 
reconcile social cohesion with individual effort, traditional values with
modern circumstances, local needs with global imperatives.
Meritocracy
As a reaction against what it sees as state collectivism, New Labour 
has also rejected the egalitarianism of the Old Left, regarding this as an
inhibition on economic prosperity and individual creativity that 
smothers social and cultural diversity (Commission on Social Justice,
1994; Gray, 1996). However, the solution is not to stumble towards either 
the market libertarianism of the 1980s or the moral libertarianism of the
1960’s counter-culture. Instead, the emphasis should be on opportunity.
This implies not only the removal of restrictions on aspiration and 
mobility, but also an attempt to embody the equal worth of individuals
by providing everyone with an equal chance in life, i.e. real opportunities.
This requires that everyone has an equal start regardless of social back-
ground, but not an equality of outcome since, by reducing the rewards
for success and the penalties for failure, this would deter people from
developing and applying their talents. Therefore, equal opportunities plus
freedom of choice leads to a meritocratic system where inequalities are
just, since they derive from individual efforts of will rather than brute luck
or inheritance.
Equality therefore needs redefining in terms of life-chances and capa-
bilities (or capacities) rather than simple redistribution from rich to poor.
What matters is less what people possess than the use to which they can
put their possessions. Because most deprivation is temporary (Leisering
and Leibfried, 1999), what people need are non-material rather than
simply material resources, such as income. Society consists of strata that
are in a dynamic state of flux, with considerable individual mobility both
up and down, rather than the rigid class hierarchies imagined by social-
ists and traditional social science. This necessitates an emphasis upon
education, skills, training and retraining. The welfare state should be
based upon ‘active welfare’, or provision that emphasises insertion into
the labour market, rather than a ‘passive welfare’ that pays people to be
idle.
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Reciprocity
Similarly, whereas the Old Left based its ideas upon the social rights of
citizenship and interpreted entitlements to welfare as unconditional
(Plant, 1998), the NSD regards obligations as equally important. This does
not mean abandoning the category of social rights, as the New Right
advocated (Plant, 1993), but it does mean being clearer and firmer about
attaching rights to responsibilities (Roche, 1992). This reciprocity mirrors
the social interdependency that is expressed in the principle of commu-
nity, since those who derive the benefits of belonging to a community
have an obligation to contribute to the production of those benefits
(White, 1999). Those who refuse to do so are ‘free-riders’, i.e. they accept
the benefits but do not shoulder the corresponding burdens. Social mem-
bership therefore implies a combination of benefits and burdens and so a
reciprocity of rights and responsibilities. It is a third way between a
society consisting entirely of rights-holders or one consisting entirely of
duty-holders, neither of which offers an adequate basis for social justice
and progress.
This principle also provides support for active welfare. Benefits should
be provided conditionally rather than unconditionally, based upon a will-
ingness to work, train, job search, learn or perform some other valuable
social contribution. Indeed, Tony Blair has referred to community as the
product of opportunity in combination with responsibility (Levitas, 2000:
191). New Labour has gone as far as claiming that rights do not exist
outside of the reciprocal relationships that are said to give them meaning:
no rights without responsibilities (Giddens, 1998: 65). However, this 
reciprocity must consistently apply to all sectors of society, not only those
at the bottom but those at the top. And responsible citizenship implies 
not only ‘negative’ actions (e.g. not dropping litter) and legalistic actions
(e.g. paying your taxes), but also ‘positive’, civic actions (helpful inter-
ventions). Hence, New Labour’s encouragement of civic virtues such as
civility, neighbourliness, charity and volunteering.
Inclusion
The Left has tended to treat exclusion from the social mainstream as a
threshold of income: those below a given income line being defined as
excluded. This is taken to be too simplistic, as there may well be some
above the line who are excluded (pensioners and disabled people) and
some below it who are not (students and academics). In short, whereas
‘poverty’ refers to the static measurements of income distribution, exclu-
sion is a far more qualitative term, capturing the dynamic, subjective and
life-chances aspect of social membership (Oppenheim, 1998). It enables us
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to recognise the fracturing of public space and social norms due both to
exclusion at the top, manifested most obviously in gated communities,
and at the bottom as a result of welfare dependency. It follows that poli-
cies of social inclusion must involve much more than a redistribution of
income, since this may only exacerbate the voluntary exclusion of both the
affluent and the workshy. The objective should not be equality per se, but
the inclusion of all in a new public space, through which common endea-
vours can be pursued and shared citizenship expressed (Dahrendorf,
1995; Giddens, 1998: 101–11).
To create this space we need to reconnect people to each other through
a series of investment strategies (Mulgan, 1998). The labour market is of
key importance and people must be equipped with the transferable skills
and qualifications that are needed to thrive in the world of work. Through
work people derive not only an income, but also self-esteem, social con-
tacts, civic connectedness and ontological stability. However, free markets
alone cannot achieve this. The state must ensure that work pays, by
requiring employers to pay a minimum wage and by supplementing
wages with in-work benefits or tax credits. Investment in potential rather
than compensation for failure (passive welfare) should be the priority.
Additionally, inclusion must not override the virtues of diversity and 
pluralism: communities should be empowered to take control of their 
fate based upon a knowledge of their local circumstances and needs.
Pragmatism
Pragmatism is not something that counter-balances the above principles,
it is itself a principle which eschews dogma (of Left and Right) in favour
of evidence, verification and realism (Taylor-Gooby, 2000). Pragmatism
allows government to be flexible, testing what does and does not work
and changing accordingly, to adapt to alterations in society and the
economy (particularly important in a global environment) and to combine
the best features from a range of political ideas. Pragmatism is suited to
a post-ideological age where we recognise that there is no perfect social
model. Yet pragmatism is not necessarily a form of conservatism, but that
which can be made to serve an ambitious and radical agenda.
This means that once we have chosen our goals, e.g. reinvestment in
the public sector, we should not be inflexible about the means of deliver-
ing them (IPPR, 2001). Public goals require more than public means of
delivery and it may well be that private companies and voluntary or-
ganisations are equally capable. This kind of pluralism ensures that the
dangers of vested interests monopolising the public sector are avoided
and that public, private and voluntary agencies can learn from one
another. Ultimately, political pragmatism simply reflects the pragmatism
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of ordinary people who are interested in ‘outcomes’ and do not much 
care about how the outcome is delivered. ‘What works’ must be the 
watchword and to automatically favour either the state over the market,
or vice versa, is to prefer ideals to facts. But pragmatism is not only 
about the consumption of services, it is also that which favours a 
grassroots, bottom-up approach to social reform. Pragmatism allows
people to make mistakes and learn from them. It is the learning which is
important and not the imposition of a ‘one size fits all’ approach to social
reorganisation.
In short, the NSD styles itself as a politics of the radical Centre that
applies the principles of community, meritocracy, reciprocity, inclusion
and pragmatism to a social environment shaped by conservative policies
in an attempt to restructure society according to the social democratic
belief in justice and opportunity for all within a humane form of capital-
ism. Is this the definition of the NSD with which we should be content or
might the key objections to NSD arguments throw a different light on the
matter?
Objections
What follows are the main criticisms of the NSD and New Labour, in
response to the above principles and arguments, some of which we will
return to over the course of the next few chapters. Note that these objec-
tions do not reject the above principles per se, merely what some see as
their conservative content.
• Community only offers a middle way between collectivism/egalitar-
ianism and individualism if these social philosophies are caricatured
and simplified. Unless we recognise conflicts over its meaning and
application, community is a vague concept that easily lends itself to
romanticised visions of home, family and nation, perhaps explaining
New Labour’s uneasy relationship with feminism (McRobbie, 2000;
Franklin, 2000) and environmentalism (see Chapter 6).
• Because it is ultimately intended to be compatible with global capi-
talism, New Labour’s communitarianism tends to be authoritarian
and moralistic rather than truly reflexive and heterogenous (Driver
and Martell, 1997). Its commitment to pluralism is correspondingly
shallow: excluding, a priori, calls for a more radical pluralism through
the redistribution of wealth and ownership.
• Meritocracy is too weak a principle (Young, 1958). Genuine equality
requires the removal of the structures that distribute power, wealth
and capital unevenly. To graft a few ‘meritocratic’ policies onto a class
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society means that (1) existing structural inequalities are justified,
because inequalities are now wrongly held to result from individual
efforts, and (2) those at the social bottom are held responsible for their
disadvantages because they obviously did not make proper use of the
opportunities provided for them.
• Equality of opportunity is meaningless without some equalisation of
outcomes, otherwise the former ossifies into the very system of un-
deserved advantage and disadvantage that it is meant to correct.
‘Outcome equality’ requires not just social protection (Giddens, 2002a:
39–40), but a substantial redistribution of material and cultural
resources. Just distribution is not only a zero sum game, but it does
depend upon some degree of redistribution from those with to those
without.
• The distinction between active and passive welfare is spurious (Lister,
2001a). Welfare has always been ‘active’ in that there has always been
some expectation that benefit claimants will work, hence the princi-
ple of social insurance. The distinction has become popular to dis-
guise the fact that what is now called active welfare is little more than
a synonym for workfare policies that often coerce and punish the
victim. Economic efficacy is now supposedly gained by reforming the
worker rather than reforming the market.
• The idea that the Old Left ignored the importance of duties is another
caricature (Deacon, 2000: 15). In fact, the NSD merely updates the
principle of ‘less eligibility’ to which state welfare has always sub-
scribed, both pre- and post-Beveridge. What traditional social democ-
rats recognised, unlike New Labour, was the duty of the state to
structure the job market. And at its worst what New Labour has done
is to decentralise responsibility while centralising power upon those who
already hold it.
• Responsibility is far more complex than new social democrats
imagine. For instance, it might be said that duties correlate to powers
rather than to rights per se (see Chapter 2), so that a real ethic of social
responsibility necessitates a far greater redistribution of power than
that envisaged by the NSD. By ignoring this point, New Labour might
also be accused of decentralising responsibility but of centralising
power even where they have attempted to be most radical, e.g. devo-
lution. Therefore, this is yet another emphasis that attempts to legiti-
mate existing inequalities.
• Reciprocity, too, is much more complex. There are general and par-
ticular forms of reciprocity, as well as short-term and long-term ver-
sions. There are rights that do not correspond to duties and duties
that do not correspond to rights. We might claim that because rights
are fundamental to human welfare, they do give rise to unconditional
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entitlements to those goods without which a minimal level of well-
being cannot be maintained. Additionally, it could even be claimed
that the NSD does not take responsibility seriously enough 
(Fitzpatrick, 2001b, 2001c) – see Chapters 2 and 7.
• New Labour has been extremely inconsistent in applying the prin-
ciple of reciprocity. For instance, it has required claimants to jump
through a number of hoops in order to qualify for state benefits, estab-
lishing continuity with the previous Conservative administrations,
often justifying this as a means of empowerment (‘by forcing people
into employment they will benefit in the long run’). However, it has
imposed few responsibilities upon affluent households or powerful
corporations and individuals.
• Equality cannot be redefined as inclusion without betraying the essen-
tial aims of distributive justice (Levitas, 1998: Chs 7–8). Exclusion may
imply more than the lack of an income, but possessing a decent
income is the sine qua non of effective social participation. To ignore
this is to substitute selectivist policies for redistributive ones. It con-
demns many on low incomes to a revolving door of retraining, low-
waged work, retraining . . . ad infinitum. This misidentifies the source
of social exclusion and the social problems that are thereby generated
and, by imagining that large degrees of income inequality are com-
patible with social inclusion, favours only a weak form of inclusion.
• The NSD incorporates conservative conceptions of dependency in
three senses. First, it fetishises market forms of independence. Second,
it treats dependency upon the state as the main problem. This misses
other forms of dependency that may be equally damaging, e.g. upon
the labour market and upon the family. Third, it identifies the welfare
state as the essential problem rather than the welfare state’s market
environment. The NSD’s solution is then to make the benefit system
more selectivist and conditional in order to adapt it to the very flexi-
ble and polarised labour market which is the real origin of most social
problems.
• Social participation is equated with participation in employment,
neglecting the informal sector and the unpaid forms of work that lie
outside the wage contract and so marginalising the contribution that
domestic labour (still predominantly performed by women) makes to
national and global wealth.
• Without reference to robust principles and ideals, pragmatism is
nothing more than a dissimulated form of conservatism. Pragmatism
has an ideological force depending upon the political context within
which it is applied and whether that context is being accepted or chal-
lenged. Pragmatism is the ideology that dare not speak its name. In
New Labour’s case, deciding ‘what works’ has involved introducing
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private sector ethics and practices into the public sector while there
has been little hint of introducing the public into the private.
• The idea that what is important is output rather than the means of
delivering the output rests upon a spurious distinction between ends
and means: as if the nature of the latter does not affect that of the
former. In reality, the means determine the ends (Leys, 2001: Ch. 4).
Introducing private provision into public services subtly alters the
nature of the latter by introducing commercial, competitive and
profit-oriented values and standards into the public sphere. This may
or may not be desirable, but the issue of whether it is cannot be side-
stepped through a ‘common sense’ appeal to pragmatism.
If these objections are fair – and we will return to some of them
throughout Part I – then we need to redefine the NSD. The NSD is indeed
a politics of the radical Centre, but a Centre that has been hegemonised
by the Right and from which the NSD is reluctant to escape. The essen-
tial criticism of the NSD is therefore this.
Post-war social democracy achieved an equilibrium of accumulation
and legitimation: the capitalist market provided the finance for welfare
services which, in turn, provided this form of ‘welfare capitalism’ with
justification and validation (O’Connor, 1973; Habermas, 1975). By the
1970s this equilibrium had become increasingly unstable: it was claimed
by both Left and Right that private markets had reached the limits of their
social potential and that the state could no longer guarantee social and
cultural stability. The proposed solutions were different, however. Accord-
ing to the Left, if private systems of accumulation were exhausted, then
it would be necessary to find non-private forms, to socialise the means of
accumulation by taking more of the economy into public ownership.
According to the Right, if the state could not guarantee legitimacy, then
it would be necessary to privatise the means of legitimation, of loyalty.
With the inability of social democratic governments to reconcile this dis-
equilibrium, the blame for economic turmoil was placed upon the Left
and so the solutions of the political Right prevailed. The effect was the
increasing use of markets, quasi-markets and private forms of investment,
priority given to low inflation rather than full employment, privatisation
and increased inequality.
But the conservative agenda dealt not only with economics, but also
with morals and social expectations. People were taught to expect less
from each other. Social relations were individualised and structured as
forms of contractual exchange; social disadvantage was pathologised and
treated as a source of menace and risk. Oppositional voices were defeated,
silenced, harried and overworked. The public sector was infused with
market-like reforms: league tables, centralisation, competition, standard-
TZP1  4/25/2005  4:49 PM  Page 24
isation, auditing, bureaucratisation, remote control managerialism, per-
petual reviews and reforms (Clarke et al., 2000), as well as diversionary
criticism and demoralisation. The result has been a privatisation not 
only of the economy, but of culture and discourse, the means of self-
description, the inner economies of the self.
It is this privatisation of legitimation, in both its economic and cultural
forms, that the NSD perpetuates. Whereas post-war social democracy
sought the social control of the economic, the NSD seeks the economic
control of society, helping the radical Right to reverse the political flow so
that the outer circuit of Figure 1.1 predominates over the inner. The NSD
‘reverses the political circuit’. The defeat of ‘old social democracy’ and the
conservatisation of the Centre has now been promoted by the social
democratisation of the Right’s hegemony. To put it simply, society is
reshaped by the above Centre-Left principles to fit the imperatives of the
free market. The NSD’s emphasis is certainly different and more pro-
gressive, but the consequence is the same: the desocialisation of society.
To repeat: the NSD is not equivalent to conservatism, but is an effective
conduit for it, an unwitting accomplice or useful idiot.
The case against New Labour and the NSD has been stated bluntly and
so the task now is to justify it, not by substantiating each and every aspect
of the above objections, but by concentrating upon those that are most
useful to the book’s aim and to the argument of Part II. In Chapter 2 we
examine the NSD in terms of justice and citizenship, Chapter 3 deals with
the state and the information society, while Chapter 4 furthers our under-
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standing of the NSD by looking beyond New Labour to social democracy
across Europe. But before we can initiate those discussions, we have to
establish the basic case: that the NSD represents the conservatisation of
the Centre and the social democratisation of conservatism, rather than
anything more progressive.
The age of mainstreams
This basic case is established by looking at how and why the NSD con-
ceives of politics and political struggle.
In the introductory chapter, I complained about those who simplified
the history of social democracy. This simplification is performed by those
who wish to distance themselves from the very tradition upon which they
continue to draw and one consequence of this is that what they defend
also ends up being simplified. Take the approach of Tony Giddens, for
example. Giddens repeatedly succumbs to the temptation to homogenise
his social democratic predecessors and peers. He ignores the extent to
which the ‘old’ social democracy was already a complex negotiation be-
tween competing principles, though one that did not treat pragmatism as
an end in itself (Callaghan, 2000; Pierson, 2001), and he overestimates the
flexibility and reflexivity of the NSD. This overestimation is easily
explained. New social democrats set out to collapse the conceptual and
discursive distinctions between Left and Right, public and private, etc.,
but in so doing they have to elide the very real divisions, associations and
identities which continue to exist and from which those distinctions
derive their salience (Clift, 2001). Because new social democrats adopt the
vocabulary of consensus they imagine that the reality of consensus must
follow automatically (Fairclough, 1999). The NSD is therefore far more
flexible and reflexive at the level of language than it has proved to be in
practice. Indeed, it is far less flexible and reflexive than the old social
democracy which, by recognising the structural depth of divisions such
as class, is more able to effect a politics of reconciliation where consensus
is (however imperfectly) built upon and through a recognition of endur-
ing social conflict. By valuing the harmonies of big-tent politics, the NSD’s
version of consensus is quite shallow and, at worst, helps to mask the
power of corporate capitalism (Callinicos, 2001). In fact, because social
harmony has not followed the harmonies they construct within discourse,
new social democrats frequently adopt a patronising attitude towards
those who disagree with them, distinguishing sharply between allies,
those whose ‘therapy’ is not yet complete and those who are allegedly
‘incurable’ (Giddens, 2001: Ch. 2; 2002a: 10–28).
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This explains why the ‘Third Way’ debate was ultimately a non-starter.
By setting up a crude contrast between the Centre and what they took 
to be either the far Left or Right, Third Wayers have neglected the sim-
ple fact that there are multiple Centres and many different forms of 
social democracy (see Chapter 4). Giddens (2000: 31; 2001: 3) briefly con-
siders this possibility only to reject it – since accepting it might imply that
the old social democracy is not so redundant after all – by ultimately ap-
pealing to a deus ex machina that supposedly reinforces the superiority of
Third Way politics: the advent of globalisation and information society as
that which allegedly renders all other strategies obsolete (Giddens and
Hutton, 2000: 45–51). As noted in the introduction, the NSD therefore
appeals to a TINA logic (‘There Is No Alternative’) which represents the
intolerant closure of the social imagination, what I have elsewhere called
the ‘extremist Centre’ (Fitzpatrick, 2002a), in stark contrast to the pio-
neering self-image that it likes to project.
If, then, the NSD simplifies both itself and its predecessors, and if 
it overlooks the extent to which there are multiple Centres and multi-
ple forms of social democracy, why is this and what are the potential
implications?
In essence, the NSD bases itself upon a limited theory of politics and
political struggle, the strategy of which is to search for a unified coalition
that will support a pragmatic instrumentalism where politics is about effi-
cient management and ‘what works’. Mouffe (2000: Ch. 5) characterises
this approach as politics without adversity, the avoidance of enemy making
in the belief that social partnership requires the absence of antagonism.
In truth, new social democrats are perfectly willing to make enemies of
those they consider to be ideologists, though because theirs has been a
journey towards the political Right the ideologists have been identified
more on the Left, i.e. in the gap left behind. Yet this kind of enemy making
is inadequate because it ignores Mouffe’s point that liberal democracy
depends upon creative disagreement, not pluralism for its own sake, but
one that drives a mutual learning process across the social and political
fields. This notion of creative dissent is important not only for liberal
democracy, which is otherwise emptied of the resources it needs to con-
stantly renew itself, but for those who wish to bend liberal democracy in
the direction of their favoured principles and values. Social democrats lost
the initiative in the 1970s, not because they failed to adapt to the new real-
ities of market capitalism, but because they treated those ‘realities’ as
inevitable and failed to reconfigure social democracy across a broader
spectrum of movements, organisations and alliances that pull away from
the reductive logic of free market capitalism (see Chapter 9). So far 
from representing a break with the past, the NSD replicates the worst 
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features of the old (Krieger, 1999: 170–1): a politics that yearns for the 
non-political.
So pluralism must not only be ‘external’ but ‘internal’, not only dis-
agreement with political enemies, but also a constant search with friends
for new forms of political friendship: a reflexive pluralism. What is objec-
tionable about the NSD is not its alliance with Centrist politics – after the
discrediting of centralised communism a retreat to the Centre was natural
and inevitable – but its insistence that the meaning and implications of
‘the Centre’ are inevitably fixed around conservative configurations. Yet
if politics must imply reflexive pluralism then there is no such thing as
‘the Centre’, since this is always subject to the flux of negotiation and con-
testation. This is not just the simple and obvious observation that ‘the
Centre’ means different things in different countries, e.g. the Swedish
Centre is still highly redistributive, whereas the American Centre eschews
income equality; it is the point that even within particular political com-
munities the Centre is a fractured alliance of forces that push and pull in
opposing ideological directions. The Centre, then, is everywhere a multi-
plicity of ‘Centres’ and the agenda promoted by the NSD (where politics
is reduced to managerial efficiency) is not determined for us, but is only
one of many on offer. The NSD is the ideological attempt to colonise the
space of social democracy once and for all and to banish those versions
of Centre-Left politics that point us away from conservative capitalism.
Therefore, the definition of politics and struggle advanced by the NSD
is very one-sided. Its vision of political struggle is the surmounting of dis-
sensus so that we can all sit around a table and agree on how to run the
trains: struggle is a journey towards a closure, a final consensus. By con-
trast, a politics of reflexive pluralism regards struggle as a paradoxical,
never-ending loop of ‘enclosure’ and ‘disclosure’. Enclosure implies the
closing of social forms around one aspect of the social field; disclosure
implies the breaking open of social enclosure by devising new descrip-
tions, practices and alliances. Strategic disclosures then lead towards new
forms of enclosure that, in turn, also require breaking open. So enclosure
and disclosure are always interdependent and relative to one another:
without disclosure, enclosure engenders social totalities (and eventually
totalitarianism); without enclosure, disclosure is aimless, ineffective and
chimerical. This distinction therefore cuts across the ideological spectrum:
there are both Left and Right versions of enclosure and disclosure. But in
our present conjuncture, after the reforms of the last quarter century, what
we face is a Right-wing closure.
Therefore, the case against the NSD is that by either not recognising
this at all or, at best, underestimating it the NSD not only fails to ‘disclose’
conservatism, but goes some way towards consolidating the conservative
enclosure (Hutton, 2002). Through the conservatisation of the Centre and
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the social democratisation of the Right, the NSD conjures a totalitarian-
ism of the mainstream.
We have received our first hint of why I refer to this as the age of main-
streams. Mainstreaming signifies the contemporary closure of social cog-
nition, value and action around conservatism. But because this process is
less visible in some countries than in others, a politics of the mainstream
may also offer the potential for reopening the social field. In order to un-
pack this idea, and suggest what ‘reopening’ might imply, I have to say a
bit more about political struggle.
I want to outline a theory of ‘open hegemony’, a notion of political
struggle that derives from liberal, Marxist and post-structuralist perspec-
tives on society, without being reducible to any one of them. The two key
figures in this respect are Karl Popper and Antonio Gramsci.
Popper (1945) argued that only open societies could secure freedom
and peace within the post-war world. For a society to be open, it must
contain institutions and cultures that permit and encourage the scrutiny
and criticism of leaders and the structures which lend them their author-
ity. This requires an educated, liberal, free-thinking citizenry that does not
allow closed hierarchies of power to be imposed upon the social order.
Struggle is always the struggle of openness against closure.
Popper’s argument is a simple yet ingenious redescription of liberal
tenets. Its strength, though, is also a debilitating weakness, since even at
a basic level there are many different versions of liberalism and, by impli-
cation, different versions of the open society. By not following through
this line of thought, and by rejecting Marxism upon spurious grounds
(Hollis, 1994: 71–7), Popper invites the support of simplistic apologias and
defenders. In particular, by regarding the state as the principal source of
closure, Popper repeats the tendency of classic liberals to either overlook
the dangers of market monopolies or even to prefer market domination
as a barricade against statism (Hayek, 1982). Therefore, if the concept of
openness is to be useful, then it must receive a treatment more sophisti-
cated than that which Popper himself is willing to provide.
Gramsci’s (1971) theory of hegemony is equally well known, denoting
a form of domination effected either through the voluntary or forced
consent of those dominated. This consent is secured because the 
dominant are able to project their particular interests, values and inter-
pretations of the social world as common sense, as a neutral reflection of
reality that is universally applicable. Such hegemony then allows the
dominant to remake the world in their image, to confirm the universality
of their worldview through a self-fulfilling reconstruction of society. 
To resist hegemonic dominance therefore requires counter-hegemonic
strategies on the part of the dominated. Marxists should concern them-
selves not only with revolutionising the economic base, but also with
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hegemonic struggle within civil society; indeed, the latter is a condition
of the former.
Like Popper, Gramsci’s vision of society lends itself to simplification.
If the overwhelming organising principle of society is a conflict between
capital/bourgeoisie and labour/proletariat, then Gramsci’s interpretation
of political struggle holds water. Yet if this conflict, however important,
is just one of many, some of which intersect the capital/labour division
and some of which do not, then hegemonic resistance becomes a much
more complicated affair. This was the fundamental point made by Laclau
and Mouffe (1985). If ‘the social’ is not reducible to an essential logic, then
hegemony is no longer polarised along a class dimension, but is dispersed
along manifold dimensions of identity and affiliation. Resisting oppres-
sion therefore requires a complex sociocultural critique that recognises the
salience of non-class forms of domination. All struggle is profoundly
political, since the political is not merely a set of representative mecha-
nisms (liberalism) nor simply a reflection of economic dominance
(Marxism).
Nevertheless, if this post-Marxist revision of Gramsci is persuasive, less
persuasive is the post-structuralist alternative. As I will argue again in
Chapter 9, by abandoning all reference to extra-contextual spaces, i.e. tra-
ditionless standards that enable us to judge traditions, post-structuralists
leave themselves in something of a social vacuum. Take their response to
those critical theorists such as Habermas who dare to imagine that they
have theorised at least the outlines of the extra-contextual standards that
post-structuralists deny exist. In rejecting such claims post-structuralists
are neither able to deliver the knock-out blow that would dispel critical
theory once and for all – since this strategy would undermine the ago-
nistic pluralism that they support – but neither can they propose a rap-
prochement with critical theory, given the incommensurability of its
premises.
We seem to be left in an impasse. A simple conception of the open
society would be one populated only by free-market conservatives; and
though a more complex reading of social openness might lead us towards
the concept of hegemony this too is vulnerable to a simplistic appropria-
tion. Yet how to devise more complex readings without falling into the
traps that ensnared post-structuralists?
My solution is to propose a theory of open hegemony that captures 
the paradox of reflexive pluralism that has just been discussed. For politi-
cal struggle redefined as an open hegemony, the ideal is neither openness
nor utopia, but an oscillation that arcs elliptically between the 
two. The liberal ideal is admirable, but neglects the fact that attempts to
curve the social grid around particular imperatives are inevitable and
desirable: inevitable, because the grid’s contours are already shaped by
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multiple gravities of power; desirable, because if an open society’s only
rationale was to maintain its openness then it would quickly lose legiti-
macy in the eyes of its citizens (something that has arguably been hap-
pening in our ‘post-ideological age’). Therefore, openness is not the static
property imagined by liberals, a redoubt against closure, but a perpetual
fluctuation away from and towards itself.
Yet equally the horizon of openness must never be lost sight of. If 
the grid is allowed to curve totally around any one gravitational force,
then it collapses in on itself, imploding into a totalitarian finality. There-
fore hegemonisation must allows carry an alterior logic within itself, 
must never seek its own end. To repeat the point made in Fitzpatrick
(2001a: 199), it is as dangerous to arrive at utopia as it is to avoid its call
and utopianism must be a journey which avoids its own destination. 
Political struggle is therefore antimonious. It is the maintenance of a loop
of enclosure/disclosure within which ideological principles and ideals,
far from being abandoned, are activated. For as the loop circulates again
and again, the aim is to approximate society more and more to one’s
vision of the good, to drag the Centre towards yourself. But this requires
not a postmodernist celebration of difference-for-the-sake-of-difference,
but the willingness to prioritise some struggles above others based upon
a reading of the contemporary conjuncture (see Chapter 6).
Against this interpretation of society and political struggle the concep-
tions of the NSD appear naive, constantly invoking the tyranny of three:
once we had the statist egalitarianism of the Old Left which, because it
failed, gave way to the New Right’s market libertarianism that wrecked
society and so led electorates back towards social democracy, albeit one
that must adapt to new social realities. On this reading, the ‘reopening’
of society is already underway due to the NSD’s ability to synthesise what
were traditionally considered to be opposites and apply this lesson to
social and economic developments. However, on my reading, the NSD is
wrong on two counts: wrong about counter-hegemonisation and wrong
in its cartographic reading of where we are.
According to the NSD, it has successfully turned society away from
conservatism by accepting the reality (and often the desirability) of its
reforms, but redirecting the resulting environment towards the goals of
social inclusion and communal responsibility. Counter-hegemonisation
therefore implies that in order to defeat your opponents you have to wear
some of their clothes. At the beginning of the new century we are now
travelling from welfare to social investment states, having been briefly
diverted towards the libertarian market. But according to the above
theory of open hegemony, counter-hegemonisation requires a degree of
reflexive pluralism that new social democrats, in their determination to
crowd out alternative social democratic traditions and possibilities, have
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not come close to demonstrating. Counter-hegemonisation also needs a
willingness to contrast what your opponents say with what they do. But
by accepting much of what the radical Right has said and done, this con-
trast has been muted at best. New social democrats have played the game
without trying to change many of the rules. For instance, it has appealed
to a particular aspect of middle-class identity, the desire for security, but
without a critique of privatisation and marketisation that would enable
the goal of security to be redefined and allow other more progressive and
cooperative aspects of middle-class identity to emerge and mobilise with
other social groupings. Consequently, the NSD retains not only the eco-
nomics of the Right, but also its moral authoritarianism and intolerance
for dissent.
The NSD therefore confuses political struggle with electoral expedi-
ency: it assembles constituencies upon a middle ground that, having been
shaped by the Right, is now held to be immutable. Its electoral successes
have been impressive, but have not generated any long-term visions of
social emancipation other than a process of permanent modernisation, or
adaptation to social changes that are somehow held to evade political
control. So the mainstream, the opposite of extremism that nevertheless
replicates its exclusionary logic, its closure of social possibility, becomes
the only acceptable reference point. The tyranny is internal, a dictatorship
of the Centre reconfigured around the Right’s conservatism.
Yet as we shall see throughout this book the social grid has not
imploded entirely and oppositional voices have refused to be silenced.
The mainstream can also become a site of renaissance and renewal since
the values which are strong enough to keep us tethered to the authori-
tarian market must also be strong enough to loosen the grip. The freedom
which mutilates itself in the desire for more security, more consumption,
more competition, is also a freedom that can recognise alternative forms
of social life, can recognise because such recognition has been clearer in
the past, articulated by forms of social democracy that continue to survive
(see Chapter 4). Therefore, although we are not locked within the exist-
ing mainstream we must think from within and through it if we are to
spy the political spaces that lie beyond. This is why I base my philo-
sophical alternative upon social democratic traditions, though not the
NSD which seeks to enclose those traditions around conservative silences.
Conclusion
To summarise: the NSD represents the conservatisation of the political
Centre and the social democratisation of conservatism. While not equat-
ing to conservatism, it does represent the hegemonisation of the Right
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rather than a counter-hegemonisation to the Right. However, the main-
stream is not necessarily closed around a conservative agenda, as there
are potentially multiple versions of the political Centre and social democ-
racy on offer. And although NSD purists want us to believe that all nations
will travel down the road pioneered by Britain and America, this is by no
means inevitable.
As such, I contend that the NSD is not a new politics, but is at best the
first steps on a long march back towards truly progressive ideals, one from
which valuable lessons can be learned, if only about how not to proceed.
My argument in Part I is that ‘old’ social democratic traditions are far from
exhausted and that the kind of principles outlined earlier can be genuinely
reconfigured away from conservatism. Therefore, the disclosure of the
social field does not mean abandoning social democracy, but does mean
radicalising it in ways that the NSD has not begun to imagine.
Notes
1 Though his initial enthusiasm was for the term ‘Third Way’, one that makes
occasional appearances in this book, he subsequently tempered this enthusiasm.
2 I am not going to make much reference to the ‘Third Way’ for reasons that will
become clear later.
3 In short, the UK will be our main point of reference, but note that Chapter 3
will make some reference to America.
4 This risks upsetting those social, one-nation conservatives and Christian
Democrats for whom the term bears different implications. However, this is a
tradition of thought that makes few appearances in this book and so I feel able
to appropriate the term. I am not going to offer a critique of conservatism
directly though it is possible to infer such a critique from my analysis of the
NSD.
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2Justice and citizenship
Chapter 1 concluded by arguing that the NSD is not a counter-hegemonic
strategy, because its notions of politics and political struggle are inade-
quate. Here we begin to examine some of the objections raised there in
more depth. As noted already, our task is not to offer a comprehensive
critique of the NSD, merely to investigate those features which most
enable alternatives to the NSD to be imagined. In this chapter, we 
concentrate upon the principle of reciprocity, and associated terms 
such as rights and responsibilities. Effectively, my argument will be 
that if we are to be genuinely concerned with reciprocity and responsi-
bility then we must attach them to a theory of egalitarian justice that I will
term ‘equality of powers’. What the NSD conveniently ignores is that if
egalitarian justice really is defunct, then not only does this eliminate
radical alternatives to conservatism, it also gives us very little reason 
to support reciprocity, responsibility, etc., thus undermining the NSD
itself. The case is established by reviewing two concepts in turn: justice
and citizenship.
Justice
As a working definition let us define justice as ‘the fair distribution of 
benefits and burdens’. Let us also assume that the meaning of ‘benefit’
and ‘burden’ is relatively unproblematic. In making this assumption I cer-
tainly do not want to underplay the contestability of these terms. For if
their meaning is determined by social norms, i.e. the shared understand-
ings of social members, then it is not difficult to see why our ideas of what
is and is not a benefit have developed with the development of social
norms. Nevertheless, for the sake of space I want to concentrate upon the
more controversial aspect of the above definition, that of fair distribution.
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There are essentially seven theories of justice offering an answer to 
this question (cf. Barry, 1989, 1995): justice as equality, as reciprocity, as 
procedure, as virtue, as restoration, as retribution and as differential inclu-
sion. Again, for reasons of space I am not going to deal with all of these
but instead concentrate upon those that have dominated the debate during
recent years: egalitarian justice, reciprocal justice and procedural justice.
Egalitarian justice
This theory states that justice requires an equality of either resources or
welfare (Dworkin, 2000). Resources may be internal (talents, skills, abil-
ities) or external (income, wealth, opportunities) and resource egalitari-
anism demands that because inequalities in endowments are undeserved,
then some equalisation of external resources is called for. If a resource is
a possession then ‘welfare’ in this context refers to that which our pos-
sessions allow us to achieve. Welfare egalitarianism has therefore received
far less support than resource egalitarianism because an equalisation of
achievement, and of the satisfaction that achievement brings, is widely
held to be both impractical and undesirable. However, some have argued
for an equal opportunities version of welfare egalitarianism (Cohen, 1989;
Arneson, 2000; Roemer, 1998), as will I.
Reciprocal justice
Although any society depends upon forms of mutual cooperation what
is to stop an individual from defecting from their side of the bargain
(Barry, 1995: Ch. 2)? One solution is to instil moral standards so that agents
regard reciprocity as the highest good and are not tempted to defect
(Gibbard, 1991). This implies a strong emphasis upon desert (so that what
you take from the social product is proportional to what you have con-
tributed) and duty (so that your notion of advantage is other-regarding
rather than self-regarding). Reciprocal justice is therefore attractive in an
age where the ethic and practice of egalitarianism have waned. It pre-
serves the ‘socialism’ of egalitarian justice and the ideal of communal
belonging and identity (Selbourne, 1994), yet it also appeals to some
notion of proceduralism (see below) where what is important is common
adherence to just rules rather than the manipulation of outcomes, yet
without the prominence that market libertarians give to entitlement, since
reciprocity preserves the notion of moral desert (cf. Gauthier, 1986).
Procedural justice
Here, the most convincing account remains that of Nozick (1974) who con-
trasts procedural theory with ‘end-state’ theories of justice. Procedural-
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ism is concerned with the means that generate a given pattern of distribu-
tion, rather than with the pattern itself. So if in a series of exchanges each
individual transfer and transaction is just (including the initial acquisition
of resources), i.e. does not violate anyone’s rights, then the outcome of
that series is also just, even if massive inequalities have been created. It is
tempting to assess whether the outcome, the end-state, is or is not just,
but doing so ignores the fact that justice consists in voluntary, harm-
respecting exchanges between free agents where benefits and burdens are
distributed according to entitlement. In short, procedural justice repre-
sents a challenge to all forms of egalitarian, socialist and welfarist ideas
which aim at some ideal of social justice. For since redistribution requires
the taxation of what people have legitimately earned, then taxation is theft
and social justice a specious means of justifying theft.
New social democracy
Which of the above does the NSD come closest to embodying? We can
eliminate procedural justice since the NSD is committed to some form of
social justice that such theories do not permit. The problem with proce-
dural justice is that entitlement cannot bear the weight it is expected to
bear. The means can justify the end only if we ignore the moral arbitrari-
ness (what I will call the ‘undeservingness’) of our endowments and 
say, as Nozick says, that although we may not deserve our talents we are
nevertheless entitled to them (via the principle of self-ownership) and to
the goods that they generate. Nozick therefore builds a theory of ‘justice
as voluntary transaction’ upon involuntary grounds. Taking account of
moral arbitrariness either means that we do not own ourselves in full or
that full self-ownership does not necessarily translate into the full own-
ership of the goods that our endowments partially, but not wholly, create
(Kymlicka, 2002: Ch. 3).
Yet nor does the NSD sit entirely within the egalitarian school of justice.
Buckler (2000) argues that New Labour’s version of redistribution in no
way corresponds to patterned or outcome forms of distributive justice.
Instead, New Labour follows a Rawlsian approach in that what is impor-
tant are the distributive rules inhering in the basic social structure rather
than constant interventions to ensure an end-state egalitarianism. This
then explains why New Labour is committed to equal opportunities,
social markets, education, employment and social inclusion. Although
Buckler’s interpretation of Rawls is occasionally shaky – tending to regard
him as a prototypical Third Wayer – he does show that New Labour’s is
at best a weak egalitarianism (cf. Wissenburg, 2001).
What of reciprocity? More than anyone, Stuart White (1999, 2001) has
established how and why the New Labour project holds to the basic prin-
TZP2  4/25/2005  4:50 PM  Page 36
ciples of reciprocal justice. The essential reason for this lies in New
Labour’s insistence that rights and responsibilities should balance. I want
to examine citizenship in more detail later on, but New Labour’s point is
that because social goods are the product of social cooperation, then those
who share those goods are obligated to make a roughly proportionate con-
tribution to the productive activities of that society or to demonstrate why
they cannot. Hence the doctrine that has constantly informed their welfare
reforms – work for those who can, security for those who cannot – and
the implicit reliance not only upon need (security) but also upon desert:
the proportionality between giving and receiving effected through work.
According to White, reciprocal justice was rooted in the socialist and social
democratic traditions as it articulated not only the collective nature of
industrial modernity, but was also a means of criticising free-market capi-
talism and even capitalism per se. Since those who contributed most 
to the social product (the workers) were held to receive less than those
who contributed the least (the bourgeoisie), then social justice required 
a ‘politics of fair shares’ and so either the substantial reorganisation of
capitalism or its replacement altogether.
But although White is correct to observe that some commitment to both
reciprocity and equality characterises Centre-Left traditions, we must not
forget that the nature of this commitment may alter depending upon how
the following two questions are answered. What is the proper combina-
tion of reciprocity and equality? What is the rationale for our chosen 
combination?
It seems clear that the NSD favours a mixture of weak equality and
strong reciprocity. As indicated in the last chapter and already in this, New
Labour is committed to a weak version of egalitarianism, of equal oppor-
tunities detached from any hint of outcome equality, where the objective
is to arm citizens with the skills and assets that they need to prosper: the
fishing rod rather than the fish. This is not to suggest that the NSD dis-
cards redistributive policies altogether, hence Tony Blair’s pledge to 
eradicate child poverty in the UK by 2019 (Walker, 2000). But this is an
opportunity-based conception of redistribution, where it is believed that
unfair disadvantages can be eliminated with relative ease through various
educational and labour market reforms (hence, New Labour speaks of
unfair advantages much more rarely). What is downplayed is the necessity
of a ‘relativist redistribution’ where the aim is to bring the top and the
bottom closer together. New Labour insists that the most important aim
is to raise the floor without worrying about the height of the ceiling: if the
absolute position of the poorest is improved, then why worry about the
relative position of the non-poor? Thus, a wealth of research and 
scholarship suggesting that equality does matter is largely ignored (e.g.
Wilkinson, 1996; Phillips, 1999), matters because the status of the bottom
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depends upon positional comparisons with the top and deprivation is not
only about what you hold, but where you stand in the scale of holdings
(Hirsch, 1977). So as welcome as Blair’s pledge is, much of the drop in
child poverty may be due to less ambitious measurements than those
applied in the past. Time will tell.1
Further, New Labour lays considerable stress upon reciprocity and
associated concepts such as desert and duty. For the redistribution of
opportunities to be successful, people must take up the opportunities on
offer; they must either want to do so because of incentives, or must be
made to do so through a series of disincentives and deterrents. Mutual
obligations to the community are therefore emphasised without the old
Leftist tendency to confuse communal standards with egalitarian criteria
and without the conservative preference for judging obligations through
the lens of the free market.
Yet this combination of weak equality and strong reciprocity leaves
New Labour vulnerable to a charge of inconsistency and even hypocrisy.
For, as White (1999: 171–3) also goes on to acknowledge, what is impor-
tant is not so much reciprocity as fair reciprocity, where the nature of our
participative obligations depends upon the background conditions that
obtain. Simply put, to enforce an equality of obligation in a social envi-
ronment which is profoundly unequal is to further victimise the casual-
ties of that environment: the least well-off (Rose, 2000). Fair reciprocity
therefore demands two stipulations. First, the state must perform the duty
of guaranteeing socially just background conditions. This may require it
to be the employer of last resort, to ensure that all jobs are well paid and
that no-one is trapped at the margins of the labour market for very long
– duties that appear to be more consistent with the old social democracy
than the new one. Second, unless exclusion at the top is targeted as
strongly and perhaps even more so as exclusion at the bottom, then the
resulting imbalance allows the former to free ride on the deprivations of
the latter.
Now, new social democrats are aware of these arguments and Giddens
(1998: 66), for one, was initially enthusiastic for fair reciprocity. However,
that enthusiasm has declined over time, bringing Giddens (2002a: 40–2)
more into line with New Labour’s policies. Three points explain this
avoidance of fair reciprocity (cf. Wetherly, 2001: 161). First, the pragma-
tism of the NSD demands that social policies are strongly oriented to
expediency and political strategies that adapt to electoral preferences
which are held to be given and substantially unalterable (Heffernan, 2000:
119–38). Therefore, second, the electoral middle ground must be captured
rather than reconfigured, by not alienating those who aspire to more afflu-
ence. The fear is that fair reciprocity would contradict the principle of 
meritocracy. Finally, the retention of unequal patterns of distribution is
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necessary since, otherwise, New Labour would be challenging the 
deregulated capitalism to which it has reconciled itself and from which 
it supposedly derives its appeal. So the New Labour antipathy to fair 
reciprocity is not an error that has yet to be rectified; it is essential to its
identity: what Standing (1999: 317–19) refers to as asymmetrical or ‘unbal-
anced reciprocity’, where the poorest are mandated to join a society from
which many of the affluent continue to abscond.
But if New Labour combines weak equality with strong reciprocity, and
if this combination is undesirable, then does this condemn the NSD per
se? Might more radical forms of NSD successfully combine strong reci-
procity with strong equality also? To begin to answer these questions we
must understand the merits of mixing equality and reciprocity in this way
by examining three recent attempts to do so by White, Miller and Rawls.
The road to surfdom?
Although he believes fair reciprocity demands much more material equal-
ity than New Labour seems willing to countenance, White is insistent that
the latter does not trump the former, since it is still the case that, . . . ‘those
who willingly accept the economic benefits of social cooperation have a
corresponding obligation to make a productive contribution, if so able, to
the cooperative community which provides those benefits’ (White, 1997:
63–4; cf. 2000: 522). So if 1000 people agree to the formation of a public
good (a lighthouse, say) and 100 then contribute nothing to its construc-
tion, this means that they free ride on the benefit-producing efforts of the
900. Therefore equality is not only material, it is also civic and civic egali-
tarianism requires that free riding be kept to a minimum through appro-
priate policies. So, for instance, this is what renders the proposal for an
unconditional Basic Income (BI) unjustifiable (Fitzpatrick, 1999a), though
White (1996) gives BI a qualified support nevertheless, because it may
contain some reciprocity-friendly effects (cf. Elster, 1998).
Miller (1999: 234) argues that need cannot be the only metric of justice.
The earth’s resources are not manna from heaven, and so an equal share
of them cannot be claimed, as resources must be produced and so shares
must be earned: ‘They are not simply waiting to be picked up and used
. . . but have to be appropriated by labor [sic]: the deer must be hunted,
the coal mined’. Social justice therefore requires reference to the princi-
ples of need, desert and equality, depending upon whether the social
sphere in question is, respectively, one of communal solidarity, instru-
mental association or citizenship.
Finally, Rawls (1993: 15–22; 2001: 61–79) affirms that the difference prin-
ciple is a principle of reciprocity, as the distributive implications of the
former depend upon productive activity of which cooperation is the most
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important condition. This does not mean that people can be forced 
into particular kinds of work, since this would violate the principle of
liberty, but it does make distribution dependent upon people contribut-
ing to the good of others by developing and deploying their ‘native
endowments’. So although the distributive pattern of society is deter-
mined on rational and impartial grounds through the original position
(Rawls, 1972), each person’s place within that pattern depends 
not upon their possession of native endowments (since possession is
morally arbitrary and has nothing to do with desert), but upon the use
to which they place their endowments within a fair system of social co-
operation. Rawls (2001: 179) likes to use the example of the person who
chooses to surf all day and so does not share the ‘burdens of social life’.
Is this person one of the ‘least advantaged’? Rawls claims not. If we
include 16 hours of daily leisure time within the index of primary goods,
then we can see how the surfer gains an extra 8 hours of leisure per day
compared to those who do work a standard day. As the surfer has 
chosen 8 hours of leisure rather than the equivalent income from a stan-
dard working day, then he cannot claim membership of the least advan-
taged and must support himself. The difference principle is therefore a
principle of reciprocity.
White, Miller and Rawls all agree that strong equality must be balanced
by strong reciprocity. To ignore this is to unbalance the egalitarian ethic
and invite a society where those who are willingly uncooperative and
non-productive free ride on the cooperative and productive efforts of
others. Do these arguments stand up to scrutiny? If so, then might we
have a firmer moral basis for the NSD? There are three main reasons for
doubting so.
White argues that those who willingly accept the economic benefits of
social cooperation have a corresponding obligation to make a productive
contribution. However, in a society, as opposed to a voluntary association
of some kind, there are economic benefits that we are free to accept and
those that we are not. For instance, we each benefit from having a well-
developed communications and transport infrastructure and short of
hiking into the Scottish Cairngorns to live the rest of our lives in a cave
and feed off the land there is little we could do to opt out of those ben-
efits. So does the experience of involuntary benefits give rise to the same
obligations as the acceptance of voluntary ones? To the best of my knowl-
edge, White does not address this question (cf. White, 1999: 174–6; 2000:
521–2), but if the answer is ‘no’ this might suggest that a more complex
approach to reciprocity is required, one where a certain degree of eco-
nomic autonomy is the precondition of reciprocity, i.e. only when that 
precondition has been satisfied can the concern with obligation and free
riding come into effect. This then resurrects arguments for BI on stronger
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grounds than White (2000: 529) perhaps imagines (Fitzpatrick, 1999a:
64–6; van der Veen, 1998).
Miller argues that we cannot claim an equal share of earth’s resources
because those resources must be appropriated and transformed. But
whereas this may be an argument against equal shares, it is not an argu-
ment against equal minimal shares (Fitzpatrick, 1999a: 58–60). The exist-
ing stock of social assets is the result not only of living labour but also of
natural and economic inheritances. If we assume that natural resources
are subject to common ownership then everyone has a prima facie claim
to a share of those resources (Cohen, 1995: Ch. 3). Although this cannot
be an equal claim, as some will work harder than others to transform this
inheritance into social assets, a minimal claim is not ruled out because it
is nature rather than the labour of others which makes those resources ini-
tially available. What then gives substance to that claim is the idea that
living labour only accounts for a small percentage of the labour which has
transformed natural resources into social assets. It is our economic in-
heritance – dead labour, technological progress, advances in knowledge
– which is mostly responsible for our stock of wealth. If it was our ances-
tors who sunk the coalmine, then although those who mine the coal have
a greater claim than those who do not, this does not eliminate the claim
of the latter for an equivalent minimal share, a BI for instance.
Finally, Rawls alleges that the surfer must support himself because
primary goods include 16 hours of daily leisure time. Yet Rawls pulls this
figure out of the air without explanation and it seems to conveniently treat
labour market activity, i.e. an 8 hour day, as the source of our social 
obligations. But even if we define leisure time as a primary good, there 
is nothing to stop us making the relevant figure more consistent with 
the level of existing social wealth. What if the average working day was
reduced from 8 to, say, 5 hours per day (cf. Gorz, 1989, 1999) and the dif-
ference treated as part of our economic inheritance? Even if the surfer then
chooses to surf for those 5 hours he would still be entitled to the equiva-
lent of 3 hours income (van Parijs, 1995: 96–8). In short, treating the dif-
ference principle as a principle of reciprocity may exclude the surfer from
the category of the least advantaged, but does rule out the desirability of
guaranteeing an unconditional minimal income for all at a level below
that of the least advantaged.
To summarise. White, Miller and Rawls argue against the combination
of weak equality plus strong reciprocity favoured by the NSD. They then
present powerful arguments in favour of combining strong reciprocity
with strong equality, a position more consistent with ‘old’ social democ-
racy – though White (2001) suggests that it might also be consistent with
more radical versions of the NSD than New Labour’s. However, ‘strong
reciprocity’ as they define it seems to contain certain weaknesses and fails
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for instance to exclude the possibility of distributing an unconditional
minimal income to all. If equality therefore has to accommodate some
notion of basic unconditionality, then this begins to take us in a post-
productivist direction, i.e. one where productive activity is merely one of
a series of badges of citizenship. The point of BI is to embody a principle
of ‘more eligibility’; unlike existing benefit systems where the aim is often
to lower benefits to the point where claimants are effectively coerced back
into work (less eligibility), BI stresses the advantages of a range of activ-
ities and lifestyles (Offe, 1993).
So my thesis is that social democracy should be taken in a post-
productivist direction, a combination that I am here terming ‘ecosocial
welfare’. Ecowelfare is based not upon ‘strong equality plus weak reci-
procity’, since the arguments for strong reciprocity remain powerful
(though see the concluding section) (cf. Levine, 1999), but a combination
of strong equality and diverse reciprocity. I return to this point in the
section on citizenship. However, before doing so there are two perspec-
tives on strong equality that we need to examine.
For strong equality to equality of powers
Even if it is strong equality that we favour, does this necessitate a sub-
stantial redistribution of income and wealth or might there be other
‘metrics’ of equality that are more compatible with the NSD? To address
this question let us look at two influential contributions to the debate on
distributive justice: Sen and Walzer.
Sen (1992) has long maintained that justice has to involve more than
the just distribution of goods since a certain package of goods will equip
different people with dissimilar degrees of freedom according to the
varying levels of ability that they possess. The same package will 
bear completely different implications for John, a skilled able-bodied
mechanic, than it will for Jane, a disabled and unemployed mother of two,
because their capacities are different. Therefore to effect just distribution
we should look not simply at goods, but at the relationship between goods
and persons. Because of their differential capacities, people achieve 
different levels of functioning, i.e. what they can do and what they can
be, and so what we must focus upon is a person’s capability to undertake
various functionings, implying not an equality of primary goods 
(Rawls) or of resources (Dworkin), but an equality of capabilities. So what
this entails is a midpoint between primary resources on the one hand 
and the end-state of welfare and achievements on the other: an equal
freedom to achieve. For our purposes Sen is important because he recon-
textualises income and wealth. He does not necessarily downgrade the
importance of a primary resource such as income and wealth, but he does
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insist that ‘income inequality’ is not the same thing as ‘income inade-
quacy’ (Sen, 1992: 109–12) since only the latter captures the idea that dif-
ferent capabilities will convert a low income into differential levels of
well-being.
While accepting the general thrust of Sen’s critique there are never-
theless two objections we can make in order to defend the importance of
primary resources. First, there are the responses to Sen made by Rawls
and Dworkin. Rawls (2001: 168–76) insists that his list of primary goods
is far more flexible than Sen allows and that those both within the ‘normal
range’ of abilities and those below it are already catered for by his theory
of justice. Dworkin (2000: 299–303) similarly argues that his conception of
resources already includes the kind of personal capabilities that, by
placing them in a separate category, tempts Sen to fly too close to the sun
of welfare equality.
The problem with these responses though is that, having reaffirmed the
role of primary resources, they continue to neglect the importance of func-
tionings. Rawls interprets falling below the normal range as a temporary,
contingent affair that requires no more than an ex post readjustment in the
goods being received. But what this does is to elide the deeper link
between goods and persons to which Sen draws attention, for what of
those who will never belong to a ‘normal’ range (Smith, 2001)? Dworkin
meanwhile treats resources and welfare as irreconcilable opposites. Cir-
cumstances shape choice, he acknowledges, but as long as the individual
identifies with the choice in question (though he excludes cravings and
addictions as examples of identification) then we need no more than
resource equality to be both endowment-insensitive and ambition-
sensitive (Dworkin, 2000: 287–99).
Yet if this represents an overestimation of the importance of free choice
in human affairs, as variously maintained by Arneson (1989), Cohen
(1989) and Roemer (1996), then we have a second, more convincing objec-
tion to Sen: focusing upon capabilities is all very well, but unless we
appreciate the extent to which capabilities are themselves shaped by
underlying circumstances then our conception of the person lacks a social
context. And it is not enough, contra Dworkin, for a person to identify
either with their capabilities and their choices, since this may derive from
nothing more than an adjustment to circumstances that the person falsely
perceives as necessary (adapted preferences) and excludes the possibility
of changing those circumstances (Roemer, 1998: 19–20).
What we have, then, is a means of bringing together functionings and
primary resources. What Arneson terms ‘equality of opportunity for
welfare’ and Cohen terms ‘equality of access to advantage’ is essentially
the convergence of three conditions: circumstances, capabilities and
choice. Distributive justice should compensate for that which is beyond
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our control (circumstances and capabilities), but not for that which is
within it (choice). Hence, Sen is correct in drawing attention to capabili-
ties, but the role that involuntary circumstances (natural and social inher-
itances) play in the shaping of capabilities and choices still leaves a major
role for primary resources and so for the substantial redistribution of
income and wealth, if we are to compensate successfully for the moral
arbitrariness of those circumstances. This is not to claim that such com-
pensation involves only income and wealth redistribution, but there is cer-
tainly no reason to believe that it does not involve redistribution at all.
Obviously, it is difficult to judge where circumstances, capabilities and
choice each begin and end (cf. Steiner, 1998). The suspicion that circum-
stances are the key condition of the three certainly needs to be demon-
strated and, even if this suspicion is correct, we still require some
mechanism for guaranteeing bodily integrity if the slippery slope towards
the redistribution of body parts and talents is to be avoided. Such a task
is however beyond the scope of this book. So if primary resources are
more important than Sen imagines, then his equality of capabilities can
be rendered as an ‘equality of powers’, a definition of which follows once
we have taken a brief look at Walzer.
Walzer (1983) is relevant because, like Sen, he also seems to recommend
a recontextualisation of income and wealth that may be more palatable to
the NSD. He asserts that money refers not to the entirety of what we mean
by justice, but simply to one sphere of justice among a number of plural
spheres each of which possesses its own distributive criteria. Therefore,
justice requires not the redistribution of money, but ensuring that market-
based inequalities in the ownership of commodities do not cross the rel-
evant border and infect other spheres of justice, e.g. education and health
care should not be distributed according to ability to pay.
Walzer’s notion of ‘complex equality’ has generated a massive debate
(e.g. Miller and Walzer, 1995), but the enduring problem with it concerns
the suspicion that differential spheres are easier to maintain in thought
than in reality. The objection to massive inequalities in income and wealth
derives not only from a distaste for large inequalities in possessions, but
also for the way in which material inequalities ossify into structural hier-
archies of advantage (including, though not limited to, class). Does Walzer
imagine that class advantages can be limited to the sphere of money? In
which case, he needs to explain in far more detail how class could ever
be so confined, given the experience of human history. Or is he suggest-
ing that complex equality is itself a politics of classlessness? In which case,
he needs to explain how material inequalities can be maintained without
degenerating into relations of dominance (Miller, 1995; Swift, 1995;
Arneson, 1995).
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In short, although he proposes a differentiation of spheres, Walzer does
not break away from the very logic that, in accounts of simple equality,
he otherwise condemns. Indeed, he merely replicates that logic on a
smaller scale. Thus, just as ‘simple egalitarians’ might assume a univer-
sality across all parts of the distributive sphere so Walzer seems to assume
that what is fair in isolation will also be fair globally (Arneson, 2000). But
if this is naive, if fairness and unfairness do not translate across all
domains automatically, whether we are talking about one sphere or many,
then what we require is a universal account of distribution (simplicity)
that is sensitive to local variations in impact (complexity). So whereas
Walzer only miniaturises the universalist logic of simple equality on a
local scale, what we need is a simple equality that incorporates complex
particularism within its universalist frame. Although this is another task
too demanding to be attempted here, we can conclude that complex
equality is implicit within simple equality, rather than being an alterna-
tive to it. If so, then the importance of redistributing primary resources is
again reaffirmed (cf. Jayasuriya, 2000; Prabhakar, 2002).
The intention of this section was to elaborate upon what is meant by
strong equality. If Sen and Walzer are wrong to underestimate the impor-
tance of primary resources like income and wealth, then we have a reason
to side with the contributions to the debate made by Arneson, Cohen and
Roemer. (It also implies that if social democrats are concerned with strong
equality, then they have to make much greater room for income and
wealth redistribution than that permitted by the NSD.) However, in con-
trast to the convoluted terms that they prefer (see above), I propose to
refer to an ‘equality of powers’.
By ‘powers’ I mean the ability to convert endowments into well-being
through choice and ambition. However, if our endowments are unde-
served because they are matters of social and genetic luck, and if they
structure the opportunities to which we have access and through which
we exercise choice, then powers are relational: my powers are not personal
attributes, they are determined by and through the powers of those with
whom I share a socioeconomic environment. If luck in the distribution of
social and natural endowments therefore leads to an undeserved inequal-
ity of powers – and so to relations of social domination – and if egalitar-
ian justice demands the rectification of undeservingness, then what we
require is an equality of powers: the equal opportunity to convert primary
resources into sources of well-being according to one’s capabilities and location
within the distributional sphere. Equality of opportunity therefore implies
the equalisation of primary resources like income and wealth rather than
the kind of weak equality favoured by new social democrats. However,
the conversion of primary resources into well-being is conditioned not
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only by choice, but by the capabilities (Sen) and the complex location
(Walzer) of the individual concerned.
Citizenship
The first component of distributive justice (equality of powers) is now 
in place and ready to be joined by the second: diverse reciprocity. I will
make the case for diverse reciprocity through a critique of the kind of 
‘un-diverse reciprocity’ that New Labour prefers. We will therefore not
explore each and every aspect of diverse reciprocity in depth, though we
will return to one significant aspect of it in Chapter 7. This section will
also be much shorter than the previous one as the basics of my position
should already be clear.
We have already reviewed the main ingredients of New Labour’s
approach to citizenship in Chapter 1. As stakeholders in a series of over-
lapping communities, our primary duty is to participate in cooperative
networks of trust and mutual endeavour. Citizenship is not a passive
status where we are members of society simply by virtue of existing, it is
an active form of contribution where individuals utilise their talents not
only for their own sake, but for the ultimate benefit of all (cf. Ellison, 2000).
Social inclusion is created not through rights and entitlements per se, but
by tying rights to corresponding duties through various incentives, sanc-
tions and moral injunctions. The space of duties centres upon the labour
market and independence within that market is the best means of achiev-
ing citizenship. However, that space does not stop at the borders of the
labour market, as it extends further into civil society and also needs to be
expressed in terms of family, neighbourliness, caring, civic engagement,
law abidingness, charitable donations and voluntary work (Turner, 2001).
In short, reciprocity is at the heart of the NSD conception of citizenship
in contrast to the Old Left’s alleged emphasis upon unconditional pas-
sivity and the selfish consumerism of the New Right. The assertion that
‘rights imply responsibilities’ has been one of the distinguishing features
of New Labour.
Is this correlation vulnerable to the kind of arguments presented earlier
in this chapter: that reciprocity must mean fair reciprocity and that it must
encompass diversity? There are four reasons to suspect so.
First, because it centres so heavily around the labour market, the cor-
relation between rights and duties that New Labour favours takes a con-
tractualist form where reciprocity is conceived almost as a type of market
exchange (Jordan with Jordan, 2000). For if it is wrong to take without
giving, the flip side of this doctrine is that it must be equally wrong to
give without taking. Rights and duties are thereby tied together as forms
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of ‘specific reciprocity’. But what this does is to eclipse and perhaps even
degrade other sorts of reciprocity which are generalised and non-specific.
For instance, if I accept benefits, tax breaks and support services by virtue
of being a parent, specific reciprocity might demand that my parenting
skills be monitored, e.g. through school/home contracts, child curfews
and parental fines, in order to ensure that I am not wasting the assistance
that society provides. By contrast, ‘general reciprocity’ adopts a more
hands-off approach that does not impose top-down obligations at the
point of receipt, but is content to receive the longer-term benefits to society
that my child will provide. New Labour therefore regards entitlements as
an expense that necessitates a corresponding fee if the ledger of citizen-
ship is to be kept permanently balanced. But this cost–benefit approach
ignores the age-old liberal idea that unless certain basic rights are defined
as pre-social, foundational and unconditional, then interference in the lives
of individuals and their associative relations is potentially unlimited. So
the combination of communitarianism and commercialism that New
Labour prefers treats liberal conceptions of citizenship as alien to the
common good, rather than as inhering within it.
And this economistic, contractualist approach also degrades the wider,
civic spaces of social participation. Take the example examined in depth
by Barlow and Duncan (2000a, 2000b). New Labour inherits from con-
servatism the model of homo economicus, where individuals are taken to
act according to a rational assessment of costs and benefits. What this
excludes are other modes of rationality, of moral negotiations that occur
in social contexts which are not quantifiable. One consequence is that
when people make decisions that New Labour considers wrong they do
not interpret this as deriving from alternative and equally legitimate
forms of rationality, but because of (a) inadequate incentives, or (b) the
person in question does not yet have enough information about the avail-
able incentives or (c) more sanctions and compulsion are needed. This
model then exposes the tensions in New Labour’s family policies: they
want citizens to be both good workers and good parents. But how are
these imperatives to be reconciled, especially given the time and effort
that each activity requires? Through the traditional, two-parent family for
which, with some pluralistic nods towards alternative forms of house-
hold, New Labour has habitually expressed a preference. The ambiva-
lence towards lone mothers that New Labour has also repeatedly
demonstrated is then explained because single parents expose the diffi-
culties of said reconciliation. But rather than a substantial reform of the
labour market, New Labour has preferred trying to modify individuals’
decision-making. So their policies towards single mothers have empha-
sised incentives (stressing the benefits of paid work), information (ex-
perts to advise on job search and childcare) and sanctions (compulsory
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interviews intended to surmount the ‘dependency culture’). What New
Labour thereby ignores is the kind of moral decision-making which is
much more sophisticated than its own cost–benefit model and so, per-
versely, it may if anything be undermining the very ethics of citizenship
and communal solidarity that it professes to support but which are actu-
ally nurtured through public services and a welfare professionalism that
effects social participation precisely by not subjecting individuals to a per-
petual audit.
This productivist preference for the ‘employment ethic’ (the citizen as
wage earner) carries over into the second objection to New Labour’s
version of reciprocity: its underestimation of caring. This is not to claim
that Third Wayers ignore the importance of care, but even at the rhetori-
cal level the support offered is often qualified by the insinuation that care
work is not real work. Take, as one example, Glennerster’s (1999: 37)
observation that, ‘Paid work brings dignity and respect. That does not
preclude us from also giving dignity and worth to non-paid work. But to
deny paid work or to encourage people to live without it is to deny a main
source of dignity in our Western capitalist industrialised world’. What this
does is to regard care work as equivalent to involuntary unemployment.
When rhetoric is then translated into practice, the tendency to neglect care
work becomes even more obvious. Although she does not examine the
extent to which a feminist care ethic is ultimately reconcilable with the
NSD, Sevenhuijsen (2000) condemns those such as Giddens for making
simplistic distinctions between ‘self-sufficient workers’ and ‘dependent
others’ since this downgrades alternative norms where citizenship is less
about inclusion or exclusion from the job market and more about the
giving and receiving of care (Fraser, 1997). Lister (2001b: 439) seems to
suggest that this downgrading is almost a form of discrimination since it
misrecognises the talents that unpaid caring involves and so places
women, the main caregivers, at a further disadvantage. Williams (2001)
goes further than Sevenhuijsen in arguing that a political ethic of care does
represent a stark alternative to New Labour and the NSD ethic of employ-
ment. The paradigm shift from the latter to the former involves both
autonomy and time: autonomy needs to be redefined as a form of inter-
dependency rather than economic independence and a feminist ethic also
necessitates a fundamental rebalancing of personal time, care time and
employment time. Finally, Land (2002) finds that New Labour’s empha-
sis upon formal care ignores and undermines the informal sector and
abandons the right to work shorter hours on the grounds that this would
be unfriendly to business and to UK competitiveness.
In short, many researchers insist that New Labour’s espousal of the
employment ethic narrows the accepted range of socially valuable activ-
ity and demoralises other forms of citizenship that do not orbit around
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wage earning, but which are equally valuable, if not more so. My argu-
ment is that this bias is not incidental to New Labour but is expressive of
the NSD’s productivism. By contrast, post-productivism subjects eco-
nomic orthodoxies to a reassessment that, in its proximity to conser-
vatism, is alien to the NSD. We will return to these arguments in Chapters
5 and 6, especially.
Defenders of the NSD may rush to condemn such radicalism as a return
to the bad old days of unconditional and therefore hollow rights and there
is a sense in which their suspicion is correct – though not their condem-
nation. To argue for diverse reciprocity is to argue that rights and respon-
sibilities do not correlate, for the reason to be sketched shortly. Yet even
if we accept the terms of the prevailing discourse, we do not have to
imagine that rights and responsibilities must always carry an equivalent
weighting. What duties does a recently born baby possess? Obviously,
duties are owed to the child, but what is controversial about the ‘rights
imply responsibilities’ mantra is not the philosophic point that the one
must somehow somewhere imply the other – this is no more disputable
than the assertion that ‘up’ must imply ‘down’ – but New Labour’s insis-
tence that they automatically correlate at the level of the individual: that for
every right you possess you also possess a corresponding duty, and vice
versa. This ‘political’ correlation does not follow inevitably from the
‘philosophic’ correlation, but by allowing the latter to slide into the
former, the NSD cuts itself adrift from what I earlier called the age-old
liberal idea that there are certain basic rights foundational to our persons
and freedoms.
Yet at the same time as rooting itself in a liberalism of unconditional
basic rights, diverse reciprocity also suggests that the NSD does not even
take responsibility seriously enough – the third of the four reasons I am
reviewing. For if there are no rights without responsibilities (Giddens,
1998: 65), then given New Labour’s contractualism it presumably follows
that there are no responsibilities without rights, a reverse correlation that
conceals a very broad range of human concern. For instance, it could be
said that we owe obligations to future generations, even though those
generations do not yet exist to claim corresponding rights against us. By
representing a post-productivist form of social democracy, ecowelfare
treats the interests of future generations and the sustainability of distrib-
utive justice through time as being of central importance, in contrast to
the short-term economic orthodoxy of the NSD. The details of the argu-
ment are delayed until Chapter 7, however, when we examine future gen-
erationalism in some depth.
The fourth and final reason for suspecting that the NSD’s version of
reciprocity is inadequate returns us to this business of correlation. The
basic argument is simple and we anticipated it in Chapter 1: it is not rights
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to which responsibilities correlate but powers. I have defined powers as
the ability to convert endowments into well-being and used this to define
an equality of powers. Responsibility is therefore generated in respect of
the voluntary elements of said conversion and not the involuntary ones.
But if it is endowments that structure our opportunities and abilities, if
(in the existing social conjuncture) those endowments are largely matters
of luck and if powers are distributed unequally as a result then the space
of voluntary action, and the corresponding space of responsibility,
expands or contracts depending upon your location within the distribu-
tional hierarchy. This is not to argue for a dutyless form of citizenship,
since only a minority of citizens (the very young, for instance) fail to
possess powers of any sort. However, it is to argue that the frequency and
intensity of responsibilities alters within the distributional hierarchy, i.e.
with the distribution of good and bad fortune in endowments. To put it
bluntly, the richer you are the more duties you possess because the luckier
you have been. (This risks penalising those who made good use of their
poor endowments and rewarding those who made bad use of their supe-
rior ones; however, something approximating Roemer’s (1998) theory of
social types may offer a way of balancing equality with endowment-
sensitivity.) By focusing upon rights, New Labour’s version of duty and
reciprocity assumes an equality of obligation that does not only camou-
flage distributional inequalities but, by loading more upon the poor and
less upon the wealthy, entrenches them. But if a right is simply a formal
entitlement to convert endowments, rather than the conversion itself, then
it is the actual powers available for conversion to which we should pay
attention.
We can therefore identify a contrast between the kind of reciprocity
favoured by new social democrats and the diverse reciprocity which takes
its place beside a strong conception of equality. For New Labour reci-
procity has little to do with distributive justice, contains no notion that
rights are foundational, is individualistic in that rights are duties are
thought always to correlate at the level of the individual (necessitating
labour market participation in most cases) and is specific in the sense that
reciprocity is thought to follow the contractualist, rationalist logic of
cost–benefit analysis. By contrast, a theory of diverse reciprocity (1)
cannot be separated from the background conditions of social justice or
injustice, i.e. fair reciprocity demands material equality rather than simply
the inclusion of unequals; (2) regards rights as unconditional foundations
of the social self; (3) is social in orientation in that obligations are thought
to correlate to powers (the structures of social relations), rights and oblig-
ations do not always correlate at the level of the individual (we may
possess rights without obligations and vice versa) and wage earning
should not be regarded as the main badge of citizenship; (4) is ‘general’
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in that the equilibrium of social give and take is more effectively main-
tained by abandoning the model of homo economicus. This last point reit-
erates the idea that citizenship should not be reduced to a form of rational
market exchange and we should adopt a hands-off approach to social par-
ticipation where we are less obsessed with enforcement, surveillance and
coercion.
There are therefore a number of reasons to suspect that ‘undiverse rec-
iprocity’ does not offer a basis for an adequate account of citizenship. By
preferring a ‘Philosophy Made Simple’ approach to citizenship, the NSD’s
sermons about duty and reciprocity are revealed to be largely simplistic
and hypocritical.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has dealt with the questions of justice and citizenship and
hopefully provided enough substance for the following definition of dis-
tributive justice:
(1) equality of powers + diverse reciprocity
= distributive justice
This definition diverges from New Labour’s preference for weak equal-
ity plus strong reciprocity and so offers an alternative to the NSD per se.
I have also hinted at a second equation that we will spend Part II of the
book exploring more fully:
(2) social democracy + post-productivism
= ecosocial welfare (‘ecowelfare’)
Before moving on, however, there is one loose thread from this chapter
that needs tying down.
I need to qualify the earlier assertion that diverse reciprocity is not the
same thing as weak reciprocity. In fact, diverse reciprocity is both weak
and strong, according to the diachronic dimension of progressive politics.
Let me explain. Whereas Dworkin seems to assume a 50/50 cut between
endowment-insensitivity and ambition-sensitivity, those such as Arneson,
Cohen and Roemer (from a more radical Left-liberal position) suggest that
luck and circumstance outweigh choice and ambition in determining pat-
terns of distribution in contemporary capitalism. If the bar of undeserv-
ingness (or moral arbitrariness) is therefore high, then the springboard of
ambition and achievements is correspondingly low. But rather than moti-
vate a radical ‘politics of fatalism’ (where we accept the inevitability of
those distributional patterns, but compensate the disadvantaged for their
worst effects), it demands a radicalism which aims to lower the bar and
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raise the springboard over time. Therefore, if we are genuinely concerned
with reciprocity, responsibility, ambition and achievement then we must
work to avoid the avoidable elements of undeservingness in endowments,
i.e. those that are either fully or partially social in origin. Reciprocity,
responsibility, ambition and achievement can be regarded not as bour-
geois fictions, but as values instrumental to the creation of strong equal-
ity. So as the bar of undeservingness is lowered we could expect the
sources of well-being to improve in both quantity and quality: it would
become easier to achieve a wider range of achievements because circum-
stances would not hold people back as much than they do at present.
Therefore, an equality of powers is also a form of liberal perfectionism
which aims to improve the sum of social welfare, not by promoting a
single version of the good, but by expanding individuals’ capacities to
improve the available range of meaningful goods. This is another way of
stating Tawney’s (1931) point that when they are properly conceived
equality and liberty can be seen to be inclusive.
So diverse reciprocity is both weak and strong: weak in the capitalist
present (and so more concerned with compensation) but in conjunction
with an equalisation of powers becoming stronger in the future (and so
more concerned with cooperative participation) as the spaces of ambition
and achievement become stronger. This relationship between equality and
reciprocity corresponds to what White (2000: 522) calls ‘threshold com-
pliance’ where obligations depend upon the social provision of a suffi-
ciently high threshold of equal opportunities. It aims to reverse the trend
of post-1970s politics where the wealthiest only recognise their duties, if
at all, once the poorest have performed theirs. Reciprocity? Yes, if and only
if it is a strategy towards egalitarian ends, ends of which reciprocity
would then be constitutive.
To conclude, if you are genuinely concerned with reciprocity, respon-
sibility, ambition and achievement, then you should be an egalitarian for
only by lowering the bar of undeservingness can the spaces of freedom,
well-being and authentic cooperation be promoted.
Note
1 Although after it emerged that in New Labour’s first term child poverty was
reduced from 4.4 million to 3.9 million, only half of its original target for the
period 1997–2001, there were increasing signs that it would begin to measure
child poverty differently.
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Chapter 2 offered not only a critique of the NSD, but also sketched alter-
natives to its theories of justice and citizenship. I now want to examine
two further debates that will not only refer us to back to some of the other
critiques offered in Chapter 1, but will also act as a platform for Chapter
8 when we examine an important aspect of ecowelfare. Here, the inten-
tion is not so much to analyse the principles of community, meritocracy,
reciprocity and inclusion as to understand the means by which the NSD
seeks to secure and enforce these principles. The first debate concerns
globalisation and I want to suggest that the NSD is congruent with a kind
of globally-oriented state that possesses both conservative and social
democratic features. This state corresponds particularly to recent devel-
opments in the UK and USA and so my analysis will draw upon a range
of scholarship dealing with these countries. The second debate follows on
from this and deals with information. My premise here is that the global
information society is ordered around some familiar structures of power
and domination that many accounts tend to neglect in their breathless
enthusiasm for new technologies.
So we begin with globalisation and an account of what I shall call the
‘security state’; this section aims to do nothing more than lay the ground
for the following, longer discussion of information. We then return to
other important aspects of globalisation in the next chapter. So as before
the intention here is not to review each and every feature of these debates,
but merely those that will allow a theory of ecowelfare to emerge.
Globalisation
With this last point in mind we can proceed to a brief overview of
Bauman’s account of globalisation, since Bauman captures very succinctly
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the kind of social and spatial polarities that are crucial to understanding
the security state and so to understanding recent developments in the US
and UK. I will be assuming that globalisation is an economic, political and
social reality, but one that can accommodate a much wider range of ide-
ological trajectories than those proposed by conservatives and new social
democrats. For a defence of my stance on globalisation see Fitzpatrick
(2001d).
Bauman (1998a, 1998b, 2001) describes the annihilation of spatial and
temporal distances as a situation where the wealthiest are now able to free
themselves from the localities that immerse the poor in immobility. To put
it simply, the sites that are deterritorialised at the global level are reterri-
torialised at the local and economic inequalities have polarised space to
the point of fracture (Harvey, 1996). This spatial polarisation is partly
physical, as the public space of social interaction is replaced by ‘interdic-
tory spaces’ that keep the polarities apart, and partly virtual: the electronic
database centres itself within these exclusionary dynamics, e.g. credit
ratings determine our degree of mobility/weightlessness or immo-
bility/density (Fitzpatrick, 1999b). Globalisation therefore represents a
structural distinction between two worlds that only appear to inhabit the
same ontological field: the cosmopolitan elites (the tourists) live primar-
ily in time, moving effortlessly through geographical and electronic
borders; the excluded (the vagabonds) live primarily in space, weighted
down in the immobile present by the monotony of meaningless time
(Bauman, 1998a: 88–9).
A raft of policies is therefore brought to bear against vagabonds in
order that the tourists’ consumption of both their present and (likely)
future status is stimulated. The increase in rates of incarceration is the
most obvious way in which the privileged try to insure themselves against
the insecurities that they misidentify as emanating from the excluded, and
virtually the entire panoply of the security and surveillance industry can
be interpreted as the refortification of class divisions and the criminalisa-
tion of poverty (Bauman, 1998a: 113–22; Short and Kim, 1999: 115–16),
expressed most alarmingly in the ghettoisation of rich and poor areas
(Body-Gendrot, 2000).
Bauman’s account is not without problems (Warde, 1994), especially
given his tendency to make sweeping generalisations that fit whatever
metaphor he is captivated by at that moment. Even so, he is one of those
whose approach is a welcome alternative to those who treat globalisation
as a rupture in the historical condition (Giddens, 1991) and those who
regard it as little more than an ideological fiction that inevitably functions
according to capitalist imperatives (Bourdieu, 1998). The following explo-
ration of the security state therefore follows the kind of lead that Bauman
suggests.
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Two caveats must be noted, however. First, this is not meant to be 
a general, all-purpose description of the globally-oriented state. States
around the world are following a variety of trajectories according to the
political and economic strategies adopted and the institutional back-
ground at work. Indeed, Chapter 4 will suggest that ‘old’ social democ-
racy is far from dead, precisely because there is far more heterogeneity
than accounts of the investment state, or the competition state, or the
workfare state, or whatever, normally allow for. Even so, I neither want
to underestimate the degree of state convergence that globalisation
implies and the ‘security state’ is a working hypothesis that I apply to the
UK and USA, two countries in which the NSD has arguably been most
influential. Second, however, this is not to insinuate that the security state
is a product of the NSD; indeed, it would make more sense to reverse the
relation and argue that the NSD is a product of the security state. More
accurately, the NSD and the security state can be regarded as aspects of
one another. The UK and the USA are two countries within which con-
servatism arguably took the greatest hold so that, in reworking the welfare
state and then, in turn, being reworked by the more limited social democ-
racy of Clinton and Blair, conservatism has fashioned a political agenda
that we can understand through the intellectual convergence of social
policy and criminology. Therefore, the security state and the NSD are both
consequences of conservative hegemonisation. I will therefore draw a
picture of the security state in outline and then indicate why New
Labour’s main welfare and criminal justice reforms to date are consistent
with it.
The state’s job on the domestic front has traditionally been to weave
order out of chaos: to prevent anarchy, to ensure historical continuity, to
suppress revolution, to scapegoat minorities, to balance the fluctuations
of economic supply and demand. As global capital becomes apparently
unmanageable, as the polity and the economy detach after a century of
alignment, the state can only now prosper if, in addition to weaving order
out of chaos, it facilitates and manufactures much of that chaos in the first
place in order to remain attractive in the eyes of capital. As the maintainer
of order at the national level, the state has traditionally been the guaran-
tor of stability (whether through constitutional or authoritarian means);
under contemporary conditions it is just as often the instigator of insta-
bility and disorder by colluding with, failing to prevent or even generat-
ing global market forces – think of the World Trade Organisation (WTO),
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services. So the chaos that the state now gives order to is often
a chaos of its own making. As the state increasingly submits to the 
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dominant logic of global capital, so it must socially and discursively con-
struct threats that only it can address through what Jordan and Arnold
(1995; Jordan, 1998: 183) call a ‘politics of enforcement’ (graphically illus-
trated by the reaction of the Genoa police to anti-WTO protesters in 2001).
It helps to create the spatial polarisation that Bauman draws attention to
and then represents itself as the principal means of depolarising and resta-
bilising the resulting conflict (Zukin, 1991; cf. Hughes, 1996). The security
state consists of a series of punitive responses to the chaos it has 
facilitated.1
Therefore, the state that withers away is only the macro-
interventionist state, rematerialising at the micro-social level through a
series of state, semi-state and non-state interventions (Cohen, 1994), 
criminalising those such as beggars, street-level entrepreneurs, claimants,
the low paid, single mothers and teenagers (Cook, 1997: 131–52; Pavarini,
1997; Dean, 1999; Parenti, 1999). The state extends its reach by relaxing its
grip. So although social spaces are polarised, they are also simultaneously
subjected to a regulatory gaze where freedom and governance merge in
new technologies of control (Rose, 1999; Garland, 2001): ‘. . . technology-
based contexts of interaction that regulate, organise or monitor human
behaviour by integrating it into a pre-arranged environment, built upon
a conception of “normality” or “regularity” that all subjects are expected
to reproduce’ (Lianos with Douglas, 2000: 264).
But if these ‘pre-regulated’ spaces encompass both rich and poor terri-
tories, the asymmetries of power between those territories alter the means
of reproduction within them (Fitzpatrick, 2001d). In the affluent territories
the periphery consists of marginal people who must be both excluded and
endlessly reimagined. Reproduction therefore consists of a constant vigi-
lance against potential threats; otherness represents a source of victimi-
sation and so must willingly subject itself to surveillance. If it does not,
then because that which is non-monitored is equivalent to lawlessness
then punitive measures are entirely justified. In the poorer territories, the
periphery consists of wealthier lifestyles that are omnipresent and so must
be emulated through recurrent debt and processes of ‘clearance’, constant
proof that you are worthy of entry. These ‘prudential’ or ‘actuarial’ spaces
enforce gestures of normality upon those the wealthier can no longer
recognise as normal, i.e. as resembling themselves.
The security state therefore presides over a patchwork of preregulatory
spaces that are polarised socially and symbolically between a series of
alternating peripheries. Struggling to meet the basic needs of social secu-
rity, it can reconfigure those needs as basic fears by operating as the simul-
taneous origin and resolution of global security risks. Once the gatekeeper
who tried to protect against post-war turbulence; now the state invites the
global turbulence to storm through the national economic and political
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walls that it generously offers to maintain. By engendering economies of
risk and flexibility, globalisation demands both the collective enforcement
of the duty to work (see Chapter 2) and the dismantling of the workplace
regulations that threaten international competitiveness (Jordan, 1998:
82–3). And so we are collectivised into an active acceptance of our own
passivity. This duty appears under several guises: as the overworked ‘pre-
senteeism’ of the securely employed, as the on-call insecurities of the 
marginally employed and as the compulsory submission of unemployed
claimants to the demands of the benefit system. Correspondingly, 
social entitlements are now based less upon having a voice within the
workplace and more upon the capacity (though only for the lucky 
ones) to flee between workplaces: entitlements are possessed by ‘job con-
sumers’ rather than cooperatively-organised workers. Thus, under pres-
sure from global capitalism, the state assists in the individualisation of
rights and the collectivisation of duties (Fitzpatrick, 1998a): the privatisa-
tion of common fate and the collectivisation and control of individual
autonomy. Hence what I referred to in Chapter 1 as the desocialisation of
society. Yet the security state’s work is, literally, never done. The more
obsessed with safety we become, then the less safe we feel because the
more we monitor (in order to reduce our fears) then the more dangerous
the non-monitored begins to appear. The security state therefore per-
petuates itself infinitely.
Developments within the benefit system, both pre- and post-New
Labour, illustrate this transformation (Fitzpatrick, 1998a). The principle of
social insurance came to embody the commonality of fate by having both
a spatial dimension (universality) and a temporal dimension (cradle to
grave) and so was oriented both to the past, in the form of work-based
contributions, and to a knowable, predictable future. Social insurance was
therefore suited to an age of working-class ascendancy (the commonality
of fate) and to a widespread acceptance of the desirability and feasibility
of planning (temporal continuity). A naive acceptance of free market glob-
alisation (see Chapter 4) has undermined both of these conditions. Con-
sequently, the income inequalities which the NSD refuses to challenge
substantially make the idea of social insurance redundant: the affluent can
afford to insure themselves whereas the poor can be helped with targeted
forms of assistance. Systems of universal coverage crumble and the life-
cycle fragments and splits: in insuring ourselves against risk, it is no
longer ‘we’ who work forward from the determinate past, but ‘I’ who
works backwards from an indeterminate future as the solitary entrepre-
neur of my personal fate (O’Malley, 1992). This is what the ‘Americani-
sation’ of social security implies and New Labour has gone even further
than its Conservative predecessors in introducing workfare, benefit sanc-
tions, in-work means testing and ‘single gateways’ which treat all new
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claimants the same, whatever their work record. The affluent are effec-
tively opted out into the private insurance market, especially with regard
to pensions and personal security; the poor become subjected to means
testing and to forms of control that are benignly authoritarian: the dis-
course of paternalism becomes indistinguishable from that of control. The
movements and schedules of claimants become part of a process of nego-
tiation between themselves and appointed experts; accents, gestures and
sartorial appearances (clothing, hairstyles, jewellery, cosmetics) become
subject to official scrutiny (Marx, 1995: 228).
Thus the benefit system, never the most benevolent of institutions to
begin with, embodies a strategy of ‘anticipatory deterrence’: whereas it
used to be largely re-active, reacting to problems once they had occurred,
it is now increasingly pre-active, defining problems in advance and clamp-
ing down on any hints of abnormality. The nakedness of this strategy has
been most in evidence in the case of asylum seekers and refugees, the
internationally homeless, for whom any distinction between social and
criminal policy has long become meaningless and when the histories 
of New Labour are written, their treatment of asylum seekers may well
prove to be their greatest shame.
What all of this means is that we do not return to the workhouse of the
pre-welfare state, nor do we advance to a post-welfare state of last-resort
safety nets; instead, we experience a security state where welfare institu-
tions paternalistically prod and encourage us into deregulated and flexi-
ble labour markets (Rose, 1996, 1999). The ethic of state welfare and basic
needs is not abandoned; instead, what we need is redefined away from
entitlement to material goods towards a duty-led ethic of emotional
belonging and social inclusion enforced, where necessary, by the globally-
oriented state (Culpitt, 1999; Kemshall, 2002). ‘Security’ encompasses
‘welfare’ in order to transcend it. This is the ethics of ‘market collectivism’
(Fitzpatrick, 1998a). If we do not volunteer to keep ourselves socially and
morally fit, ready for the opportunities that the global economy might
scatter in our direction, then the state will be on hand to volunteer us
instead. The collectivisation of duties occurs because duties are now
thought to be orientated to the global; the individualisation of rights
occurs because it is assumed that the global cannot accommodate
common rights. Citizenship attenuates between two spaces. The social
space recoils upon itself despite various compensatory efforts to knit these
shrinking spaces into an integrative patchwork, e.g. the European Union;
the global space inflates into an immense, vaulting arena, big enough both
to amplify the shouts of the angry and drown the cries of the powerless.
Being an attenuated citizen now implies localised training for global
responsibilities.
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These developments have also been visible within the criminal policies
of New Labour’s first term and some have argued that by the 2001 general
election there was no effective distance between Conservative and New
Labour policies on law and order (Downes and Morgan, 2002). Putting to
one side forms of electronic surveillance and control (dealt with below),
those policies have been characterised by the following four main 
characteristics.
First, New Labour accepted the ‘prison works’ philosophy of the Con-
servatives, the belief that incarceration for individuals is the best way of
resolving social problems. The continuities in this respect between Michael
Howard and Jack Straw as, respectively, Conservative and Labour Home
Secretaries are obvious. By 2002 England and Wales had a higher pro-
portion of its population in jail than China, Saudi Arabia or Turkey, 
the second highest rate in the EU behind Portugal (Travis, 2002). And
although this is still only one-fifth of the rate of incarceration to be found
in the USA, it nevertheless represents a similar trend towards a punitive
individualism in the context of unjust social inequalities (Christie, 1994;
Reiman, 1998).
Second, there has been a preference for targeting repeat offenders and
for zero-tolerance campaigns, the ‘broken windows’ strategy imported
from the USA of coming down hard on minor examples of law breaking
in the belief that these, if left unattended, will multiply into major inci-
dents through their impact on victims, perpetrators (if left unpunished)
and the civic capital of the local community. This zero tolerance has also
affected other aspects of civil order with New Labour partly collapsing
the distinction between terror and civil disobedience. Again, there is no
solid evidence that such strategies work, but they have served the purpose
of fuelling tabloid paranoia about the imminent breakdown of society
(Garland, 2001).
Third, New Labour has promoted the use of curfews and exclusion
orders in order to keep troublemakers either at home at certain times of
day or away from certain urban districts altogether. Naming and shaming
persistent troublemakers is a means not only of exclusion, but of inclu-
sion: by ‘keeping out’ we also ‘keep in’ the law abiding and hard working,
so reaffirming norms of civic, communal and familial identification
(Braithwaite, 2000). That these powers have been actually deployed much
less by local councils and police forces than the government would have
liked reflects the belief that pandering to the fear of crime is different to
addressing the actuality, not least because perceptions of risk almost
always diverge from the reality of risk, with the public consistently over-
estimating the extent of crime, misidentifying the victims of crime and
underestimating rates of incarceration (Pantazis, 2000).
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Fourth, the evidence has struggled with ideology to influence govern-
ment policy. Civil liberties arguments have been repeatedly denounced as
the chatterings of middle-class liberals comfortably separated from the
working-class communities where crime palpably affects the quality of
life. Therefore, the fear of crime needs addressing, even when those fears
are naive or unrealistic (Young, 1999; cf. Taylor, 1999). Targeting ‘the crim-
inal’ is so important that it can only be infrequently left to juries, ‘liberal’
judges (hence the need for minimum mandatory sentences) or defence
lawyers. But what this populist stance then does is to feed an hysteria that
can never be satiated. When paranoia is pandered to rather than chal-
lenged, then there is no need for self-limitation, since the politicians and
press always say you are right. If asylum seekers are dispersed and given
vouchers, then racism is given an official stamp and you can riot; if the
courts and prisons are soft then the enemy is always within and you can
intimidate a few paedophiles (and settle some old scores along the way);
if immigrants are not integrating – otherwise why else would they need
language classes? – then there is no need for British identity to change.
Ironically then, the separation between civil liberties and social justice 
not only backfires on New Labour’s more liberal tendencies, but leads 
to a situation where crime seems to be ubiquitous and so quality of life
in the very communities New Labour professes to support is always
undermined.
This is not to accuse all New Labour’s policies of being unremittingly
foolish. Just as a preference for targeting has allowed rises in some benefit
levels, so the government has been able to sneak in some welcome reforms
below the populist radar, e.g. to drug laws and to the police (through the
Macpherson Report). It has also resisted the worst excesses of anti-
paedophile hysteria and the outcry over the Bulger killers’ release in 2001.
Nevertheless, both social and criminal policies have been willing to recon-
figure welfare and need in terms of security and risk, effecting a conver-
gence of conservatism and social democracy around the imperatives of a
security state. The distinction between criminal and welfare policies is
now less clear than at any time since the nineteenth century.
To summarise, the security state arises as a result of two processes: the
conservative assault on the social democratic welfare state, followed by a
more limited version of social democracy (the NSD) later accommodat-
ing itself to the conservative settlement. The security state is therefore
characterised by: (1) large amounts of social inequality, increasingly mani-
fested as spatial polarisation, regulatory instincts, the loss of a common-
ality of fate and fewer communicative and symbolic interactions between
richer and poorer; (2) a pathologisation of social problems where those at
the social edges are blamed for their marginalisation, criminalised for
being unable or reluctant to become risk takers in the global environment
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that the security state engenders; (3) supply-side reforms where the
excluded are to be supervised and remoralised as a condition of their 
reintegration into the social mainstream, whether through rationalist
incentives, normalisation, surveillance or punitiveness. The security state
represents not the dismantling of the welfare state, but its incorporation
within a punitive ethic of risk and fear. The consolidation and growth 
of the security state can then be witnessed in the bulk of New Labour’s
social and criminal policies, and the ways in which those disciplinary 
boundaries are flimsier than ever. As a last word I suspect that, without
a substantial change of direction, New Labour’s eventual replacement in
power by the Conservatives will produce no greater discontinuities than
the replacement of the New Democrats by Bush junior’s Republicans in
the US.
Information
We now move on and explore the NSD’s relationship to the information
society by applying the above lessons. My basic thesis will be that New
Labour has conceived of information as being asocial and contextless
(reflecting the individualisation of social problems), as commodified
(reflecting the hegemony of conservative economics) and as a source of
surveillance (reflecting a criminalisation of the supply side). The argu-
ment is made through the following four sub-sections. I shall first set out
my analytical stance by applying critical theory to information society
debates and then review the above characteristics in turn.
Cyber-criticalism
As perhaps the key contemporary figure in information society debates
Castells makes an effective startingpoint. Castells (1996: 470–4) underlines
the point that networks are not structureless webs demonstrating no hier-
archical features, but grids that flow according to logics of power. Net-
works may consist of nodes, but some nodes are more powerful than
others, exerting a greater gravitational force on the relations that stream
around them. He talks of networks being connected by ‘switches’ that are
the privileged instruments of power, i.e. global flows of financial capital,
ensuring that the network society is a capitalist society of ‘decentralised
concentration’.
Having reached this point, however, Castells (1996: 469) then veers
towards a postmodernist reading (though he might not accept the descrip-
tion), insisting that ‘. . . the power of flows takes precedence over the flows
of power.’ In short,
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above a diversity of human-flesh capitalists and capitalist groups there is a
faceless collective capitalist, made up of financial flows operated by electronic
networks. . . . This network of networks of capital both unifies and com-
mands specific centers of capitalist accumulation, structuring the behaviour
of capitalists around their submission to the global network. . . . While capi-
talism still rules, capitalists are randomly incarnated . . . (Castells, 1996: 474)
So although capitalism has triumphed, it is potentially vulnerable to
changes within the electronically-mediated ‘global capital network’. Yet
what this does is to remove capitalist agents from capitalism, to treat it 
as an agentless system where capitalists must submit to their ‘random in-
carnation’. The reason for this move – first recognising power and then
emptying it of agency – is because Castells wishes to contrast the ‘power
of flows’ with the ‘power of identity’, defining the latter as the cul-
tural representations and codes of information around which socially-
significant mobilisations can form. What Castells (1998: 348) eventually
makes clear is his belief that there are no more stable power elites because
culture is now the source of power, of capital and therefore of the infor-
mation age’s social hierarchies.
From a critical theoretical perspective, the kernel of truth here masks
the fact that when oppositional movements mobilise against global capi-
talism they do so not only in terms of cultural identities but also in terms
of the materiality of the global network that Castells dissolves into infor-
matic signs. Therefore, although he offers hope to oppositional move-
ments, it is the hope of an identity politics divorced from the great
economic and ideological struggles of modernity (Castells, 1998: 359). So
as well as underestimating the power of capitalist agents, Castells enjoins
us to abandon the ideological reference points and strategies that provide
such struggles with long-term direction. That most of the social move-
ments he celebrates are perversely unwilling to do so, that ideology may
actually motivate micro-political struggles is not something he seems able
to accommodate.
One consequence of this is that his observations regarding surveillance
practices are too simplistic (Castells, 1997: 299–303). For although he is
correct to identify the enhanced surveillance capacity of corporations,
Castells seems to believe that this renders forms of centralised surveil-
lance impossible, due to the declining power of the nation-state. But what
this analysis does is to neglect the points made above, namely that the
security state attempts the reregulation of the micro-social within a global,
free market economy. According to this thesis, and as we shall see below,
state and corporate forms of surveillance are conjoined in a network
where centres and peripheries continually fold into one another.
Cyber-criticalism, then, offers a richer account of surveillance because
it does not imagine that the power of flows has overwhelmed flows of
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power. Therefore, the application of critical theory to information 
society debates requires us to understand how and why traditional 
hierarchies of power adapt to new technologies, allowing themselves to 
be reconfigured by them, without being substantially undermined in the
process. Cyber-criticalism therefore characterises the work of a number of
authors (Sardar and Ravetz, 1996; Perelman, 1998) who identify hierar-
chical struggles (as always, including class but not limited to it) as a defin-
ing feature of ‘informatic capitalism’. Let us quickly review two principal
contributors.
Herbert Schiller (1981, 1984, 1989, 1996) works with three basic
premises. First, informatic capitalism is riven by inequalities between the
information rich and poor. This does not mean that the poor are excluded
from information per se, merely that ICTs constitute a positional good so
that informational inequalities will always be reproduced, even as access
to informational networks spreads. Second, that information is subject to
market criteria such that the most valuable information is that which can
be bought and sold. Increasingly, this implies not information about the
goods and signs to be consumed, but information about the audiences
who will do the consuming. In short, the marketisation of information
engenders the next stage in the capitalist commodification of the self.
Third, the advent of informatics strengthens corporate capitalism (van
Dijk, 1999). So Schiller lays down the three characteristics of information
that I listed earlier: asociality, commodification and surveillance.
Dyer-Witheford (1999) offers a similar but more optimistic reading,
relocating cyber-criticalism in an interpretative context that stresses the
power of excluded agents to resist and challenge the growing hegemony
of informatic capitalism. He cites numerous struggles by class and social
movements around the world as evidence that, although the frontiers of
information are expanding, the interior spaces of those expanding hori-
zons are vulnerable to opposition and reconfiguration in the direction of
radical alternatives.
Therefore, cyber-criticalism agrees with Castells that information net-
works are significant, but is less ambiguous than Castells appears to be
about the political economy of this shift. It treats the information revolu-
tion as a revolution within capitalism and not a revolution of capitalism,
so that although information flows, it either flows up or down a gradient
that, like all stages of capitalism before it, continues to be defined by the
state–market nexus (Wyatt et al., 2000; cf. Slevin, 2000: 204–7). Informatic
struggles therefore occur between those who use technological systems to
assemble peripheries around multiple centres of information flow (call it
the Bill Gates approach) and those who exchange and/or disrupt infor-
mation to resist the state–corporate nexus by peripheralising the centre
and breaking it open to the public gaze (Fitzpatrick, 2002c).
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So we can define ‘information systems’ as the technological infrastruc-
tures that form the principal conduits of the informational web, as the
flows of power of informatic capitalism, as systems that are also poten-
tial sites of both submission/repression and resistance/liberation. I now
want to explore those information systems in more detail, relating them
to the NSD along the way, in order to explain why the latter offers only
a myopic vision of the information society. The next three sections there-
fore explore the three characteristics already mentioned, focusing more
upon examples of submission than resistance.
Asocial information
Now this is not to claim that New Labour omits any reference to social
contexts in its approach to ICTs, as it appears to be fully aware of how
social inequalities affect the access to, and use of, information technology.
However, having made the link between social inequality and access New
Labour has been driven to a series of technological fixes to repair what it
sees as the gap between the two (Selwyn, 2002; Hudson, 2003). Its 
reasoning seems to resemble the following: if we now live in a post-
industrial service society and if the job of government is to facilitate social
inclusion through the provision of opportunities and assets, then access
to ICTs not only requires a technological fix but a fix that is itself a means
of addressing social inequalities (Leadbetter, 1999). This reasoning has had
several tragicomic results.
For instance, in his 1999 budget Chancellor Gordon Brown set aside
£15 million to provide 100,000 computers under a Computers Within
Reach scheme (Humphries, 2002). The scheme’s intention was to supply,
through the voluntary sector, low-income individuals and families with
cheap, secondhand PCs, software and printers. The scheme proved to be
fairly disastrous, partly due to poor administration and partly due to
recipients lacking the financial resources that would enable them to exer-
cise their intended role as consumers. The scheme was quietly shelved in
2002. Even with the best of intentions, therefore, New Labour missed the
point repeatedly made by researchers (e.g. Hellawell, 2001; Nixon and
Keeble, 2001) that the digital divide is so embedded in social divides 
that improving access to technology requires more old-fashioned social
policies than the government has been able to contemplate, due to its
inability to regard egalitarian redistribution as essential to social justice.
This inability has consequently influenced its entire approach.
As articulated by its 1999 White Paper, New Labour has interpreted the
ICTs revolution as providing innovation, empowerment, choice, greater
convenience and improved opportunities for all. Any problems relate to
the difficulties of implementation alone so that ‘information exclusion’ is
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attributed to a lack of knowledge and skills, with inequalities in socio-
economic resources being pushed into the background; what is largely
ignored is the danger of ICTs reinforcing existing power imbalances and
injustices. So the White Paper (HMSO, 1999: section 3.19) heralds the
arrival of teleclaiming (submitting benefit claims electronically) in terms
of an enhancement of efficiency, accuracy and speed in the processing 
of claims, but ignores, and may implicitly welcome, the possibility of the
technology subjecting claimants to bureaucratic harassment, disciplinary
sanctions and conditions, and relentless observation of their habits,
lifestyles and sexual partnerships. With ‘independence’ constantly being
confused with ‘wage earning’, the potential disadvantages of integrating
administrative systems and databases is wilfully overlooked. In short,
what is constantly emphasised in the White Paper is the right of tax-
payers to know that their taxes are not being ‘wasted’ and so, ultimately,
it is the taxpayer who is being empowered by ICTs, not the claimant. At
one point, the White Paper (HMSO, 1999: section 5.14) does acknowledge
the dangers that ICTs can pose through the ‘inappropriate transfer of data’
and states that government must commit itself to data protection. But who
decides what is inappropriate? Is data pertaining to a claimant to be as
secure as that pertaining to a non-claimant? The government’s obsession
with targeting and benefit fraud suggests that it will not. Therefore dis-
asters such as the Computers Within Reach scheme are not accidents, but
are rooted in New Labour’s hostility to strong equality.
To treat information as asocial, to underestimate the influence of offline
upon online environments (Fitzpatrick, 2000), to prioritise national 
competitiveness and to reach for technological fixes is to reconstruct the
citizen as the ‘massless citizen’. The ‘massless citizen’ is the ghostly inhab-
itant of the information society and the term is meant to conceptualise the
fact that with the integration and comparison of computer files, we each
have an electronic shadow or doppelganger, a ‘data-self’ (Lacy, 1996: 162–3;
Fisher, 1997: 120). Sometimes this virtual self is nothing more than a cyber-
reflection of the real person; increasingly though, the flesh and blood
person is being treated as an inferior version of their data-shadow, as in
the case of a credit check or a CCTV scan. It all depends upon whether
we possess our data-selves or are possessed by them. So, somebody does
not have to be logged into the Internet to become massless: in a society
of information systems, even the most computer-illiterate person is a
massless citizen in that they have an online virtuality which is sometimes
a simulation of, and sometimes simulates, their offline realities. We are 
all massless citizens because we are all caught and implicated within the
informational webnet of the state–market nexus. So, whereas the term
‘digital citizen’ focuses simply upon online–offline interactions, ‘massless
citizen’ is meant to encompass both digitality and social hierarchy: the
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‘digital hierarchy’. Masslessness implies both virtuality – streams of data
that are without mass (photons) – and post-collectivism, i.e. a society
where the masses are no longer said to exist; and despite its communi-
tarian discourse, by accepting the post-collectivist settlement of conser-
vatism, it is precisely this shift to an individualist society of social
polarities and pathologies that the NSD has perpetuated.
So what New Labour’s actual and proposed reforms to social security,
health care (Keen et al., 1998) and education add up to is a ‘self-service
welfare state’ where the individual performs many of the functions and
roles traditionally performed by administrators (Loader, 1998; Fitzpatrick,
2003a). It also implies a one-stop system where individuals interface with
government at a single point as a range of public services become elec-
tronically available (Frissen, 1997). Self-service welfare may only enhance
a process whereby the state penalises those who demonstrate an inability
to look after themselves by enforcing a strong market dependency in a
deregulated global economy. In a digital version of the Poor Law, the state
may say: here is the information and the technology needed to access it,
now solve your own problems, or else!
Information as commodity
New Labour also has little to say regarding the commodification of in-
formation about both employees and consumers (Fitzpatrick, 2002c). 
With power having shifted towards employers and large corporations,
and with New Labour having consolidated that hegemony, employees
and consumers are reduced to information bits that are then conceived 
in terms of profit and loss. The simple, productivist logic of many em-
ployers and managers says that since they are paying employees a set rate
to perform a job, then they need to know whether they are getting their
moneys worth. Unfortunately, workplace surveillance tends to be a one-
way system (Sewell, 1996; Marx, 1999; Miller and Weckert, 2000; Moore,
2000). The monitoring of emails and Internet activity is extremely simple,
mini surveillance cameras are increasingly prevalent, background checks
on employees and job applicants are now easier to run because of data-
matching techniques and genetic screening is on the rise, especially in the
USA (McCahill and Norris, 1999). Call-centre workers are assessed upon
simple, quantified criteria (how long it takes to dispose with each caller),
through teleworking it becomes easier to monitor workers at home and
dial-in facilities erode the distinction between job and non-job sites.
Employees are increasingly judged upon what they may do rather than
what they have actually done (Lyon, 2001: 41).
In short, electronically generated information tends to act as informa-
tion always acts in a market; it is information about the relatively pow-
erless that flows to the relatively powerful. So although there is some
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capacity for good in such surveillance, e.g. to prevent sexual harassment,
this is more than outweighed by the dangers of misuse on the part of those
who control the systems in question.
Consumption betrays similar preregulatory characteristics (Sklair,
1995) and again New Labour has said little about the inherent dangers
here given its reluctance to challenge the conservative agenda substan-
tially. Demand is now increasingly managed through practices that con-
stantly predict future behaviour, based upon past behaviour. As every
purchase is logged or every credit card scanned, and as consumers mirac-
ulously find their favourite brands on the supermarket shelves in just 
the right quantities, so the windows of consumption begin to narrow.
Demand is matched to supply not only through mass advertising, but
because we become our own market researchers. The loyalty or reward
card is only the most individualised manifestation of networking tech-
nology: the encoding of the purchaser and not just the purchase. ICTs help
us to consume more efficiently, but also close off non-consumerist spaces,
both because of the allurements of frictionless consumption and because
those same databases easily become means of surveying those who will
not or cannot browse the shelves.
Furthermore, the body is no longer a simple appendage to the machine,
but what some like to call a terminal plugged into the informatic circuitry.
The cyborg is neither just a metaphor (Haraway, 1991) nor a physical
assemblage of machine and organism, but a risk processor that increas-
ingly simulates an informational system by relating to its environment 
as a series of dichotomous zeroes and ones: threatening/non-threatening,
insider/outsider, same/other (Fitzpatrick, 1999b).
Nor does net surfing allow us to erase the traces that we leave behind
us. Our own computers store data about us through ‘cookies’ that can be
accessed by commercial interests (Lyon, 2001). Though apparently con-
ducted in secret, journeys in cyberspace emit visible electronic trails that
can be accessed by those with the means and the software to do so. Such
electronic information is generated for the ultimate benefit of capital accu-
mulation and permits the ideology of exchange value to invade personal
areas of life, e.g. leisure time, with greater ease than ever before. And
because the information available to consumers remains limited (not
revealing, for instance, the impact that the production of goods may have
had upon the environment or upon the lives of workers in the develop-
ing world), then it acts as something of a barrier to anticonsumerist forms
of social interaction and political mobilisation.
Information as surveillance
But if surveillance is generated by a logic that fetishises market com-
modities, it is also driven by the security state itself (Fitzpatrick, 2002c).
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As information systems make it theoretically easier for people to gather
information upon those who rule them, both commercially and politically,
so it becomes easier for the latter to justify the gathering of information
on the former (William and Webster, 1999: 129). Convenience and 
accessibility become the watchwords of both the commercial and politi-
cal worlds: the frictionless flow and instantaneous exchange of infor-
mation. Of course, possession of information about the governed is 
an inherent feature of governance and over the last century, the welfare
state was instrumental in accelerating the gathering of information.
Cradle-to-grave provision requires the tagging and monitoring of the
employment, contributory, educational, marital and medical histories of
its citizens, a bureaucratic and administrative machine that files, cata-
logues, indexes and processes you in hundreds of ways (Lyon, 1994: 94–6).
But as the welfare state mutates into the security state, as needs are recon-
figured as risks and fears, so policy-makers propel surveillance into new
realms.
The most obvious example of covert surveillance is the spread of
CCTVs. ‘Covert’ not in their visibility (which is deliberately prominent,
though people still underestimate their prevalence), but in their insidious
effects upon the public sphere: the will to govern strengthens as the
macro-state shrivels (Smith, 2000). Those effects are being chartered by an
increasing amount of research and scholarship (Coleman and Sim, 2000;
Williams and Johnstone, 2000) and so Norris and Armstrong (1999) are
not alone in concluding that CCTVs are used in accordance with the exist-
ing structures of social power: by and large, the cameras are there to
defend commercial and affluent areas and camera operators survey those
they perceive as being socially excluded according to popular prejudice.
CCTVs may be popular with local politicians and administrators, due 
to the need for cities to maintain social order, so that they may advertise
themselves as desirable objects of global investment (Sassen, 1991) within
the security state. With such attitudes in place the way is clear for sur-
veillance cameras to be increasingly computerised so that images (faces,
behaviour, licence plates) can be scanned, digitised and compared to
various databases. This has already led to the blanket scanning of public
areas and the technological presumption of guilt in crowds of post-
anonymity. CCTVs enable databases to grow which, in turn, justify the
use of CCTVs, and so on. Cameras do not see people, they see classifica-
tions into which digital images may or may not fit and some allege that
ever more sophisticated, algorithmic forms of surveillance are imminent
in order that those categories can be multiplied and applied indefinitely
(Graham and Wood, 2003).
But as well as facilitating covert surveillance, New Labour also oper-
ates more overt forms. Let us take two recent controversies. The Regula-
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tion of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) came into force in the UK in
October 2000 (Calleja, 2000). The Act sets out the procedures by which the
security services and the police can monitor and access electronically-
mediated communications. For instance, they are now able to track com-
munications data – the websites and newsgroups individuals visit and the
addresses of their email correspondents – through the use of ‘black box’
technology, effectively transforming service providers into wiretappers
for the state. If criminal activity is suspected, then the security services
can apply for a warrant to intercept and decode the actual content of such
Internet traffic. The original bill was particularly draconian and came
under sustained attack. Critics were able to argue that New Labour was
allowing its authoritarian instincts to dominate and allowing ‘gee whiz’
technological determinism to shape the agenda. This opposition was suc-
cessful, but only partially so.
So even though the RIPA is preferable to the preceding bill, its powers
invade privacy to a far greater extent than previous interception proce-
dures and the criteria for the release of warrants is not as stringent as it
should be. Additionally, if that content is encrypted then the individual
in question is required to surrender the encryption keys or face a jail sen-
tence of up to two years – or even five years if they reveal to a third party
that the surveillance warrant exists. Initially, the burden of proof was
entirely on individuals to establish that they had lost or forgotten their
keys, i.e. that they were guilty until they could prove themselves inno-
cent. The government backtracked and the Act requires the prosecution
to prove that individuals have not done all they can to recover a key.
However, critics like Liberty and Stand allege that the burden of proof in
UK law has been undermined and that, bizarrely, those whose criminal
activities would otherwise attract longer jail sentences can now opt for a
shorter sentence by refusing to surrender their keys.
The second controversy concerns New Labour’s foray into biometrics.
Biometric technologies are those that employ the body as a site of identi-
fication and surveillance (Nelkin and Andrews, 1999; Andrews and
Nelkin, 2001) where we are identifiable through our physical characteris-
tics: voice, face, eyes, fingerprints, palmprints and DNA. Increasingly,
then, existing forms of identification are likely to merge with biometric
technology, with the latter protecting the information contained on smart
cards and credit cards and such cards being used to store biometric data.
So biometrics has a wide range of applications, from welfare institutions
such as the benefits and health-care systems through to the criminal
justice system. DNA fingerprinting is an obvious form of biometrics that
is now a commonplace procedure (Krawczak and Schmidtke, 1998) and
many are now calling for the expansion of DNA registers and databases
(Blume, 2000).
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Those who worry that biometric technology may encourage an increase
in institutional coercion, error and alienation (Lyon, 2001) were not reas-
sured by New Labour’s expansion of biometric surveillance. In January
2001 New Labour presented to Parliament the Criminal Justice and Police
Bill. Receiving the Royal Assent in May 2001, this was to allow the police
to retain fingerprints and DNA profiles from individuals suspected of a
crime, even when they are not subsequently prosecuted or when they are
acquitted of a crime. DNA samples will also be retained when they have
been volunteered during a mass screening programme by the police.
Written consent from the donor must be obtained but, once given, that
consent can never be revoked.
New Labour offered five main justifications for this extension of police
powers. First, that it will help to fight crime, especially crimes perpetrated
by habitual criminals, because the DNA of those individuals will already
be on record. Second, it will help to eliminate innocent people from sus-
picion and law-abiding people in general have nothing to fear from exten-
sive DNA databanks. Third, safeguards to prevent abuse will be ensured.
Fourth, a DNA profile is an ‘objective form of evidence’ which should no
more be thrown away than other pieces of evidence, e.g. interview notes
– the quote comes from Home Secretary Jack Straw in the Commons on
29 January 2001. Finally, too much time and expense is wasted in repro-
filing those who have already been profiled in a mass screening pro-
gramme. Do these reasons bear scrutiny?
If fighting crime is such an overwhelming priority, then why not
require everyone in the country to provide a DNA sample (including
newborn babies)? Politicians who claim that large DNA databanks are
popular know that they are not this popular. Yet even if they were there
can be no mandate for the abandonment of basic civil liberties and even
those politicians who disagree might hesitate to compel millions of non-
compliers to surrender DNA samples. Much easier then to allow the data-
banks to be built up from those who come within the purview of the police
since, as is well known, it is individuals who commit crimes and not social
conditions! This is a pathological argument which overlooks the extent to
which crime is socially and discursively constructed. Almost inevitably,
such databanks will contain a disproportionate amount of DNA samples
from the poorest and most vulnerable.
The endless refrain that the innocent have nothing to fear is the usual
Orwellian means of neutering the civil liberties argument that the proper
distinction is not between the innocent and the guilty, but between the
relatively powerless and the relatively powerful. In fact, the relatively
powerless do have something to fear whenever the presumption of inno-
cence shifts towards a presumption of guilt. Yet in denying this what the
Orwellian refrain does is to employ an actuarial logic where individuals
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are required to obey the norms that define them as moral/insiders rather
than immoral/outsiders. Yet since there is no system that is immune to
abuse and errors ‘the innocent’ do have something to fear and only a naive
technological determinism can pretend otherwise.
The claim that a DNA profile is an objective piece of evidence is even
more disturbing. Not just because a piece of evidence is objective only in
conjunction with other pieces of evidence (a DNA-yielding hair found at
a crime scene may have been planted), but because Straw’s claim reduces
DNA to the status of an interview note rather than as something that
yields vital personal information about us. The commodification of
society that Schiller warns against has engendered the criminalisation of
society for, as Bauman (1998a) notes, those who cannot or will not be
seduced by the commodity form are immediately suspected as being
threats to it. Therefore the commodification of the body also engenders
the criminalisation of the body as its logical extension: what I earlier referred
to as the security state’s criminalisation of the supply side. After all, why
not treat genetic tissue and body parts as just another processable piece
of matter if crime is of such overwhelming concern?
Finally, what of the idea that, once given, written consent for the reten-
tion of DNA samples taken during mass screening programmes cannot
be revoked? As the then Home Office minister Charles Clarke pointed out,
if consent can be revoked at a later time, then we have barely changed the
current situation where samples are automatically destroyed. Clarke was
actually being quite honest: a managerialist logic that values centralisa-
tion, efficiency and cost effectiveness above liberty and autonomy is one
that demands the non-revocation of consent.
Conclusion
I warned you earlier that we would be examining the repressive rather
than the liberatory aspects of information systems and it is worth repeat-
ing now that the worrying trends identified above do not mean that 
we are sinking inevitably into a one-dimensional society of surveillance.
Surveillance, even in some of its less appealing roles, can have socially
beneficial effects if, say, it helps to reduce traffic congestion or protects
children from abuse – mobile-phone robberies notwithstanding! Further,
ICTs also permit forms of counter-surveillance and counter-hegemonic
activity through which the gaze of employers, corporations and the secu-
rity state is redirected (Fitzpatrick, 2002c). Yet these qualifications aside, I
have wanted to stress New Labour’s role in promoting an information
society that is drifting towards some disturbing ends. Sometimes covertly
and sometimes overtly, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, New
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Labour is ushering us towards a society where civil liberties, like social
justice, are constantly on the defensive.
In the previous chapter I outlined New Labour’s preference for weak
equality and strong reciprocity and in this chapter I have wanted to
suggest that, by tipping the balance away from redistributive rights 
and towards duty-led inclusivity, this preference both derives from and
further engenders a security state. As an amalgamation of conservatism
and social democracy, the security state has not replaced the welfare state,
but subsumed it within a society (1) of social and spatial polarities; (2)
where social problems are pathologised; and (3) of punitive supply-side
reforms. These dimensions are then visible with New Labour’s approach
towards ICTs, where information is conceived as asocial, as commodified
and primarily as a source of surveillance. Along the way, I have hinted at
an alternative approach, one that I termed ‘cyber-criticalism’. Like the
theory of distributive justice offered in the last chapter, we will now put
this to one side until Part II.
So we are almost ready to proceed to Part II and to the outline of 
ecowelfare contained there. However, before we can do so there is one
highly important and influential defence of the NSD that we have not yet
considered at any length.
Note
1 Although I am focusing upon global developments throughout the 1990s, I
believe that developments since 11 September 2001 help to confirm my hypoth-
esis, since the most extreme and hysterical reactions to the attack in the West
have occurred in the paradigm examples of the security state, i.e. it is in the
USA and UK that civil liberties have been subjected to the greatest threat. People
(if governments and newspapers are to be believed) appear more willing than
ever to sacrifice freedom (their own and that of others) in exchange for security.
And this security often takes the form of pre-emptive intervention against the
Other, no matter how remote or improbable the imagined threat.
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The NSD’s defenders have quite a devastating card up their sleeve, 
one which I mentioned in the introductory chapter. Whatever the merits
of the last three chapters’ criticisms – and they would no doubt reject 
all or most of them – there is an argument which potentially trumps 
them all.
It does not matter whether equality of powers or diverse reciprocity or
whatever triumph on the page, what matters is what we can do in the real
world, according to existing circumstances. And if you look at the present
social, economic and political conjuncture, you will see that the circum-
stances are not propitious. Even if the world is bad, it is both self-
indulgent and harmful to the least well-off to refuse to adapt yourself to
it. The old social democracy ran its course and conservatism altered the
agenda in ways that we have to acknowledge and work with. This is what
almost all countries have been doing: neither to praise the welfare state
nor to bury it, but to save it! Like it or not, the NSD is the best we can do
in a bad world.
This argument has an undoubted persuasive force. How should we
respond to it? The premise of this chapter, and so of the book, is that this
argument is not a trump card for two reasons. First, it is at best a sim-
plistic interpretation of post-1970s developments. Conservatism has cer-
tainly been in the ascendancy and the political Centre has certainly shifted
towards the Right, but this is only a broad brush caricature of a very
complex situation. Conservatism may have set the agenda in several
countries, the UK included, but its influence elsewhere has been contested
more effectively and so we must be sensitive to details and nuances that
the above account overlooks. Second, therefore, we should not all be 
sheltering beneath the umbrella of NSD as older traditions continue to
hold sway throughout Europe and the ‘old’ social democracy continues
to thrive, even if with some difficulty, in the Nordic countries.
TZP4  4/25/2005  4:52 PM  Page 73
74 After the new social democracy
So our aim here is to establish that social democracy is more robust
than defenders of the NSD imagine. A further aim of this chapter and the
next is to suggest that the difficulties it faces are best addressed not 
by the productivist form of social democracy but by a post-productivist
one. We begin by examining strong and weak versions of the ‘social 
democracy is dead’ argument and reject both in turn. We then examine
the health of European social democracy and diagnose general good
health, though with several ailments that are cause for concern. We finish
with an initial contrast between productivist and post-productivist
responses to those ailments and conclude that the case for the latter
deserves to be made.
Globalisation again
There are two versions of the argument that social democracy is dead: the
strong argument (SA) and the weak argument (WA). The SA asserts that
globalisation and certain ‘endogenous factors’ (demographic pressures,
technological costs, changes to families and households, taxpayer revolts)
have made social democracy redundant and that it only continues to exist
as a residual after-image that will eventually fade. The WA asserts not 
that social democracy per se is finished, but only those versions that are
socialistic, collectivist, egalitarian, corporatist, Keynesian and welfarist.
Something resembling the NSD is therefore appropriate. Let us examine
the SA first of all.
The strong argument
The SA has been proposed most often by conservatives on a variety of
grounds though we will here confine ourselves to the economic ones.
The economic case revolves around the supposed superiority of free,
flexible and deregulated markets. Evolving in various stages throughout
the 1970s and 1980s, the basic allegation is that an expensive, compre-
hensive welfare state puts a country at a competitive disadvantage in a
globalising economy where capital is mobile and where endogenous
factors already create enough internal pressures for reform. Nations that
therefore refuse to deregulate and privatise will fail to attract investment
and so will undermine their own welfare states anyway once the economy
eventually begins to haemorrhage.
This argument was heard constantly in the early to mid-1990s follow-
ing the final discrediting of command economies and an explosion in
financial markets and, popularised by the IMF (1991), the OECD (1994)
and the World Bank (1994); it still articulates the background assumptions
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of negotiations in and around the G8 and the WTO. The discourse has
become less extreme than that heard in the early 1990s and there are fewer
calls to dismantle state welfare than there are to reconstruct it as a series
of safety nets that would underpin and facilitate economic productivity
on the grounds, not of austerity-for-austerity’s-sake, but because this
would be the best way of preserving the well-being of the poorest (OECD,
1999). (The argument is usually extended on a global scale in assertions
that only free trade can assist the world’s poor.) Does it stand up to
scrutiny, though? There are three main reasons to suspect not.
First, there is enough empirical evidence to show that comprehensive
and expensive welfare states are not at a competitive disadvantage at all
(Leibfried, 2001; Pierson, 2001a; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Sykes et al.,
2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2001). For example, with some reforms (see 
below) the Nordic countries are weathering the global economy fairly
well for various reasons. The high degree of protection that Nordic
welfare states provide assists productivity by allowing the economy to
absorb shocks, by making people less risk-averse and by encouraging
agreement among the social partners (government, employers, unions)
for mutually-beneficial reforms. This evidence could be disputed by
arguing that globalisation actually does its work quite slowly so that the
debilitating effects of state welfare have yet to be fully felt. Time will tell,
though this retreat makes the SA resemble those people who predict the
immanent destruction of the world because they are actually quite looking
forward to it.
Second, the SA focuses upon competitive cost at the expense of com-
petitive quality (Hay, 2001). One way of undercutting your competitor is
to do what he does cheaper, or better or to create a new demand. The SA
advocates a ‘race to the bottom’ – under cover of anticipating one accord-
ing to the ‘iron laws of globalisation’ – because it overemphasises the
importance of competitive cost: to make your labour force attractive, you
must reduce relative wages, reduce the burdens on business (red tape and
employers’ insurance contributions) and make the social protection
system less passive and more flexible. The failure of this race to ma-
terialise on any significant scale indicates that the social cohesion and 
stability which welfare states can engender is as important to the main-
tenance of competitive advantage as cost.
Third, globalisation and endogenous factors are not homogenous 
entities but are differentiated across time and space. One reason for this
is what the ‘new institutionalists’ refer to as ‘path dependency’ (Myles
and Pierson, 2001). Globalisation affects different countries differently
according not only to the political responses they make to it, but to the
environment upon which it impacts and through which it is inevitably
mediated: a complex of institutions, structures, practices and relations are
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socially and historically embedded to the point where they affect
exogenous forces as much as they are affected by them. Context matters.
Globalisation is therefore dialectical (Palier and Sykes, 2001), meaning
that it is constructed differently on a variety of local, national and regional
levels.1 Similarly, endogenous factors vary across time and space, so there
is no such thing as the demographic time-bomb or the family crisis. The
SA is insensitive to these variations.
The weak argument
But if the SA fails what of the WA? This is an altogether trickier proposi-
tion, not least because it is promoted by those who say they come to save
social democracy from itself. The WA can be identified in the work of
Giddens and Merkel, New Labour and Ramesh Mishra – for a variety of
additional arguments for and against social democracy see Chris Pierson
(2001: Ch. 4).
Giddens nowhere provides a substantive argument in support of the
view that globalisation is sweeping all before it. He accepts the interpre-
tation of Hirst and Thompson (1996) that recent developments resemble
a rerun of the international economy between 1870 and 1914, but insists
that what is really important is the dissimilarity with the 1945–75 era of
the Keynesian welfare state; he also accepts that globalisation is not a
‘force of nature’ because it has been engendered by a series of state and
non-state actors (Giddens, 1998: 29–33). Yet despite these acknowledge-
ments of the importance of agency (the agency that constructed the
welfare state and the agency that has challenged it) he still characterises
ours as a ‘runaway world’ that renders old forms of social democracy
unviable (Giddens, 1999, 2000). He does not accept globalisation un-
critically, since without coordination it threatens a kind of market 
fundamentalism that must be resisted, but because Giddens believes 
communication technologies to have sliced open the closed economies
upon which the post-war welfare state allegedly depended, social democ-
racy has to mould itself around the open economies of global finance,
investment and trade through what he calls the ‘social investment 
state’ that nurtures social and human capital rather than egalitarian 
redistribution.
There are a number of criticisms that have been made of Giddens’s
approach to globalisation (Hutton and Giddens, 2000). First, the dis-
tinction between closed and open economies is overdrawn, since all
economies embody relative degrees of closure and openness and one of
the criticisms of the WTO is that it allows affluent nations to impose upon
developing ones an openness that they do not always practicse them-
selves. Nor is it the case that the welfare state depended upon economic
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closure: some welfare states did and some did not; indeed, Rodrik (1998)
and Garrett (1998) maintain that high social expenditure is more con-
sistent with economic openness. Secondly, to the extent that post-war
economies were stable vis-à-vis one another this was due to collective
agreement through the Bretton Woods System, an agreement that even-
tually broke down as a result of political action and inaction rather than
due to any economic law of nature. But what Giddens does is to allow
just enough agency into the picture to justify the NSD, but no more. 
Yet there are no grounds for this and so no grounds for denying that a
substantial global regulatory system could be reconstructed. Thirdly, 
citing the obstacles presented by ICTs is not enough. As we saw in 
the last chapter, governments are perfectly willing and able to regulate
when it suits them. Indeed, markets always depend upon regulation of
one form or another: it is not a question of whether markets are regulated
but in whose interests (Standing, 2002: Ch. 2) and so ‘deregulation’ is 
something of a myth. An inability to regulate market exchanges is 
therefore due not to technological determinism but to a lack of political
will. Finally, Giddens welds ‘Keynesianism’ and ‘old social democracy’
too closely together. This is something that many social democrats have
done (see the introductory chapter) but because Giddens does not want
social democracy to postdate Keynesianism, he has to erase any sugges-
tion that the former predated the latter also (Pierson, 2001: 88–9). So even
if Keynesianism is finished then the case for the NSD is not automatically
made.
Nevertheless, the view that this case is done and dusted has been
prominent in recent years. Wolfgang Merkel (1999) offers one of the
shrewdest accounts by claiming that there is not one Third Way but many:
the British, the Dutch, the Swedish and the French.2 We will be taking a
closer look at recent Swedish and Dutch welfare reforms later on in this
chapter and in the next, but we can immediately raise a number of criti-
cisms. Essentially, like Giddens, Merkel depends upon an overdrawn
series of distinctions between the ‘golden age’ and the present:
Old welfare state New welfare state
Statist corporatism Market facilitation
Redistributive egalitarianism Equal opportunities/supply side
Industrialism/homogeneity Post-industrialism/heterogeneity
Dependency-inducing passivity Activation and flexibility
Rights Responsibilities
Universalism Selectivism targeting the needy
It should be pointed out that Merkel is by no means uncritical of existing
Third Way politics. Even so, his motive is to favourably contrast the NSD
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both with the old social democracy and with conservatism. Doing so,
however, leads him to homogenise all three schools of thought. First, it
can be said that the old welfare state incorporated elements that are
grouped under the new (work-search requirements, citizenship duties,
means testing) and that what Merkel calls the new welfare state inherits
key aspects of the old, e.g. corporatism and egalitarianism have not been
abandoned in countries like Sweden. Second, in order to distant it from
the NSD Merkel identifies conservatism with free markets and the
minimal state. But this characterisation is simplistic. Echoing the point just
made, conservatism does not so much deregulate as reregulate in favour
of the already-powerful; nor does it minimise the state, but allow it to
invade more and more aspects of social and cultural life in order to ensure
that the ‘free’ market is protected. Therefore, if the distance between the
NSD and conservatism is not as great as Merkel imagines, then the rel-
evance of the old social democracy may be more compelling than he
seems to believe (Moschonas, 2002: 80–1, 202, cf. 228–31).
So Merkel does not make either a conceptual or normative case for the
NSD. As argued in this book, the NSD describes a few countries like the
UK and has influenced various others, but to regard it as describing all of
the recent developments within social democratic movements and gov-
ernments is to stretch the portrayal too far (see below). The conclusion of
Chapter 1 was not that the NSD is conservative, but that it represented
the social democratisation of conservatism, reintroducing some old
themes (justice, solidarity) but failing to pull away from the conservative
hegemony.
But if Giddens and Merkel at least make an effort to kill off the ‘old’
social democracy before interring it, New Labour just buries the victim
under cover of darkness (Jordan, 1998; Wetherly, 2001). What is exorcised
from their position is any suggestion of causal structure. For whereas
Castells observes capitalism without capitalists (see Chapter 3) New
Labour lives in a world of capitalists without capitalism. It constantly refers
not to capitalism but to ‘the market’ and so is able to score cheap 
points off those who do not believe in ‘the market’. Fairclough 
(1999: 23–30) underlines the point that, in its speeches, newspaper articles
and White Papers, New Labour reifies the processes and effects of 
globalisation, treating it as if it popped into existence from nowhere. Since 
it is reluctant to challenge capitalism to any great extent, and since 
globalisation is in large part the newest phase of capitalist development,
one that contains many harmful features, New Labour is consequently
reluctant to offer a substantive critical analysis. And without a convinc-
ing account of structure, its conceptualisation of politics is hollowed out
also. Politics is inserted into the picture only once this global economy of
capitalists without capitalism is in place as a fait accompli; we are free but
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we must use our freedom responsibly to compete, to train and retrain, 
to adapt ourselves to ‘changes’, or else be left behind in the global
economy. So, this global environment is regarded as empty of structural
conflicts (Brown, 2000), such that those who engage in conflict must 
therefore be ideological dinosaurs who have failed to adapt and recog-
nise the positive-sum nature of the new economy. Globalisation is there-
fore monolithic (economistic, exogenous, unregulatable, inevitable,
omnipresent) and government’s role is to shape society to those external
pressures by enabling business to innovate and by requiring the labour
force to do so.
As indicated in Chapter 1, what we are faced with here is ideology 
masquerading as pragmatism. New Labour regards the free movement of
capital as inevitable and beneficial, whilst insisting that the migration of
labour needs to be carefully regulated lest it offends national borders and
identities: thus the gulf between (genuine) asylum seekers who are fleeing
persecution and (bogus) immigrants who are coming here for ‘economic’
reasons. The consequence of New Labour’s discourse is that people are
justified in being outraged at ‘bogus asylum seekers’, requiring their sym-
bolic exclusion through dispersal policies and supermarket vouchers, but
have to accept the inevitability of global forces.3 That New Labour is rarely
consistent on this last point, that it is shocked and upset when companies
decide to disinvest, e.g. BMW in 2001, signifies those moments when it is
faced with the inadequacies of its position, when agents act according to
structural imperatives that New Labour has airbrushed from its percep-
tions. Furthermore, upset turns to fury when the structural conflict that
is supposed to be dead suddenly reappears, when another set of actors,
the anti-corporate movement, turns up on the doorstep of those agents
who are determining the shape of this ‘unregulatable’ globalisation. But
rather than address the contradictions of this position – other than a con-
stant reassurance to listen to the protestors next time – it is easier to
condemn those who unreasonably force the local police from Seattle to
Genoa to act brutally.4 In short, the NSD is not justified because of the
advent of globalisation (New Labour’s view); instead, globalisation is
constructed in a certain, conservative way because the NSD needs 
justification.
Finally, Ramesh Mishra (1999) insists that globalisation is one more nail
in the coffin of the post-war, classic welfare state. Our job, he says, should
be to identify and secure the best form of capitalism available: one that
does not sacrifice the ‘social’ in the name of the ‘economic’. So although
the category of social rights is redundant, being no longer acceptable 
to either governments or electorates, it is still possible to imagine social
standards being formulated through some form of communal consensus,
standards that would be relative to that community’s level of economic
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development. These standards could then establish the rules according to
which global capitalism would be regulated.
The problem is that Mishra’s defence of social standards is premised
upon an epitaph for social rights which is without substance and uncriti-
cally translates the experience of countries like the UK to other developed
welfare states. There is no real analysis of this argument, though, and
Mishra is reduced to rehashing old ideas about social rights being un-
attractive because (unlike civil and political rights) they depend upon
public expenditure. Yet if, as Plant (1993) argued long ago, this distinction
is specious then, according to the logic of Mishra’s argument, we would
either have to bury civil and political rights also, or else allow for the
reconstruction of all rights and entitlements, including social ones, at 
the global level. Mishra would presumably dislike the first alternative,
whereas the second is one that he nowhere considers.
We have therefore reviewed three versions of the WA that, whilst being
nowhere comprehensive, indicate that rumours of the ‘old’ social democ-
racy’s death are somewhat premature. But even if arguments for the NSD
fail on these grounds, does this mean that everything is hunky-dory in
the welfare states of traditional social democracies? Not quite.
Family resemblances
If it is simply incorrect to portray the old social democracy as finished, as
having metamorphosised into the NSD along the lines suggested by
Merkel, it would be equally misguided to overlook the cuts and bruises
it has received since the early 1990s. Whether the cause is globalisation,
or the attempt to fulfil EU convergence criteria, or a series of domestic
pressures common to all countries, or problems with social democracy
itself (Glyn, 1998), or political mismanagement, or recession, or some com-
bination of these, social democracies are no longer the laboratories of
socialism that they were once assumed to be. If we take Sweden as our
exemplar, research identifies the following five trends (Callaghan, 2000;
Kosonen, 2001; Timonen, 2001).
First, Sweden’s welfare system has become more employment-oriented
than before. Although it has always operated with activation policies on
job search and what might be called the social democratic version of work-
fare, those policies were joined in the 1990s by cuts in unemployment 
benefits and sickness benefit. Benefits have also been made more 
earnings related and linked to contributions, more people now draw 
assistance benefits, and eligibility criteria were tightened to discourage
fraud. Second, Swedish corporatism is now based less upon social 
criteria, aimed at the maintenance of social solidarity, and more upon
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market criteria and the need to maintain competitive advantage. Third,
taxation and wage policies are also more closely oriented around market
criteria. Incentives have been accorded more importance than before,
leading to support for the creation of low-paid service jobs and lower mar-
ginal rates of taxation at the upper level. Fourth, the growth of public
sector employment has long since levelled out and has been reduced in
line with social expenditure cuts. Finally, pensions have gone through a
number of reforms, e.g. a change from defined benefits to a defined con-
tributions system, that will make pensions less expensive in the future
than under the old system.
However, these trends can only be fully understood if they are seen in
context (Lindbom, 2001). Swedish society is still highly egalitarian.
Despite the pressures it has faced, especially in the early 1990s, income
inequality barely changed throughout the decade (though it did increase
slightly towards the decade’s end) and there are few voices demanding
its dilution. And universalism is still the operating principle despite the
increases in means testing, due to its beneficial affects upon both equal-
ity and solidarity (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Rothstein, 1998). In short,
Sweden’s welfare reforms have defended traditional social democracy
rather than replaced it with an alternative (Pennings, 1999; cf. Ryner, 1999;
Feld, 2000). Its cuts and bruises have not required major surgery. The other
Nordic countries reveal similar ambiguities: some evidence of retrench-
ment and dilution, yet set against a background where social democratic
principles and practices are still healthy and widely supported. This 
reiterates a point made in Chapter 1: conservatism is more likely to fail 
to alter the existing settlement wherever social democracy has laid down
substantial social roots.
But perhaps the defender of NSD could accept the picture just sketched
and yet nevertheless identify NSD as the trend in those countries which
are less committed to traditional social democracy. Two examples. Welfare
reform in the Netherlands predates New Labour and, indeed, goes 
far beyond it in its passion for a more targeted and conditional benefit
system that is offset by a spectacular growth in employment. By 
applying NSD-type reforms, the Dutch Disease of the early 1980s had
been replaced by the Dutch Miracle of the mid-1990s. In France, the 
Jospin government talked Left but acted Right. For example, its pro-
gramme of working-time reductions appealed to socialist aspirations but,
as worked out in practice, embodied a doctrine of market flexibility that
employers in other countries might envy. So here, too, the NSD can be
identified. In short, the NSD signifies a trend across a range of West 
European nations that are trying to create American-style employment
growth without replicating American levels of poverty: flexibility and
security, ‘flexicurity’.
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This is another powerful argument that draws upon the path depen-
dency thesis that we earlier used in defeating the SA. For if it is true that
different historical and social environments blunt the local effects of 
globalisation – so that the global economy does not hollow out national
contexts as the hyperglobalisers imagine (Held et al., 1999) – then it is
equally true that path dependency militates against traditional social
democracy for all but those few (Nordic) countries that possess strong
institutional and cultural roots in that direction. Therefore, egalitarians in
those countries that are not social democratic are far better off support-
ing a NSD that is consistent with those nations’ long-standing support for
market capitalism. This is exactly what New Labour, the ‘Purple Coali-
tion’ and the Parti Socialiste were doing even if, respectively, UK, Dutch
and French versions of the NSD are not identical. So, for instance, to try
and introduce the old social democracy into a conservative context is a
non-runner for precisely the same reason that the SA was a non-runner:
to be successful reform has to go with the grain.
A full response to this interpretation of the path dependency thesis will
be delayed until the next chapter, since it bears considerable implications
for post-productivism. What can be pointed out here is that the above
argument, even in making concessions to the continued strength of the old
social democracy, still works with blunt conceptual tools. For if it is true
that the old social democracy is still thriving, albeit with some dilutions,
it must be equally true that it manifests itself in non-Nordic countries also.
In short, the above argument achieves its effect by distinguishing too
sharply between social democratic and non-social democratic nations and
does not capture the extent to which social democratic traditions, as well
as being fairly heterogeneous, are to be found within and across a much
wider range of welfare states. Therefore, ‘going with the grain’ may be an
argument as much against as for the NSD since, in any one country, there
are several grains, i.e. multiple paths that could be followed, since each is
consistent with that country’s values and institutions.
This is precisely the problem with regime theory and so much of the
comparative analysis upon which it is based (Esping-Andersen, 1990): in
grouping nations according to ideal-types (regimes) it misses the com-
plexities, the nuances, the conflicts and contestations to which all nations
are inevitably subject – a particular criticism of feminist researchers
(Sainsbury, 1999). Even in a conservative country like the USA, there is
no reason for ‘old’ social democrats to thrown in the ideological towel
since there are many aspects of American values and conventions that
support it. ‘Going with the grain’ does not mean we are locked into the
paths that have dominated in the past.
So let us return to the above examples. Although they are broadly sup-
portive of its reforms, Hemerijck and Visser (2001) resist depicting the
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Dutch ‘Polder’ Model as Third Way since they regard this as too much of
a broad-brush description. Green-Pedersen et al. (2001) are willing to 
identify a Third Way across a range of European countries like the 
Netherlands and Denmark, but argue that this represents continuity with
old, egalitarian social democracy rather than discontinuity. Goodin 
et al. (1999) go even further in depicting the Netherlands rather than
Sweden as the archetype of (old) social democracy. Finally, Clift (2000)
argues that the Third Way does not translate into a French context at any-
thing other than a superficial level – though Jospin spent the last two years
of his incumbency trying to imitate it, an attempt that contributed to his
unceremonious defeat in April 2002. In short, the path dependency argu-
ment for the NSD does not succeed. The old social democracy has had to
adapt and reform itself, but those reforms can be interpreted as a defence
of traditional objectives and values rather than as a capitulation to the
NSD.
None of which is to deny the salience of the NSD – otherwise I would
not have spent the previous three chapters arguing against it – but it is to
deny the geographical scope that Blair, Giddens and those such as Merkel
attribute to it. What we find in Europe is not a crude distinction between
the old and new social democracy, and certainly not a situation where the
former must give way to the latter, but a mosaic of social democratic
movements, some of which hegemonise the country in which they are
found and some of which do not. Drawing upon Wittgenstein’s notion of
family resemblance, we could identify overlapping clusters of European
social democracies. In the UK we find a representative form of NSD 
that has accommodated itself to substantial aspects of conservatism; in
Sweden we continue to find a form of old social democracy that has more
or less resisted the sirens of NSD; and in between there is a range of
nations within which both old and new social democrats contend with
each other and with other political traditions and ideas. What unites these
social democracies is commitment to social solidarity and opposition to
laissez-faire markets, but to imagine that they can all be described in terms
of the NSD is to eclipse other countervailing traditions. NSD may have
stretched towards the Right, but this has elongated the social democratic
family rather than having encircled it.
Yet if these arguments stand then far from establishing a case for 
post-productivist social democracy, they seem to support the familiar, pro-
ductivist type. For it is only by proving its compatibility with national
prosperity, investment, competitiveness, productivity and employment
growth that social democracy has been able to persist under such
unfavourable conditions. To replace productivist social democracy with a
post-productivist variant would therefore be inherently risky. It is to this
criticism that we now turn. My argument in the next chapter will be that
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social democracy already finds itself at the door of post-productivism and
throughout Part II I will maintain that it should start to push that door
open.
Post-industrial equality
The last section proposed that, although the SA and the WA fail, 
European social democracy finds itself in an ambivalent position. It is still
prospering in both its old and new forms, but has received some bruises
since the early 1990s and its electoral strength by 2002 looked less im-
pressive than just 5 years earlier. Its welfare systems continue to attract
popular support but have been subject to various degrees of retrenchment
in differing countries. The divergence of European welfare regimes 
has therefore not collapsed and there is no convergence around a single
welfare model – the NSD or anything else. Nevertheless, some kind of
paradigm shift has occurred and the divergence of welfare states may well
have been reconstituted. As such, some are concerned about the future
viability of social democracy within this new paradigm. Bonoli et al. (2000: 
Ch. 8, 160) foresee the greater use of private provision, widening in-
equalities and the subversion of ‘welfare objectives’ to the imperatives of 
competitiveness. Europe, they say, therefore faces a future of ‘divergence
within convergence’.
This notion of divergence within convergence, or what we might call
‘relative reconvergence’, is articulated most forcefully by Bob Jessop
(1994, 1999, 2002) in arguing that the Keynesian Welfare National State
(KWNS) has gradually been replaced by a Schumpeterian Workfare Post-
national Regime (SWPR). The KWNS incorporated four dimensions. First,
it secured the conditions for full employment through a demand-side
management of the economy. Second, economic and social policies were
closely attached to citizenship rights. Third, it subordinated local, regional
and international states to national economic and social priorities. Finally,
it was statist, in so far as the mixed economy was shaped and guided 
by state institutions. Despite its successes, though, an ongoing paradigm
shift, ultimately due to the transformation of Fordism into post-Fordism,
can be traced to the 1980s, whereby the KWNS has been gradually trans-
formed into the SWPR. Jessop is at pains to point out that the latter is as
characterised by divergence as the former, so that this shift took a number
of complex and multiple paths. Nevertheless, he claims that those paths
have led us to a new paradigm: the SWPR.
First, it is Schumpeterian and so is characterised by a permanent 
revolution of innovation and flexibility in the name of competitiveness.
Economic and labour market instability therefore becomes the organising
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principle. Second, the SWPR is concerned with workfare rather than
welfare, in that social policy is subordinated to the demands of com-
petitive flexibility. The needs and rights of individuals take second place
to the needs and interests of business, as paid employment is widely
assumed to be the main source of well-being. Social policies become less
concerned with demand-side interventions and more with improving the
supply of labour by equating ‘citizens’ with ‘workers’ and remaking the
latter into dynamic, risk-taking entrepreneurs who embrace market inse-
curity. Those at the bottom of the income ladder can then be assisted with
workfare policies (King, 1995, 1999). Third, policies become postnational
as the nation-state is ‘hollowed out’: upwards towards international agen-
cies and interstate forums, downwards towards regional and local levels
and sideways towards cross-border forms of governance. Finally, the state
plays less of a role in the SWPR. Or, rather, the state must enter into a
variety of partnerships with the private and voluntary sectors in a ‘mixed
economy’ of social welfare provision.
Therefore, in order to survive the demise of the KWNS, liberal, con-
servative and social democratic regimes have transformed themselves
into liberal, conservative and social democratic versions of the SWPR.
Although Jessop has been criticised for being too economistic, his analy-
sis does capture the fears of many contemporary social democrats. For it
is not that social democracy is on the slippery slope towards a conserva-
tive ditch, since social democracy may be as compatible with post-Fordist
globalisation as conservatism, if not more so, but that the upward 
trajectory of social democracy has vanished. Post-war social democracy
depended upon an expansion in social expenditure, the public sector and
the hope of some that, if taken far enough, welfare capitalism would give
way to welfare socialism. But if, as Paul Pierson (2001b) insists, we have
entered an era of ‘permanent austerity’ then we face not necessarily the
contraction of social democracy but a politics of compromise whereby
aspirations for a post-capitalist society have been closed off forever. Put
simply, the horizons of the SWPR are narrower than those of the KWNS
and social democracy may find it harder to breathe within this confined
space than its liberal and conservative alternatives.
What shape might this politics of compromise take?
The problem
Whereas Jessop’s account draws upon the post-Fordist debate, I want to
answer this question through the lens of a different but not dissimilar
debate, that of post-industrialism.
One of the most influential post-industrial accounts is provided by
Iversen and Wren (1998) drawing upon the ideas of Baumol (1967).
Social democracy in Europe 85
TZP4  4/25/2005  4:52 PM  Page 85
86 After the new social democracy
Baumol argued that productivity increases in manufacturing were always
likely to outstrip those in the service sector, since the latter is inevitably
labour intensive. Whether it be public services or private ones, we
consume services precisely because of the labour involved: computers
may supplement but can never replace the teacher or personal tutor; and
you go to a restaurant precisely in order to be served by a waiter. Baumol
predicted that although service prices would therefore remain high, the
demand for those services would also remain high so that the service
sector would absorb the jobs lost in the more efficient manufacturing
sector. With more and more workers employed in the service sector, the
economy would face reductions in productivity and so reductions in the
rate of economic growth with inevitable knock-on effects: lower growth
means less growth in wages which therefore means less revenue from 
taxation and payroll contributions. The fiscal basis of the welfare state is
consequently undermined. In a demographically static society this might
not matter, but since all societies face ageing populations, then the
demand for health care, elderly care and pensions rises as the state’s
ability to fund that demand declines.
According to Iversen and Wren (1998), these post-industrial changes
lead us towards a ‘trilemma’ where we must trade-off between employ-
ment growth, wage equality and budgetary constraint: we can achieve
two of these objectives but not all three. Conservative societies prioritise
employment and budgets. According to conservatives, the answer to the
trilemma is a strong private sector with employment growth at the low-
wage end of the labour market, benefit reforms to prod the unemployed
into that labour market (‘a low wage is better than no wage’) and the pri-
vatisation of large parts of the welfare state, e.g. the shift towards private
and occupational pensions in the UK in the 1980s. The price is a massive
degree of income inequality and the individualisation of risks and costs.5
Corporatist welfare states prioritise equality and budgets. High payroll
costs offer workers an impressive degree of protection through high
replacement ratios, but public sector expansion is contained. The problem
is a gulf between labour market insiders and outsiders, leading to high
rates of unemployment amongst the latter and the conservative allegation
that generous social insurance systems are inflexible, inefficient and 
so unaffordable. Social democracies prioritise employment and equality.
The public sector provides a large degree of employment and wage 
equality, but the problem is that depends upon very high levels of social
expenditure.
None of these responses to the trilemma is economically superior 
to the others, they each have advantages and disadvantages, such that 
our preference is ultimately a matter of politics, morals and (if we take
path dependency seriously) historical inheritance. The problem for each
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welfare regime in the future is in coping with its ‘excluded objective’. 
Can conservative societies contain the social pressures caused by in-
come inequality? (The attempt to decrease income inequality without
destabilising employment growth and budgetary constraint is precisely 
what characterises the NSD.) Can corporatist ones reduce unemploy-
ment? Is social democracy still affordable? Many social democrats there-
fore worry not that its resolution of the trilemma is logically weaker than
the others, but that high social expenditure is becoming harder and harder
to maintain.
Of course, much of the above can be disputed. Leys (2001: 90–5; Mahon,
2000: 34; cf. Schwartz, 2001) argues that Baumol underestimates the 
extent to which, given capitalism’s propensity to commodify anything
and everything, productivity increases in the service sector are possible.
Nevertheless, and whatever the timescale involved, the evidence sup-
porting Baumol’s thesis is impressive (Huther, 2000; Iversen, 2001). How
then might social democracy best cope with its excluded objective? How
do we maintain employment growth and wage equality whilst keeping
social expenditure within high but nevertheless acceptable limits?
Possible solutions
These are the questions with which contemporary social democrats are
wrestling. There is no space here to review all facets of the debate and the
contributions made by those such as Leisering and Leibfried (1999) and
Gershuny (2000) will be placed to one side, though we will make passing
reference to Goodin et al. (1999) – for a critique of all three, see Fitzpatrick
(2003b). However, there are several suggestions that I would like to
examine and we shall do so in the form proposed by Huber and Stephens
(2001: 324–31).
First, Huber and Stephens make the point that what matters is less the
ageing of the population and more the ratio of the economically active to
the economically inactive. In this respect social democracies are better
equipped to meet the demographic challenges of the future, for whereas
conservative countries also have an impressive record of job creation, the
low wages of the latter displace rather than address the demographic
problem. High labour market participation rates, of women as much as
men, are therefore the sine qua non of social democracy.
Second, domestic investment has to be encouraged and they suggest
this be done through social insurance funds. However, because these
funds would quickly become the ‘dominant owners of stocks, bonds and
money markets’ (Huber and Stephens, 2001: 326), and because it is 
necessary to prevent the kind of backlash that killed the Meidner plan in
the 1970s, those funds should own and be owned ‘passively’. Moreover,
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continued wage restraint is necessary, especially if investment is to be em-
phasised above profits. The insurance funds could be invaluable in this
respect also, since by improving the share of capital that accrues to wage
earners, workers would have a built-in incentive not to drain the resources
needed for investment.
Third, payroll contributions should be reduced so long as employers
agree to deploy the revenue for investment purposes rather than profits
or dividends. This would then boost jobs at the lower end of the pay scale,
requiring some kind of tapered benefit scheme to improve the resulting
incomes of those who take such jobs. What they are hinting at is a Nega-
tive Income Tax (NIT) (Scharpf, 2000). Furthermore, those entering the
labour market at the lower end need some kind of additional protection
if they are not to be trapped in such jobs permanently. Esping-Andersen
(1999: 178–84) recommends a ‘mobility guarantee’ that would limit the
amount of time each individual was forced to remain in low-waged, unre-
warding jobs.
Finally, social democracies need to follow the Dutch example in creat-
ing more ‘part-time jobs, opportunities for job sharing, and flexibilization
of work schedules’ (Huber and Stephens, 2001: 327). This in turn requires
a scheme of benefits for part-time workers. Furthermore, greater flexibil-
ity in hiring and firing is desirable so long as generous compensation and
retraining programmes are available for those workers made redundant.
The justification that Huber and Stephens (2001: 184) offer for the above
proposals involves a reformulation of decommodification, defined by
Esping-Andersen (1990: 21–2) as occurring ‘when a person can maintain
a livelihood without reliance upon the market’. But if this implies
‘freedom from the market’ then social democracies have never been based
upon this as an operating principle. Instead, they have been, and must
always be, based upon a strong level of participation in the market.
Decommodification captures the idea that people should have entitle-
ments to an adequate standard of living when involuntarily separated
from the labour market, but for Huber and Stephens the key social demo-
cratic principle is active participation. This goes some way to meeting the
feminist objection to Esping-Andersen’s formulation – that it ignores the
patriarchal effects of decommodification for women – and offers what
Orloff (1993: 318) calls a ‘right to commodification’.
If these proposals define a productivist future for social democracy,
then what can we say against them? Why should we even try when they
appear eminently desirable? Let us run through them again.
First, the distinction between active and inactive is simply too crude.
The implicit premises are that employment equals activity and unem-
ployment equals inactivity. Yet there are relatively few people who are
economically inactive. If, for example, a retired grandfather looks after his
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granddaughter for several days a week then the net gain to the economy
is obvious, since this is work that neither his child’s employer nor the state
now has to perform. Undoubtedly, lower levels of activity do correlate
with old age (especially after the age of 80) and with certain conditions
like unemployment and sickness, but a simple active/inactive dichotomy
does not capture this complexity.
Furthermore, what is important is not so much ‘activity’ as ‘value’.
High-activity employment that is environmentally unsustainable may be
of less long-term value than low-activity non-employment which is eco-
logically friendly. So although social democracies are rightly regarded as
environmental pioneers (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997) even their record
is mixed (Grant et al., 2000: 118, 140–1), as we shall see in the next chapter,
and it may be that a new conceptualisation of value – one that interprets
economic health in terms of environmental health – is needed.
Second, the idea that insurance funds should own and be owned 
passively, merely as sources of investment and wage restraint, resembles
the kind of asset egalitarianism long championed by Meade (1995) and
implies that participation in the economy is active so far as the labour
market is concerned, but passive when it comes to the structural and insti-
tutional foundations of the labour market, i.e. the distinction between wage
earners and profit earners is maintained, though to the greater benefit of
the latter. This would certainly represent an improvement on existing cap-
italism, even social democratic variants, but somewhat gives the lie to the
equation of social democracy with active participation. In truth, social
democracy is active with regards to the labour market, but relatively
passive in terms of democratic participation in the economy.6 So as with
activity/inactivity, the active/passive dichotomy is constructed according
to some familiar and quite conservative orthodoxies.
Third, what of NIT plus a mobility guarantee? The problem with NIT
– and with the tax credit schemes that are working towards it (Jordan 
et al., 2000) – is that it derives from the orthodox constructions that the last
two paragraphs have queried: that activity and active participation need
greater incentives than the ‘incentives’ of inactivity and passivity – the
attractions of the latter are usually assumed by NIT advocates rather than
explained. NIT and BI are administratively and financially similar, yet by
being ex ante the latter provides a degree of security and risk taking that
the ex post provision of the former cannot match (van Parijs, 2000). NIT
also represents an ‘Oliver Twist’ form of citizenship (‘please, sir, can I have
some more?’) that elides the apparent equity between those who would
and those who would not need to draw it (Fitzpatrick, 1999a: Ch. 5).
The initial problem with Esping-Andersen’s mobility guarantee – apart
from the fact that it is based upon a superficial rejection of BI – is that it
saves social democracy by destroying part of it, i.e. by proposing that the
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maintenance of budgetary constraint requires greater income inequality,
and does not explore other potential sources of value and revenue. This
‘equality within inequality’ approach is justified by giving it a temporal
rather than a social dimension: social equality is to be maintained through
occasional periods of low wages and insecurity. But is this distinction
plausible? Esping-Andersen states that the time limit on those periods is
to be guaranteed through effective education and retraining schemes –
rather than through the guarantee of public sector jobs, presumably
because this would reintroduce the budgetary dilemma. This seems to
indicate that the risks of inequality would fall upon the individual and,
more likely than not, disadvantaged individuals: ‘skills are the single best
source of escape from underprivilege’, he states (Esping-Andersen, 1999:
183). Yet Esping-Andersen avoids the implications of his recommenda-
tions by quickly substituting the reference to ‘underprivilege’ with that of
‘unpleasantness’. Risks will not fall disproportionately upon the poorest,
he implies, because ‘many of us will experience a spell of unpleasantness’.
Yet if this rhetorical slip from underprivilege to unpleasantness means
anything, it means that Esping-Andersen is concealing (perhaps from
himself) the true import of ‘equality within inequality’, for it is not unrea-
sonable to anticipate that the ‘unpleasantness’ will continue to fall most
frequently and most catastrophically upon the least well-off. In short, tem-
poral stratification is a manifestation of social stratification and not its
replacement (Fitzpatrick, 2003b).
Finally, Huber and Stephens recommend more part-time jobs, job
sharing and work flexibility. Here I am in agreement, but this still leaves
open the question of civic context. Goodin et al. (1999: 225–36) also praise
the Dutch model as coming close to the ideal of ‘combined resource auton-
omy’ where individuals have enough income to meet basic needs and
enough free time to make use of that income. However, this embodies a
rather hollow, negative conception of free time (freedom from employ-
ment) rather than the more positive conception of informal, civic engage-
ment that Gorz (1999) and Jordan with Jordan (2000) discuss. So free time
is as much about quality as quantity and, because quality requires socially
just background conditions, we are again referred back to the kind of insti-
tutional reforms that the social democratic principle of ‘active labour
market participation’ (productivism) only touches upon.
From productivism to post-productivism
Huber and Stephens’s critique of decommodification is therefore relevant
but limited. It captures a productivist conception of social democracy, but
ignores the possibility of a post-productivist alternatives. By incorporat-
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ing the notion of ‘involuntary separation’ from the labour market it retains
a pathologised view of socioeconomic interdependency and reaffirms the
‘employment ethic’: the assumption that employment is and should be the
principal means for achieving wellbeing (Fitzpatrick, 1998b). This is not to
define post-productivism, as Goodin (2001) unhelpfully does, as ‘welfare
without work’ but it is to detach wellbeing from employment to a greater
extent than most social democrats seem presently willing to contemplate.
Post-productivist welfare therefore agrees that the challenge of the
postindustrial trilemma needs to be addressed, but suspects that pro-
ductivist dichotomies of activity/inactivity and active/passive divert us
away from sources of social and ecological value that are deeper than
those captured by the principle of ‘active labour market participation’.
Social democratic versions of productivism are preferable to conservative
and infinitely preferable to conservative ones, yet risk ossifying into
another end-of-history ideology unless we can push through towards
post-productivist institutions and relations. Let me underline this last
point.
Post-productivism is opposed to the ideology of productivity, not the
practice. If productivity implies increases in the transformation of natural
resources into sources of wealth then post-productivism insists that those
increases be assessed according to moral criteria that do not derive from
the discourse of production itself (criteria specified in the next chapter).
There is little point in supporting an economic system where the only end
of productivity is the search for more productivity. Social democratic pro-
ductivism has thankfully generated high levels of well-being, but the ulti-
mate end of social democracy should be the maintenance of those levels
without having to live in an employment society where we are required
to spend so much of our lives being ‘active’ in this narrow sense. For
instance, Huber and Stephens (2001: 326) talk about more income accru-
ing to wage earners but neglect the issue of time accumulation. Indeed,
unless productivism aims at its own demise then the moral (as opposed
to the economic) case for social democracy is undermined. If we could
start society again from an original position we would have three options:
(1) to avoid productivism altogether, (2) to use and then transcend it or
(3) to perpetuate it forever. The third option is meaningless. If social
democrats do not realise this then, to misuse Bevan, they are proudly dis-
playing the medals won in the battles that they have already lost.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that social democracy is much more robust
than either conservatives or even new social democrats suppose.
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Although some parties and countries have moved identifiably towards
the Right, others have been able to weather the storms of social and eco-
nomic changes without abandoning the core precepts of the old social
democracy. However, this is not to claim that post-war welfare states can
simply be resurrected with a wave of the political wand and when looking
to the future social democracy (old and new) undoubtedly faces 
some hefty challenges whether we characterise this in post-Fordist terms
(Jessop) or postindustrial ones (Iversen and Wren). According to those
such as Huber and Stephens (and Esping-Andersen) social democracy can
meet those challenges by re-emphasising its productivist principles and
institutions. However, I have introduced several reasons why the case for
a post-productivist social democracy deserves to be made. We will pick
up these themes again in Chapter 5.
We are now ready to define, theorise and explore post-productivism in
more detail and this is the task for Part II.
Notes
1 We examine path dependency below and return to it again in Chapter 5.
However, I want to explain at the outset that although it is a useful tool for criti-
cising the SA it, too, carries conservative implications in that it risks ossifying
the existing political environment and so underestimating the potential for
radical change (Gray, 1998). Therefore, path dependency is a useful tool with
which to criticise the hyperglobalisers, those who would hollow out all local
contexts in the name of the global economy, but is not necessarily an accurate
depiction of those local contexts.
2 A position close to that I expressed in Chapter 1 when arguing that there are
multiple political Centres.
3 Vouchers were eventually curtailed in 2002, but not before the Government’s
discourse had effectively legitimised the attitudes of the British National Party
and done so at the very time when the far Right was on the move across the
rest of Europe.
4 Though note how New Labour’s response to employers’ revolts, e.g. the Fuel
Protestors in 2000 or the Countryside Alliance in 1999–2000, has been far more
muted and respectful.
5 2002 brought additional evidence that private pensions are not the panacea that
Conservatives and New Labour imagine them to be, with many private schemes
shifting towards the defined contributions or money-purchase model that pro-
vides less security in old age for many.
6 I say relatively passive because I am aware of social democracy’s favourable
record in achieving social partnership and cooperation. Nevertheless, this cor-
poratism still falls short of the kind of economic democracy that is the ultimate
rationale for Centre-Left politics.
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5Productivism and beyond
In Part I, we began by outlining the main principles of the NSD, using
New Labour as our exemplar. I outlined the major criticisms and argued
that the main problem with the NSD is that, although it should not be
equated with conservatism, it fails to establish a distinct and convincing
alternative to the conservative hegemony. Chapter 2 began to substanti-
ate this position, defining the NSD as support for weak equality and
strong reciprocity, in contrast to an alternative theory of distributive
justice (equality of powers plus diverse reciprocity) that I believe a more
radical politics should aim towards. Chapter 3 argued that the NSD
derives from and embeds a security state that has remodelled the welfare
state and reconfigured needs as risks and fears; the security state was then
further explored in terms of New Labour’s approach to information and
ICTs. In the last chapter I then questioned the scope of the NSD, showing
that ‘old’ social democracy is still very much alive, though not without
difficulties. However, I also suggested that productivist reforms are not
the only potential solution to the post-industrial dilemmas that social
democracy faces.
We have therefore laid the ground for Part II where our focus shifts
from the NSD to what I call ‘ecowelfare’. Since ecowelfare is a post-pro-
ductivist form of social democracy, theoretical and practical hints of which
can be found lurking within existing social democracy itself, then our first
task is to define and justify what is meant by post-productivism. This then
leads into a model of ecowelfare. Rather than expose you to an overlong
chapter, we will here focus upon post-productivism and then use Chapter
6 to explore ecowelfare.
Productivism and post-productivism
Robert Goodin (2001) offers an interesting purchase on these ideas. He
categorises welfare regimes in terms of the relationship between welfare
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and work: conservative welfare states are based upon the ideal of ‘work
not welfare’, corporatist ones are based upon ‘welfare through work’ and
social democracies are based upon ‘welfare and work’. In other words,
whereas conservatives interpret welfare and work as crowding each 
other out, social democrats regard them as being complementary and 
conservatives adopt a middle position between the two. On this basis,
Goodin defines the ideal of post-productivism as ‘welfare without work’
and identifies the Netherlands as the embryo of a post-productivist
welfare system. Yet as suggestive as Goodin’s formulation is, there are at
least three problems with it.
First, as a description of the relationship between work and welfare
policy it is reasonably accurate, but it says little about welfare in the more
philosophical sense of well-being. Second, by gathering both waged and
unwaged labour under the heading of ‘work’, Goodin confuses work with
employment, although he is undoubtedly aware of the distinction, and
intimates that attitudes towards unwaged work can be read off from atti-
tudes towards waged work, though feminist researchers have argued for
years that things are not so simple (e.g. Lewis, 1992). Third, Goodin’s
encapsulation of post-productivism is a hostage to fortune, since it 
is hardly realistic at present to imagine an employmentless society and
certainly not a workless one! Nevertheless, so long as these points 
are remembered we can use Goodin’s formulation as a starting 
point for understanding the contrast between productivism and post-
productivism.
The common denominator for each of these welfare regimes is waged
work. They may disagree on the nature of citizenship rights and duties,
and on the relation between formal and informal labour, but the commit-
ment to employment is pivotal to all three. This commitment derives ulti-
mately from the view that underpins all developed societies: something
is valuable proportionate to the extent to which it contributes to produc-
tivity growth, i.e. social value is primarily economic value. This does not
mean that activities which do not contribute to, or even subtract from,
productivity growth are necessarily devalued, but it does mean that they
are undervalued, that the farther we stray from economic criteria then the
harder it is to justify non-economic sources of value. There is, we could
say, a kind of ‘economic gradient’ by which moral, aesthetic, emotional
and natural values must constantly struggle to overcome the event
horizon of the economic. This gradient tends to be more severe in con-
servative versions of capitalism than in social democratic ones, as the cash
nexus is more prominent in the former, but although social democratic
capitalism has reduced the gradient, it has nowhere near eliminated it,
due partly to the fact that the traditional labour movement has sought to
distribute social goods more widely rather than reconfigure the meaning
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of social value. Productivism is therefore the insistence that employment
is the principal means by which growth in productivity can be effected
because it is easier to increase capital stock, and therefore output, through
formal than through informal activity, since the former involves more spe-
cialisation, more division of labour and a greater potential for substitut-
ing labour with capital. So just as social value largely signifies economic
value, so work revolves around the norms of employment.
Before defining post-productivism, I should indicate how the above
account differs from some other recent theorists. Holliday (2000: 708–9)
characterises productivist welfare as an alternative to Esping-Andersen’s
typology and identifies it as an East Asian regime for which ‘social policy
is strictly subordinate to the overriding policy objective of economic
growth’. He therefore interprets productivism as the subordination of
‘state policy’ to economic growth, a subordination that even liberal and
conservative systems avoid. Yet this is too narrow a conception of pro-
ductivism, since economic growth is everywhere the sine qua non of social
policy and although welfare states may differ in the degree of subordi-
nation they embody, none has sought to invert it. Holliday imagines that
decommodification implies freedom from the labour market when, in
practice and as indicated in the last chapter, it offers only relative freedom.
This is not a mistake made by Dahl et al. (2001: 301), though even 
they too tend to interpret productivism as activation policies rather than
as a logic that underpins modern welfare. It is Offe (1984: 296–99; 1993:
67–72) who manages to trace that logic through the ontological and cog-
nitive frames of modernity, regarding it as that through which a complex
of political and cultural practices constructs as natural, desirable and 
self-evident activity which is most conducive to the commodification of
well-being.
Although there is no space here to critique Offe’s approach in any
depth, he does suggest that there are at least two counterpoints to the
reduction of social to economic value and of work to employment. First,
there is carework, most of which is unwaged and most of which contin-
ues to be performed by women. Carework possesses obvious economic
value, in that it involves the performance of activity that neither the cap-
italist market nor the state have either the inclination or the ability to
remunerate fully (Waring, 1988), which is exactly why public carework
services have been established almost everywhere in recent decades.
Indeed, there have been various attempts to estimate the shadow value
of carework, i.e. the extent to which it would increase GDP. However,
although carework possesses economic value, economic value is not its
primary rationale. We do not have children in order to populate the future
economy, or look after us in old age; we do not care for elderly relatives
in order to make a profit.1 The value of carework does not derive from
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our willingness to pay for it in a market. Therefore economic value is 
a consequence of carework, but not its motivation; some carework can 
and should be performed as waged activity, and should be factored 
much more closely into social and economic policies than at present, but
most carework will always remain informal, performed for reasons of
emotional belonging. In short, carework is largely non-employment work
and a form of value captured by the term ‘emotional labour’. We will
return to these points in Chapter 6.
Second, there is the ecological value of the environment. Greens have
long pointed out that, whatever your ideological interpretation of it, eco-
nomic value depends upon and feeds off an environmental substructure
(Henderson, 1981; O’Connor, 1998; Douthwaite, 1999; cf. Brennan, 2000,
2001). The resources we mine and the ecosystem we pollute once those
resources have been utilised are the origin of economic value. Locke’s 
definition of property, as the mixing of labour with the fruits of the earth,
gave rise to the labour theory of value where labour is implicitly defined
as ‘active’ and nature as ‘passive’ leading, whether subsequently cloaked
in capitalist or Marxist costume, to an emphasis upon labour rather than
the nature that labour converts into commodities. For Greens, by contrast,
the environment’s value may be quantified to some extent (Pearce, 2000),
but ultimately transcends the economic. As argued in Chapter 6, to con-
vert each and every aspect of nature into the commodity form is the pre-
ferred solution of productivism, but one that is ultimately self-defeating.
Most Greens therefore argue that no economic system is fully capable 
of preserving the environment: it is certainly necessary to ‘Green’ the
economy, but even a Green economy could not perform all of the work of
sustainability that needs to be done. For this, a wider conception of social
activity and participation is required. In short, sustainable work takes us
beyond the employment society in order to preserve the intrinsic essence
of ecological value.
These counterpoints resemble each other in that both are concerned
with the emotional and ecological conditions of economic value, but con-
ditions that can be only partially nurtured by the employment society,
given the dominance it accords to economic value (the economic gradi-
ent). At the end of the last chapter I mentioned the importance of devis-
ing criteria that do not derive from the discourse of production. What I
now propose is that we regard the above emotional and ecological con-
ditions as providing us with such criteria, the means by which produc-
tivity (the transformation of emotional and natural resources into sources
of wealth) should be judged. I therefore propose to incorporate emotional
and ecological value under the heading of ‘reproduction’. Reproductive
value refers to the emotional and ecological foundations of economic
value, that upon which economic value is founded, but which it can never
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fully incorporate or commodify, since care and sustainability imply forms
of activity so extensive that they can never be completely quantified or
reduced to economic criteria. Reproductive value and economic value
therefore share ambiguities vis-à-vis one another. Economic value
depends upon the reproduction of its conditions, but cannot acknowledge
this dependency, since no economy is wealthy enough to fully compen-
sate for the emotional and ecological costs that it creates: the ethics of
affluence and growth are undermined the moment we render visible the
foundations upon which they rest, because it is these foundations which
they are gradually eroding. Reproductive value is the ultimate source of
economic value, yet it is the destructive effects of affluence and growth
which now provide us with the reflexive skills and resources needed 
to preserve reproductive activity. Reproductive and economic values
therefore push both away from and towards one another.
Productivism is that which would subsume reproduction within the
sphere of production, insisting that the costs of the employment society
can be incorporated within an economic logic, e.g. by insisting that care-
work and sustainability are job and therefore growth friendly. Post-
productivism is that which would subsume production within the spheres
of reproduction, insisting that those costs are beyond the capacity of the
employment society to fully recognise and absorb, so that we must alter
our conceptions of value and so of affluence, growth and work. Post-
productivism is therefore a doctrine of ‘reproductivity’, whereby produc-
tive activity is justified if and only if it can be demonstrated that the 
emotional and ecological sources of production are enhanced. Reproduc-
tivity does not, then, deny the importance of productivity, but subjects it
to ‘non-productivist’ criteria, i.e. it is opposed to the ideology of produc-
tivism but not to productivity per se, since productivity growth may be
crucial to the maintenance of reproductive value – though the extent to
which this is true cannot be judged theoretically. Of course, productivists
will argue that productivity is never an end in itself and that economic
growth is pursued not for its own sake, but to improve human well-being.
Post-productivists answer that this ideal no longer prevails (if it ever did)
and that the well-being we are allowed to experience has narrowed to an
economistic range upon which it is consequently dependent. Rather than 
economic growth serving improvements in well-being, it is the narrow-
ing of well-being that serves the pursuit of economic growth. For post-
productivists, therefore, it is increasingly necessary to foreground
emotional and ecological values that underpin the economic, but which
are not reducible to it.
This contrast between productivism and post-productivism may throw
light on the faultlines in radical politics. Many within feminism, environ-
mentalism and on the Left advocate the productivist route (Midgely, 1997;
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Bowles and Gintis, 1998; Gough, 2000: Ch. 8). ‘Wage-earner feminism’
prizes Orloff’s right to commodification and says that gender equality 
is best delivered through dual breadwinning households; ecological 
modernisers insist that Green reforms are ineffective unless they 
promote productive activity; the labour movement has long argued for
better ways of creating and distributing, rather than reconstituting, 
economic growth. However, others advocate what we here call post-
productivism on the grounds that productivism undermines the sources
of its own value and so is ultimately self-defeating. Some feminists point
to the disadvantages of dual breadwinning, e.g. that it predicates gender
equality upon the repertoires of masculinity; many Greens argue that 
ecological modernisation is a short-term solution at best; the post-
industrial Left calls for approaches that do not try to beat capitalism at its
own game.
So should we base our radical politics upon productivism or post-
productivism? The strongest support for productivist radicalism can 
be found in social democracies, for here we witness not only distributive
justice, but also a large degree of gender equality and the gradual emer-
gence of sustainable economics.
Feminist researchers nearly always praise social democracies, though
they also acknowledge the incompleteness of the social democratic record.
Plantenga et al. (1999) note that the Netherlands idealises the equal
sharing of time between waged and unwaged work and between men and
women. However, although women’s labour market participation has
increased, there has been no corresponding increase in men’s care partici-
pation and so women are still the secondary earners in a ‘one-and-a-half-
earner’ model (Lewis, 2001). The Dutch system salutes part-time
employment as the means of combining employment and care, but it is
primarily women who take such jobs and so the government has not yet
created a ‘twice-three-quarter’ model where both men and women are in
the labour market for approximately 4 days per week. Policies still favour
breadwinning and thus the privatisation and feminisation of care. Accord-
ing to Tracey Warren (2000), Denmark too pulls away from the male
breadwinner model, but only half successfully as unwaged work remains
underemphasised and, as in the Netherlands, because the substitute for
male breadwinning is regarded as dual breadwinning, then considerable
remnants of male breadwinning nevertheless remain as women are con-
centrated away from the core jobs that men have little incentive to vacate.
There is a similar pattern visible in Sweden: high rates of female partici-
pation in the labour market combined with generous childcare and
parental leave policies. The price, though, is a labour market with some
of the most sexually segregated divisions to be found anywhere, with
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women grouped into public sector jobs and the one-and-a-half model also
visible here (Sainsbury, 1999).
Is the ambiguous record of social democracy due to relatively simple
policy failures that await rectification? Or might those policies be perfectly
consistent with the productivist logic that underpins them?2 Productivist
logic demands either lots of waged breadwinning or lots of unwaged care-
giving (or preferably both): the former facilitates economic growth, since
improvements in output are easier to achieve through formal activity; the
latter is consistent with economic growth so long as employment levels
are reasonably high. Conservative and social democratic nations 
depend upon high rates of breadwinning, though the former prefers low-
wage jobs in the private sector, whereas the latter prefers high-wage 
jobs in the public one. Corporatist welfare states by contrast have 
strong insider/outsider markets and so have low rates of female partici-
pation and therefore high levels of unwaged caregiving. What the pro-
ductivist logic cannot countenance is lots of remunerated caregiving, since
this seems to subtract from growth by being neither inexpensive nor ori-
ented to productivity increases. In a productivist economy, then, employ-
ment (labouring for another) must be promoted over carework (labouring
for others).
So the ambiguous successes and failures of productivist social democ-
racy is no accident. Whereas social democracy is able to pay women to
enter the labour market, and so expand the very caregiving services that
those women need, it cannot pay men to leave, it since this would strain
social expenditure to bursting point. This is not to decry social democ-
racy’s record on gender equality, nor to predict that future improvements
will not be made, but it is to observe that there are productivist limits to
the feminist agenda: male breadwinning can only be reduced if it is
replaced by dual breadwinning, though evidence shows that the latter
retains considerable residues of the former.
Similarly, evidence also suggests that social democratic societies are the
Greenest (Lafferty, 2001). We hinted at this in the previous chapter and,
in the mid-1990s, then Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson was talking
of creating a Green welfare state and society (quoted in Lundqvist, 2001a).
Action, though, has languished behind the rhetoric and, because of the
stress upon international market competitiveness, the emphasis has been
placed upon technological, end-of-the-pipe fixes, top-down managerial-
ism rather than grassroots democracy, a win–win philosophy that avoids
the difficult questions of trade-off and a legacy whereby Swedish indus-
try has developed through environmental exploitation (Jamison and
Baark, 1999) – Sverrisson (2001) suggests that this is for reasons of 
pragmatism. Environmental concerns have not been integrated into the
Productivism and beyond 101
TZP5  4/25/2005  4:53 PM  Page 101
102 After the new social democracy
wider array of economic, social and welfare issues, unless to justify a
‘business as usual’ approach (Eckerberg, 2000, 2001). Jamison and Baark
(1999: 217) find that Denmark’s record is better, but that, even here, envi-
ronmental policies have not been integrated in the social lifeworld, such
that they are easily abandoned when they become too costly – a risk also
noticeable in Finland (Niemi-Iilahti, 2001). In the Netherlands and
Norway, the environment tends to be brought into the decision-making
picture only when it benefits, but does not challenge, economic orthodoxy,
e.g. job creation in the waste management industries (van Muijen, 2000;
Langhelle, 2000).
Again, this is not meant to sound petulant, as social democracies
already offer a model for other nations to follow, but it is to insist that just
as there are productivist limits to feminism, there are similar limits to
environmentalism. There are many aspects of the environmental agenda
that can assist productivity, growth and efficiency: where, say, sustainable
technologies can reduce the costs borne by the transport infrastructure or
health care systems, releasing expenditure that can be invested elsewhere.
But just because there can be sustainable growth, it does not mean that
all forms of growth can be rendered sustainable and costs to the envi-
ronment that are inherent within a productivist economy tend to be
ignored. For example, without a reduction in many types of consumption
and without the localisation of production, the shift towards cleaner 
technologies and recycling is likely to resemble the habit of jamming one
foot on the brake and the other on the accelerator (Douthwaite, 1996). 
Yet such reduction and localisation point in the opposite direction to 
consumerist, cosmopolitan capitalism and would mean bringing onto 
the economic stage values and criteria which are of no obvious or short-
term benefit to the actors involved. Only a democratic, ecological state 
can direct the action across a longer timespan, but that requires the kind
of political rationality that is barely visible even in social democracies,
where the imperatives of global competitiveness hold sway (Lundqvist,
2001b).
So although the strongest support for productivist radicalism can be
found in social democracies, that radicalism has taken social democracy
to the door of post-productivism. In terms of both caregiving and sus-
tainability, social democracies have gone further than other countries in
incorporating reproductive values into their socioeconomic institutions
and policies. Yet they are bumping up against the limits of productivism
because the economic gradient makes it harder to achieve more than
modest (though still welcome) forms of gender equality and sustainabil-
ity. And, I would argue further, if social democracies are therefore poised
between productivism and post-productivism, then path-dependency
arguments finally fall by the wayside.
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Path dependency and post-industrialism revisited
This is an argument that I hinted at in the last chapter when addressing
the criticism that if path dependency disproves the hyperglobalisation
thesis, then it also rules out the possibility of all but a few countries 
pursuing the social democratic path. I suggested that this depends upon
a simplistic conception that neglects the extent to which political tradi-
tions are to be found across a range of national contexts. Indeed, if this
were not so then hegemonic struggles could not occur as there would be
no oppositional forces to hegemonise!
But if so, then it is also the case that political traditions are not one thing
or another. Within the hegemonic battlefield they are spread across
diverse lines of attack and defence. So just as there are multiple paths
within a particular nation, there are also multiple paths within a particu-
lar tradition. In short, the path-dependency thesis explains nothing 
unless we understand (1) the extent to which traditions are ‘overdeter-
mined’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), i.e. each tradition incorporates multi-
ple versions of itself within a multilayered domain, and (2) the means by
which traditions hegemonise in the process of being hegemonised. 
This means that version of the tradition that prevails is not the real or only
one, but the version which dominates within a given conjuncture accord-
ing to contingent circumstances. But that conjuncture and those circum-
stances not only fluctuate constantly, but do so as a result of hegemonic
struggle, both within and between traditions. So just as the distinction
between social democratic and non-social democratic nations is over-
drawn, so the distinction between productivist and non-productivist
social democracy is overdrawn. Those who therefore say that the future
of social democracy must be productivist, because this is the path that has
already been set, are ignoring the idea that any path is a multiple overde-
termination of itself within a contingent field. Counter-hegemonisation
may be difficult to achieve, depending upon the conjuncture in question,
but is never impossible. This is one reason why I have defined post-
productivism, not as opposed to productivity, wealth, etc., but as a 
doctrine that, consistent with feminism, environmentalism and the post-
industrial Left, recontextualises those goals at a layer deeper than that of
economic value.
What this also does is to throw a new light on the trilemma that we
discussed in the last chapter. In fact, the trilemma might be regarded as
an example of social democrats limiting their horizons by refusing to
think outside the productivist box. The trilemma holds if economic and
employment growth not just are but ought to be the objectives of any
welfare system. However, we have reason to question both of these aims.
What of economic growth, first of all?
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Let us dispense with two perspectives, both of which insist that growth
and sustainability are mutually exclusive (Dryzek, 1997). The first 
perspective insists that sustainability must prevail, even at the risk of 
economic contraction (neo-Malthusianism) and the second insists that
sustainability can be made consistent with existing forms and rates of
growth (the Procrustean Bed argument). Neo-Malthusianism diverts too
radically from contemporary expectations and neglects the possibility that
social (if not always personal) affluence can be a force for good; Pro-
crusteanism is simply dangerous wishful thinking. We are therefore faced
with two further options. One is to introduce environmental criteria into
GDP/GNP measurements and the other is to regard economic growth as
only one among a much broader range of indicators. In short, the pro-
ductivist orthodoxy defines us as wealthy according to the size of GDP
and as productive according to the rate at which GDP wealth grows (cf.
Coates, 2000: 265–73). Post-productivism defines us as wealthy according
to the enhancement of the reproductive conditions underpinning GDP
growth and as productive according to the rate of reproductivity. What
are the respective merits of these options?
Those who defend Green GDP/GNP do so on the basis that the envi-
ronment can be treated as a form of capital for which we must pay 
the appropriate charge and what follows from this is support for the ‘sub-
stitution’ of natural resources for their manufactured equivalents 
(Choi, 1994). The first of these premises risks being superficial. Nordhaus
(Nordhaus and Tobin, 1972), for instance, estimated that the USA should
commit no more than 2 per cent of its annual national income to envi-
ronmental investment. One problem with this is that to make estimates
of ecological value according to (a) economic standards and (b) existing
market preferences is to confuse price with value and to regard the envi-
ronment as equivalent to other goods when it is in fact much more fun-
damental (Douthwaite, 1996: 38–9). Another problem is that economists
usually favour a ‘market discount rate’ rather than a ‘social discount rate’
in comparing future costs and benefits to present-day ones, precisely
because the latter is less amenable to purely economic calculation. But if
economistic calculations are too narrow, then the market rate is mislead-
ing (see Chapter 7).
The second premise of Green GDP/GNP tracks back to the assump-
tions that neo-classical economists were making in the 1970s, namely that
capital can substitute for natural resources. Daly (1997a, 1997b), follow-
ing the lead of Georgescu-Roegen (Perrings, 1997), argues that this is to
underestimate the importance of nature, the entropic effects of growth (at
least on a local scale) and to overestimate the possibility for converting
resources into capital, since this does not overcome the ultimate problem
of scarcity and ecological finiteness. In response, one of the architects of
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those neo-classical assumptions conceded that substitution has only an
‘intermediate’ usefulness (Stiglitz, 1997); the other architect (Solow, 1997)
does not address the essential critique. The merit of a Green GDP/GNP,
then, is that it ties in with existing practice and offers a short- to medium-
term solution that, through substitution, can slow down the rate of envi-
ronmental degradation. The problem, as Stiglitz acknowledges, is that
although substitution can reduce the resource amount needed to produce
one unit of output, it cannot ever halt the depletion of resources. The
problem of scarcity and finiteness is simply deferred.
The implication is that Green GDP/GNP must eventually be super-
seded by less productivist conceptions and measurements of wealth such
as that articulated by the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW),
an overview of the debate being provided by Jackson (2002). According
to research cited and conducted by Jackson, because we have reached a
threshold beyond which the benefits from growth no longer outweigh the
losses of environmental degradation, then the quality of life is perma-
nently stalled. This is true even in social democracies, though here the
ISEW scores began to diverge from GDP scores more recently and less
dramatically than in other nations. In short, Green GDP/GNP can be
effective in the short-run if it is used to turn our economies away from
their present course towards conceptions of wealth captured by the ISEW
though Jackson concedes that even the ISEW may need to be superseded
in the long term. To put it another way, productivism must gradually
abolish itself in favour of post-productivism.
These considerations also relate to the second assumption of the
trilemma, that concerning employment growth. If we need much broader
ideas of wealth, then we may also need a much broader notion of what
is and is not valuable work and an acceptance that unwaged activity may
often be preferable to employment. As noted in the last chapter, if it 
can be demonstrated that unwaged work contributes to sustainability
more than its employment-based equivalent – by being more local, involv-
ing more self-reliance and less orientation to profit, for instance – then we
can no longer afford to devalue it as most productivists continue to do,
e.g. recall the dichotomy between employment/activity and non-
employment/passivity that Huber and Stephens expressed in Chapter 4.
Employment growth is essential only if ‘the active’ are interpreted as sub-
sidising ‘the passive’, since the passive would otherwise be without pur-
chasing power (income). But if this distinction is too crude, then what we
need is a kaleidoscope of social activity that contributes to reproductiv-
ity, a mutual service society of both waged and unwaged service provision
which operates on the basis of diverse reciprocity.
On one level this is a now-familiar call for an expansion in the ‘Third
Sector’ or ‘social economy’; yet remember that almost everyone supports
Productivism and beyond 105
TZP5  4/25/2005  4:53 PM  Page 105
106 After the new social democracy
the Third Sector and almost everyone disagrees about its practical impli-
cations (cf. Mertens, 1999). For conservatives, it is frequently an alterna-
tive to state provision (Green, 1993), while for new social democrats it
complements state provision in the form of not-for-profit associations and
faith-based organisations offering welfare services (Jordan, 2001). For
post-productivists, it implies an expansion in land trusts (and ecotaxa-
tion), welfare associations, communal self-management, democratic social
investment funds, stakeholder firms, basic and participation incomes,
informal exchange systems (whether based on currency or time) and local
banking (Offe and Heinze, 1992; Offe, 1996: Ch. 7; Douthwaite, 1996;
Benello et al., 1997). What this Third Sector would do is capture and
harness the wealth that we already create for ourselves, and upon which
productivism already depends, directing it in more socially reproductive
ways (Jordan and Travers, 1998).
None of this is to deny the difficulties that social democracy faces. In
fact the post-industrial trilemma actually underestimates the obstacles
ahead because, by focusing upon budgetary constraints, it neglects not
only environmental constraints but also the familial constraints that Dean
draws attention to (Dean, 2002). Yet the characterisation of our future 
as one of permanent austerity does not capture every aspect of our con-
dition, since productivists also underestimate the natural and social
resources to which we have access and which can be re-engineered to
meet these constraints if we can break free of simplistic notions of growth
and affluence. It may well be that post-productivist welfare would require
an increase in the absolute amount of wealth dedicated to common goods,
yet this increase may actually represent a relative decrease as a percentage
of the total stock of available wealth compared to existing social expen-
diture levels.3
Concluding remarks
Tying up the loose ends of this and the previous chapter leaves us with
three points to make.
First, productivist social democrats will continue to appeal to realpoli-
tik by observing that post-productivism in one country, or even several,
is far from being a realistic option, given the shift towards global free trade
in the 1980s and 1990s. Path dependency implies that enough space exists
for variations around the productivist model, but not for an ideal that
appears to violate international constraints. Even if Nordic countries are
poised at the brink of post-productivism, international constraints ensure
that at the brink is where they will remain.
This objection is well taken and because post-productivism recom-
mends the greater localisation of economic activity, such localisation is
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unlikely to occur on any worthwhile scale unless the national and inter-
national structures are in place to facilitate it. Yet this dualism is not some-
thing to which the Green, anti-corporate and women’s movements are
oblivious (Cohen and Rai, 2000; Houtart and Polet, 2001; Rowbotham and
Linkogle, 2001) and in fact the campaign for alternative forms of globali-
sation operates with a much more sophisticated vision of local/global
interactions than the apologists for global free trade will ever achieve.
Therefore, productivist social democrats have to decide whether they are
on the side of the free traders or the fair traders. If the former, then how
are they to take account of the familial and environmental constraints that
we have discussed above? If the latter, then why not argue for more local
production, trade and consumption, as post-productivists recommend? In
short, because international constraints are an omnipresent feature of any
political strategy, then productivists have to make a moral case for the
superiority of one type of international order over another. Realpolitik is
no more than a refuge for the lazy.
Second, Chapters 4 and 5 have hinted more than once at the limitations
of the concept of decommodification if this implies ‘freedom from the
market’, since such freedom is only ever partial and highly conditional,
even in terms of health and education systems.4 Huber and Stephens are
correct to point out that in practice decommodification refers to ‘active
participation in the labour market’ and so implies a contributive form of
autonomy and satisfaction that social democracies have come closest to
embodying: freedom within rather than freedom from. However, although
a complete freedom from market exchange is unrealistic, the more impor-
tant questions are ‘what kind of market?’ and ‘what kind of informal
activity, are possible?’ Post-productivism addresses itself to both of these
questions, implying markets that are geared towards reproductive value
and activities outside the formal economy that are similarly concerned. In
short, the aim of radical politics should not be decommodification per se,
but the post-productivist versions of both commodification and decom-
modification. This idea is partly captured by Room’s (2000) redefinition
of decommodification as self-development, where creativity, learning,
self-actualisation and critical participation are regarded as much more
important than at present. Room offers this as an alternative to the 
standard notion of decommodification for consumption, where 
Esping-Andersen and his intellectual descendants set out to measure the
extent to which living standards are maintained during periods of labour
market absence.
Yet although Room’s variables are more subtle and varied than those
usually run through the statistical cruncher, he too remains with an
employment-centred paradigm that valorises human and social capital.
To be fair, Room does so to operationalise self-development and it 
has to be conceded that, by relegating the kind of variables that render
Productivism and beyond 107
TZP5  4/25/2005  4:53 PM  Page 107
108 After the new social democracy
productivist societies quantifiable, post-productivist societies would be
difficult to measure and so could make thousands of social scientists
unemployed (I suspect I’ve just lost half my audience). Fortunately, those
social scientists would not find themselves trapped between the pincers
of employment and non-employment, for the rationale of post-produc-
tivism is not that it frees us from ‘the market’, but that it multiplies the 
number of social spaces within which meaningful social interaction 
and exchange can take place. Therefore post-productivism is not an alter-
native to decommodification, but it is an alternative to the productivism
that collapses decommodification back into the employment society
where our primary role as citizens is to earn, shop, save and pretty much
shut up.
Finally, I have associated post-productivism strongly with social
democracy. But does this mean that conservative societies cannot provide
a launch pad to post-productivism? If so, this would imply that the only
route to post-productivism is through social democracy and how realis-
tic does that make post-productivism in anything shorter than the very
long term?
However, the answer is ‘no’, social democracy is not the only launch
pad and it is possible to envisage conservative and corporatist variants of
post-productivism. The former would perhaps resemble a situation where
reproductive values are attended to through an extreme form of social
stratification, i.e. ecological and emotional conditions depending upon
heavy doses of inequality, coercion and moral conditioning. The corpora-
tist version would be more solidaristic, but might still make reproductiv-
ity depend upon a strict distribution of fixed roles across a conditional,
hierarchical and familialist set of social relations. In short, just as there are
free-market, corporatist and social democratic versions of productivism,
so there could be free-market, corporatist and social democratic versions
of post-productivism.
Yet just as social democracy is the preferable version of the former, so
it is the preferable version of the latter given its core commitment to egal-
itarian universalism. Therefore, and especially within conservative con-
texts, productivist and post-productivist social democrats need to do what
they usually do already: make common cause in favour of universalism,
distributive justice and social citizenship. The dispute about the relative
merits of the productivist and post-productivist models cannot be
deferred forever, obviously, and clearly affects the counter-hegemonic
strategies adopted in nations where social democracy does not dominate.
Nevertheless, such compromises are possible and the faultine in radical
politics can be overcome and has been on numerous occasions. To con-
clude, post-productivists and traditional social democrats have more to
gain from one another than they have to gain from alliances with others:
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social democracy needs post-productivism, and vice versa. Such is the
premise of this book.
Notes
1 Though some of these economic reasons may have been stronger in the past.
2 I am not intending to analyse the concept of patriarchy. I assume that patriarchy
and productivism are not the same – indeed, wage-earner feminism insists 
otherwise – but that they are mutually reinforcing. So although there is no
logical contradiction in the idea of non-patriarchal productivism, it is unlikely
ever to emerge for the reason about to be given.
3 However, I offer this assertion tentatively and it is another hypothesis that
cannot be demonstrated theoretically and so awaits empirical proof or disproof.
4 I specify ‘limitations’ because my intention is not to reject commodification
either as a concept or an indicator (and recall that we made use of it in Chapter
3), but simply to observe that it has to date been caught within the productivist
discourse that I have now spent more than a chapter challenging.
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Post-productivism is therefore opposed to the social dominance of waged
work, as this involves neglecting the reproductive value of emotional and
ecological labour. As such, productivism has begun to reach the limits of
itself because of its increasing inability to reproduce its own conditions.
Like a dying star, productivism survives by consuming the waste that it
has produced, it absorbs the consequences of too little care and too little
sustainability by attempting to convert them into further sources of pro-
ductivity. But these waste products are no substitutes for a proper ethics
of care and sustainability, ethics that guide us beyond the employment
society of endless GDP growth and endless productivity, so that this
process cannot last indefinitely. Productivism does not necessarily reach
a crisis – there is nothing historically inevitable about post-productivism
– but it does implode into a cycle where productivist solutions are more
and more ephemeral, re-inverting into further social problems at an ever-
accelerating rate. It is the disease that purports to be the cure.
So, over the last couple of chapters I have stressed the importance 
of care work and sustainability, on the basis that these continue to be
underemphasised by social democrats, old as well as new. In addition to
distributive justice, these are the philosophical foundations of an ecowel-
fare politics, of a post-productivist social democracy. We have already
addressed the main features of distributive justice in Chapter 2 and so our
task here, in the following two sections, is to give an account of care 
and sustainability. I will then provide a simple model of ecowelfare and
explore the main points of creation and tension between its three princi-
pal components.
Recognition and care
For reasons that will become clear, I want to treat care not in isolation, but
in relation to the principle of recognition (cf. Daly, 2002: 263). Recognition
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has become an important and controversial topic in recent years and may
represent the single most important contribution that postmodernism,
post-structuralism and the ‘cultural turn’ have made to radical politics.
However, my argument will be that recognition is incomplete without ref-
erence to distributive justice and to an ethic of care. In turn, the deficits
of this ethic can be repaired by relating it to that of recognition.
I first want to dispense with those who would either replace distribu-
tive justice with recognition or at least subvert the former to the latter.
This is the position of Iris Young (1990) and Alex Honneth (2001) for
instance.1 Young (1990: 15–16) wants to displace the distributive paradigm
on the grounds that it is concerned with the distribution of material goods
and social positions and so is too inert to be extended to social goods that
are non-material and culturally dynamic. Honneth (2001: 53–4) insists that
both recognition and distributive justice derive from the demand for
social esteem so that, for instance, unemployment represents the denial
of social esteem, because the unemployed person is left less able to engage
in social cooperation than before.
The problem with Young’s formulation is that although she is correct
to cite potential problems with the distributive paradigm – the insensi-
tivity of its abstract universalism to particularity – she then wants to shift
paradigms altogether without considering the possibility of resiting dis-
tribution upon a more sophisticated universalism. So, although Young
acknowledges the importance of distribution, by abandoning universal-
ism altogether she leaves herself unable to reconcile distribution with 
difference and so continues to prefer the latter.
The problem with Honneth is that although unemployment may
deprive an individual of self-esteem, this is a consequence of unemploy-
ment and not the motivating factor. Employers do not issue redundancies
in order to reduce self-esteem, but as a response to market imperatives.
Contrast that action with the racist joke. Of course, such instances may
overlap, as when the employer makes only his black employees redun-
dant, but although distributive injustice can take a cultural form, this does
not mean that culture reaches ‘all the way down’ the system of produc-
tion. Honneth might reply that such capitalist acts derive ultimately from
the impulse to gain power over others by ‘misrecognising’ their moral
worth, i.e. conflict within capitalism involves struggles for recognition
rather than, as for Marx, the recognition of (economic) struggle (Honneth,
1995: 145–51). But by giving such weight to recognition, Honneth seems
to propose that as recognition implies justice so injustice must imply mis-
recognition. Yet although this will often be the case (see below), this does
not mean that injustice is no more than a form of misrecognition (A may
imply B but B may imply both A and not-A) and so Honneth neglects the
possibility that we can have injustice even where we have recognition.
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This is precisely what is at stake in arguments about capitalism. Does
recognition require (a) the equalisation of resource ownership, (b) equal
opportunity for ownership or (c) an opportunity (however remote) for
ownership? Because each may imply a recognition of equal worth,
depending upon your social premises, adjudicating between them
requires a theory of justice that cannot be reduced to ‘moral feelings of
indignation’.2
But if a politics of recognition is not enough, then should we be satis-
fied with a politics of distribution? Brian Barry (2001) has launched a
wide-ranging attack on the political theorists who champion multicultur-
alism, minority rights, difference and recognition, accusing them of fash-
ionable incoherence at worst or, at best, of saying nothing that cannot be
accommodated within a philosophy of egalitarian liberalism. Barry’s is an
effective attack against those who would either abandon liberalism or else
substantially reconstitute it around a differential politics of identity. At the
extreme, this leads to a social morality of group separatism that was effec-
tively satirised by Lukes (1995) and which Rorty (1998) and Klein (2000)
condemn as having sent the American Left down the blind alley of politi-
cal (or, more properly, ‘cultural’) correctness. The problem is that Barry
tends to conflate these positions (anti-liberal multiculturalism and liberal
multiculturalism) with a third that we can term ‘multicultural liberalism’.
His critique is therefore at its weakest when it is rejecting those who extol
this third position.
For instance, Barry (2001: 138) presents Kymlicka as believing that ‘self-
governing national minorities should not be constrained by measures
imposed by a liberal state to prevent violations of liberty and equality’, in
the course of outlining a liberal theory of group rights that substantially
replicates that offered by Kymlicka (1995) himself.3 Similarly, Nancy
Fraser is condemned for imagining that homosexuals need anything more
than ‘equal legal rights’ (Barry, 2001: 274–9), a kind of don’t-frighten-the-
horses argument that neglects the varied reasons why the walls of gay
and lesbian prejudice are gradually falling. I do not want to pick a fight
with Barry, since he offers many ideas that are themselves consistent with
a multicultural liberalism. Nevertheless, he often manages to simply
invert the simplicities that he otherwise condemns in multiculturalism; as
when, for example, he equates cultural identity with expensive tastes, or
when he treats preferences as if they exist in a socio-cultural vacuum, or
when universalism is presented as having to make no concessions to
group differences (Barry, 2001: 34–5, 65, 114).
It is perhaps Fraser who therefore has come closest to outlining a lib-
eralism that is both multicultural and distributive (1997, 2000; Fraser and
Honneth, 2001; cf. Okin, 1989). Fraser (2001) notes how distributive justice
and recognition are usually treated as incompatible, because the former
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is regarded as a question of ‘the right’ (Kant’s notion of universal rules)
and the latter as a question of ‘the good’ (the Sittlichkeit or ethical judge-
ment that Hegel attributed to the embedded self). But Fraser’s argument
is that recognition, too, involves justice claims so that it can rescued from
an identity politics which, in valorising group identity, everywhere risks
a repressive and non-material communitarianism. Instead, recognition
implies social status and participation on a par with others and is there-
fore opposed to the ‘misrecognition’ that is generated through institu-
tional exclusion and forms of subordination. Challenging misrecognition
therefore means ensuring a ‘parity of participation’ by distributing mate-
rial resources in such a way that economic structures are just and through
an equal respect being accorded to all social participants. Fraser observes
that a certain pragmatism is required in judging who does and does not
warrant recognition and whether recognition should imply universalistic
or particularistic strategies. It is not the case that all groups deserve equal
recognition. For instance, by denying participative parity to others, racist
groups could be said to exclude themselves from equal social participa-
tion. Equal respect should therefore be accorded to all those who would
not deny participative parity to others. In short, by elaborating upon a
philosophy of right, Fraser offers a liberalism that is multicultural,
without according equal value to all groups indiscriminately, and which
can also encompass the economic, non-cultural dimensions of distributive
justice. She steers a course between those who would either subvert dis-
tribution to recognition (Honneth), i.e. the economic into the cultural, or
those who would collapse recognition into distribution (Barry), i.e. the
cultural into the economic.
While agreeing substantially with Fraser, I would point to several
potential weaknesses in her argument. First, to acknowledge that recog-
nition involves justice claims does not commit us to the view that justice
claims are all it involves. For instance, in a brief discussion of environ-
mentalism, Fraser argues that the dispute between ecologists and 
anti-ecologists can be resolved with reference to the needs of future gen-
erations, needs of which only a Kantian, deontological approach can con-
ceptualise. But, as I will argue in Chapter 7, although deontology is the
most useful starting point for discussing future generations, any such dis-
cussion has to take account of the contingencies of the present and near
future. Our conception of future generations will alter, depending upon
whether ecological catastrophe is assessed as being 50 years away or 500
years. Therefore, although there are some future generations whose inter-
ests we should recognise, there are others (presumably in the more distant
future) to whom we should be fairly indifferent. Yet this ‘recognition’ 
is such an integral part of the deontological equation that it cannot be
determined by that equation itself.
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So the second potential weakness is that although Fraser makes room
for pragmatic judgement, she perhaps underestimates the role that 
such judgement will have to play. Participative parity is an important
benchmark but, unless we are to restrict our notions of ‘participation’ 
and ‘parity’ to some kind of all-purpose universalistic denominator, 
then contextual contingencies again become important. In the ecological
example, there may be some future generations to whom we should 
be paternalistically accountable, but who cannot be said to enjoy parity
with more immediate generations. Finally, Fraser (2001: 36–7) acknowl-
edges that it may be necessary to turn to Sittlichkeit but, she insists, not
until deontological reasoning has been exhausted. However, if the above
criticisms are valid then the ‘turn’ cannot be delayed for very long, which
is another way of saying that deontology cannot be exhausted without
contextual judgement entering into it as an equative factor. Fraser’s
account of reasoning (deontology then Sittlichkeit) is too linear and
dichotomous.
So although Fraser is correct to root both distribution and recognition
in the ‘right’, we also have to make greater room than she allows for prac-
tical judgement (Bauman, 2001: Ch. 6). This practical judgement is what
I here term ‘care’, defined as a means of negotiating between abstract
justice claims and context-sensitivity. I am not going to spend much time
defining care as this is covered thoroughly in the literature referenced
below (also Kymlicka, 2002: 398–420) – see also the discussion of New
Labour and care work in Chapter 2.4 In essence, though, care involves the
following key features.
Care implies interdependency, i.e. an alternative to the indepen-
dence/dependence distinction that infects social policy with all it implies
for those not perceived as being willing to be productive by labouring for
another in the formal economy. Interdependency implies a relational, dia-
logical concept of the self in contrast to the possessive self that pervades
both economic and political markets. It refers to the solidaristic lifeworld
which is our ultimate source of well-being. Care is therefore an expres-
sion of, and a means of, nurturing the webs that we weave around and
through one another, often without knowing it; interdependency return-
ing endlessly to itself in a loop we call society. Care is also an other-directed
practice, in that both the giving and the receiving of care are gifts. Care
cannot take place without action (whether in speech or gesture) directed
towards others, yet because of the interdependency of which the self is
made, ‘gifting’ should not be confused with ‘giving’. Receiving is as much
an act of gifting as is giving: to gift is to give by receiving and receive by
giving. Love is the most perfect example of gifting in that the acceptance
of another is a means of nourishing the other.5 Care is therefore not the
same as charity. For whereas charity is unidirectional at best (or enlight-
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ened self-interest, at worst), gifting is multidirectional; charity fragments
the self that gives from the self that receives, in line with Protestant indi-
vidualism, where gifting unites the receiving and giving selves as an inter-
dependent bond. Care is directed towards needs. While preferences are
expressed as bargains and satisfied through exchange, i.e. a trade that sat-
isfies both partners by confirming their separateness, needs are expressed
as calls that can only be satisfied through interchange, the contraction of
separation. Preference items are things to be ingested where need items
are emotional harbours into which we can moor: the former takes in, the
latter takes itself to. The calls of the needy are answered not to augment
the needed, but so that it and the needy can mutually belong. That even
our needs are so often institutionalised as demands, claims and entitle-
ments is a sign of how far our moral cultures have lost themselves within
productivist mazes. Finally, care implies attentiveness, meaning an
empathy for multiple perspectives and sympathy towards interdepen-
dent others. It is an openness to all voices, especially those that normally
go unheard, and a willingness to respond. The responsibilities of care are
not primarily reciprocal, they are not triggered by an equivalent stimulus
and do not take the form of exchange for visible, productive effort. First
and foremost, responsibility involves listening for sounds of the invisible,
the quiet screams of the vulnerable.
But if this is what care is then how is care to proceed? It is here that we
part company with those who would have care proceed either religiously
or conservatively through the world, as if care is too fragile to sustain cat-
egories and boundaries. The problem is that for every Simone Weil (1987)
there are thousands for whom pain and suffering is to be welcomed either
as a opportunity to share in divine grace or as an opportunity to demon-
strate, through charity, the ultimate benevolence of capitalist inequality.
Care must therefore proceed politically. Although the reservoirs of care
may be infinite because, as imperfect social beings, we cannot draw from
those wells quickly or simultaneously then caring is not a costless activ-
ity. Political conceptions of justice are therefore needed as guidance to
how and why those costs should be borne.
We can first dispense with those who would exclude care from con-
siderations of justice. Jaggar (1983), for instance, says that in order to adju-
dicate between different and competing interests we need a degree of
objectivity and rationality that a care ethic, immersed as it is in the con-
tingencies of particularity, cannot supply. In anything less than a world
of harmonious interests a care ethic cannot suffice. But this runs up against
an objection similar to that noted against Fraser, above: admitting that care
cannot substitute for the justice perspective is not the same thing as exclud-
ing care from that perspective altogether. Imagining that the necessity of
exclusion follows from the impossibility of substitution risks neglecting
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the perfectly legitimate features of adjudication that a purely rationalistic
approach may overlook.
We should also dispense with those who would separate care and
justice out into separate moral epistemologies and/or gendered ontol-
ogies (Elshtain, 1981; Gilligan, 1982). Here, the problem consists in recon-
textualising the elements that have been so sharply divided out. If care
and justice co-exist in parallel epistemological worlds, then how are we
to travel consistently and effectively between those worlds? One solution
is to propose that the dividing lines are gendered: care is what women do
best in the private sphere and justice is what men do best in the public.
Feminist politics should then try to achieve parity between male bread-
winners and female caregivers (Fraser, 1997: 55–9). But apart from the
latent contradictions within this position – how can parity ever be
achieved if our epistemologies are so gendered? – its coherence depends
upon sacrificing considerable elements of social identity; to put it simply,
women are called upon to suppress their need for public participation and
men are called upon to suppress their need for caregiving and receiving.
Such parity would be a perverse reflection of existing inequality.
The best recent work on care therefore attempts to bring care and justice
more closely together. Take the following examples. Tronto (1993: 166–75)
insists that care and justice should not be separated out into what she calls
‘false dichotomies’, as a justice perspective reveals the many problems
that an exclusivist care ethic would involve. For Sevenhuijsen (1998: 59)
care and justice are extensions of one another. Meyers (1998: 143) regards
a care/justice distinction as antithetical to feminist politics and political
theory. Noddings (2002: 22) insists that ‘care supplies the basic good in
which the sense of justice is grounded’.
Yet having reached this point the above authors are still neglecting an
important aspect of care. Tronto (1993: 153) writes that, ‘. . . any attempt
to posit a universal moral theory of care would be inadequate . . . If all we
can do is to determine universal principles about the need for care, then
we will not be able to understand how well care is accomplished in the
process of realising it.’ Yet this stance is confusing. Tronto begins by
stating that the attempt to posit a universal theory would be inadequate,
but then immediately proceeds to acknowledge that although the attempt
could succeed, the actual realisation of care is not the same as its theoreti-
cal formulation as a set of universal principles. But although it would be
impossible to universalise each and every aspect of care, precisely because
life is too messy and chaotic, to be both motivated and assessed, actions
must be referred back to a universalist background in order to negotiate
a way through the vagaries that are used to justify a care ethic in the first
place. Should I first help the driver or the pedestrian when the latter has
been more badly injured in an accident, but had stumbled out of a pub
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obviously drunk? Such dilemmas cannot be decided in some kind of court
of moral universalism, but because when we act we act with principles,
rather than leaving them behind, it is best to be clear about what a uni-
versalist reasoning reveals those principles to be.
Sevenhuijsen (1998: 64–8) goes even further than Tronto, adopting what
looks like an anti-universalist position or rather a post-structuralism 
that treats universalism only ever as an ephemeral construction which is
glimpsed occasionally through the storms of dialogical contestation
(Butler et al., 2000). The problem here is that, in abandoning the ‘liberal
distributive paradigm’, Sevenhuijsen leaves herself making a distinction
between power and domination without any real explanation of where
the distinction lies, without an account of why domination is non-
distributive and without an exploration of anti-universalists’ inability to
either supplant or properly assimilate universalism (Fitzpatrick, 2002b).
In order to avoid an overhasty marriage of care and justice, Sevenhuijsen
risks an overhasty divorce that collapses back into the epistemological
dichotomies that I criticised above.
Meyers (1998: 147) comes closer to explaining what a non-distributive
form of domination means: it consists of some depriving others of the
power that comes through interdependent relations. But, as above, what
this depends upon is a separation of principles from practices and an
insistence that morality involves sympathy for the disadvantaged
(Meyers, 1998: 166–8). This is fine if we possess an acute moral sense of
desert and disadvantage; the problem is when we remember that our
moral sense is tutored in societies of conflicting needs, demands and inter-
ests for which an indiscriminate, all-embracing sympathy, cut adrift from
principled frames of reference, is likely to be inadequate. Meyers attempts
to address such objections by discussing the teaching of moral sympathy
in schools, but does not explain why Professor Hume would be less biased
in this respect than Professor Kant.
Finally, Noddings (2002: 24–31) regards caring for as the primary,
natural state from which justice (caring about) derives and upon which it
is dependent for its efficacy. She insists that to try and base justice upon
rationalist foundations, as Rawls does, is to search for laws that do not
exist. Natural care (affection, inclination) precedes justice claims, though
natural care requires cultivation in families and schools, i.e. it is a virtu-
ous disposition rather than a biological essentialism.
Noddings is correct to some extent, as the problem of defining justice
and erecting just systems is only a problem for those who are virtuous
enough to recognise the pull of justice in the first place. The problem arises
when Noddings attempts to relegate rationalism to a subservient role. A
social ethic of care, she says, revolves around the psychological instinct
to ‘stand with one’s own’, at which point a theory of justice is needed to
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ensure that this instinct does not work to the detriment of others. The
trouble with this is that if moral boundaries are first drawn through psy-
chological instinct, then any subsequent theory of justice is likely to reflect
this bias and so may provide inadequate recognition of what is and is not
harmful. Noddings allows for the possibility of justice tempering care
(cultivation), but not of challenging it. Basing care upon ‘neighbourly
affectation’ is to assume that the identification of one’s neighbours is
unproblematic, yet this assumption is dangerously myopic. Justice may
sometimes need to work with the grain of psychological instinct and some-
times against it; justice may sometimes follow the lead of care but, when
the care instinct proves to be parochial and prejudiced, it may also need
to precede it. In short, what Noddings excludes is the possibility of an
ethic of grounded universalism, an ethic of both justice and care that can
identify moral laws based upon considerations of luck, disadvantage,
responsibility and domination.
What the above theorists are doing then is either ignoring or down-
grading a universalistic ethic of care, as if care is too fragile to cross the
universalism-particularism borders. So whereas Fraser delays for too long
the turn towards context, pragmatism and Sittlichkeit, for those such as
Tronto the turn cannot come quickly enough. Therefore what is being
missed here is an ethic of recognition and care that while grounded in a
universal frame of reference is also sensitive to particularism. Not a uni-
versalism and then recognition/care – as Tronto (1993: 148) seems to
imagine in her quip about universalists treating care as a ‘moral fill-in’ –
but recognition/care that is simultaneously universal and particular.
Fraser (1997: 59–62) is hinting at this kind of move in her ongoing work
on the ‘universal caregiver model’ and, while bearing the above criticisms
of her in mind, it is this which may represent the best platform for future
reflection.
For the sake of convenience, I propose to group recognition and care
under the heading of ‘attention’. Attention implies ‘attending to’, that is,
we have a responsibility to recognise the diversity and difference out of
which one’s own identity is shaped; it also implies ‘being attentive’ or
caring for the damage that is an ineluctable part of social and emotional
relationships; finally, it also possesses a locutionary force (as in ‘stand to
attention!’) that implies a systematic approach to justice and care, which
avoids treating all groups or all care claims as being of equal moral worth.
Sustainability6
The key principle associated with environmentalism is that of sustain-
ability though, like any key concept, this migrates around the political
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spectrum, reappearing in a number of ideological guises. This means that
like its counterparts – ‘equality’, ‘liberty’, etc. – sustainability is overused
to the point where it has become less rather than more precise. In its most
famous definition, sustainability implies meeting ‘. . . the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
theirs’ (Brundtland Commission, 1987: 8), yet this apparently simple 
definition is contested and contestable. What do we mean by ‘needs’, ‘the
present’, ‘compromising’, ‘ability’ and ‘future generations’? The many
possible answers to this and to numerous other questions are due to the
sheer diversity of environmentalism.
Essentially, environmentalists identify a disjunction between what we
demand of the world and what the world is capable of supplying. If the
demands we make are infinite, yet the resources upon which we can real-
istically draw are finite, then ours is an unsustainable existence. Sustain-
ability therefore refers to the process of reducing human demands and/or
increasing resources, so that that disjunction is reduced.
Yet how can demands and resources be made to conjoin? This is where
the controversies really begin to kick in (Dobson, 1998). One way is to
expand the stock of resources, perhaps by replacing renewable resources,
by substituting for non-renewable ones and by searching for technologi-
cal solutions to the problems of depletion and pollution (Weizsacker et al.,
1998). Let us call this approach one of ‘weak sustainability’. A second way
is to revise the demands that we make on the world so that, for instance,
we consume far less than we do at present. So, rather than adapting the
world to suit ourselves, we adapt ourselves to meet the finitude of nature.
Let us call this approach one of ‘strong sustainability’. A final way is to
navigate somehow between those two approaches; call this ‘moderate
sustainability’.
Now I assume it is uncontroversial to state that since the Rio Confer-
ence of 1992, governments have preferred the ‘weak’ version of sustain-
ability and have struggled to operationalise even this, the least ambitious
of the three objectives just sketched. It would be surprising had weak 
sustainability not been the priority since sustainability is a collective action
problem that both governments and electorates are notoriously slow both
to recognise and to address. Policy-makers have thought it best to work
from within the existing institutional forms of market and state and so 
the emphasis, to put it simplistically, has been upon changing the world,
i.e. making resources go further, rather than changing society (Mol and
Sonnenfeld, 2000). This form of ‘ecological modernisation’, an approach
based upon the regulated market, has prevailed even in social democra-
cies (see Chapter 5) with the insistence that the economy can be Greened
without challenging its fundamental precepts. What is more surprising is
the general lack of progress that has been made towards even weak sus-
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tainability. To some extent this has been due to the obstinacy of the USA
yet, according to many Greens, it is also due to the inadequacies of eco-
logical modernisation and the modesty of the weak sustainability at
which it has aimed. The World Summit in Johannesburg in September
2002 is a useful illustration of this point. Corporations dominated the
agenda, ensuring that voluntary guidelines rather than binding regula-
tions would prevail. Poor countries were urged to make themselves more
hospitable to inward investment, tying ecological policies into an agenda
for privatisation and deregulation. Consequently, the summit concluded
with only one major achievement (a sanitation target designed to halve
the number of people without basic sanitation by 2015, the lack of which
kills 1.3 million children a year) and a long list of failures.
If these criticisms are valid then what alternatives do Greens propose?
As should be already clear, no simple answer to this question can be given
since there are as many schools of Green thought as there are of socialist,
libertarian, feminist thought, etc. Nevertheless, we might with only some
distortion group those various schools under the headings already men-
tioned, the disagreement being fundamentally one of temporal scale and
ecocentric range. For some, moderate sustainability should be the aim.
This means working with a timeline of several centuries, where human
and non-human interests are balanced in an ethic which is humanistic
without being anthropocentric, and supporting a more radical adaptation
of existing state and market practices. For others, this is still too modest
an approach and we should be thinking across an even longer timeline
that necessitates not piecemeal, techno-administrative reforms, but a root-
and-branch restructuring of socioeconomic relations. Human interests are
important (for all but a minority of anti-humanists), but only if those inter-
ests are recontextualised within a new biocentric ethic that does not centre
around the human. This is the option of strong sustainability.
I am going to assume that moderate sustainability is the preferable path
and a justification of this stance has been offered elsewhere (Fitzpatrick
with Caldwell, 2001). For the time being, then, we assume that ‘piecemeal,
techno-administrative reforms’ are appropriate even though this is
regarded by the prevailing orthodoxy as too utopian and by the advocates
of strong sustainability as not utopian enough. We do not have to spell
out the full implications of moderate sustainability here, merely those that
relate to social policy. So, what are the main critiques of state welfare made
by the school of moderate sustainability and where might those critiques
lead us?
Critiques and proposals7
First, environmentalists oppose social policies and welfare systems that
are unsustainable and argue, as we have already seen in previous chap-
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ters, that indiscriminate economic growth is at the heart of all unsustain-
able practices. Despite this, economic growth is one of the logics of
modern society whose value is usually unquestioned. It is the economic
expression of the Enlightenment vision of historical progress and social
development and, as such, almost all political philosophies have incor-
porated that productivist logic into themselves. Consequently, economic
growth has become a form of meta-ideology, such that environmentalists
often attract a kind of vitriol that productivist ideologies do not reserve
for each other.
On these grounds, social policy leaves itself open to the criticism that
existing welfare systems are dependent upon productivist practices that are
ultimately unsustainable and that social policies contribute to unsustain-
ability. The unifying factor here is the commitment to GDP growth that
we have already explored. In essence, moderate sustainability therefore
advocates a reconceptualisation of the economy and of economic activity
that does not necessarily abandon the ethic of growth, etc., but certainly
regards as inadequate the introduction of a few Green indicators into
orthodox measurements and discourse.
This leads to the second Green critique of social policy, that it is too
heavily based upon wage earning, whether as a source of material secu-
rity, self-identity or social participation. Again, I do not want to revisit
arguments already, made but there is one question that we have not
addressed. Given the prevalence of productivist assumptions, is it not the
case that environmentalists are arraying themselves against a series of
opposing forces that they can never hope to defeat? Yet environmental-
ists are not quite as isolated as they first appear and it is precisely this
post-productivist coalition that I am articulating in this chapter. Moder-
ate sustainability does not argue for the abolition of employment, but for
a recognition that security, identity and participation derive from a far
wider range of sources and activities than the current orthodoxy admits.
In this respect, ecologists side with those feminists who redefine flexibil-
ity towards employment, unpaid work and leisure away from restrictive
masculinist conceptions of economic well-being. Indeed, since both ecol-
ogism and feminism argue for what I have here called ‘reproductivity’
(though the former stresses ecological labour and the latter emotional
labour), then the scope for further convergence between these ideas is con-
siderable. It is not the case that all forms of either feminism and environ-
mentalism converge beneath the umbrella of post-productivist social
democracy, since some will prefer productivist solutions and some will
eschew social democracy altogether, but there are considerable numbers
of those who challenge the employment-centred society (and includes
many who might not identify themselves primarily with feminism or
environmentalism, e.g. post-industrial socialists), so that the ecowelfare
constituency may be very large indeed.
A model of ecowelfare 121
TZP6  4/25/2005  4:53 PM  Page 121
122 After the new social democracy
The third main critique made by environmentalists towards social
policy concerns the degree of control and autonomy currently possessed
by individuals. The allegation is that existing forms of social organisation
and welfare provision underestimate the extent to which citizens can be
self-organising and most Greens are dissatisfied with the degree of cen-
tralisation that currently prevails. The state is interpreted largely as too
distant and impersonal a set of institutions. Representative democracy 
is thought to encourage a passive, consumerist attitude towards the
common good, one that minimises the level of political participation and
organises participation around party machines that are top heavy
(Doherty and de Geus, 1996). The assumption is that although most
people care about the environment, this concern has barely registered on
the mainstream political agenda since the party system embodies a status
quo that is immensely slow to respond to new developments. And even
where the Greens have had some success (Die Grunen, for instance), they
have had to compromise to such an extent that their ideological distinc-
tiveness is eclipsed.
In terms of social policy, this state centralisation is thought to encour-
age the ‘clientalisation’ of welfare, where well-being is something 
we receive from other sources (experts, bureaucrats) and rarely something
that people collectively generate for and through themselves (Fitzpatrick,
1998b, 2002d). The price of paternalism and basic needs satisfaction 
has been an overarching collectivism that allows little space for 
bottom-up provision. Greens therefore tend to support not an ethos of 
Victorian self-help or the decentralisation of the market, but a new 
welfare settlement where the state provides a universalistic framework of
regulation, accountability and basic service provision, but where greater
room is made for civic associations (Hirst, 1994), decentralised 
policy communities (Ellison, 1999) or cooperation circles (Offe, 1996) that
would control funds and allow the ‘recipients’ of welfare to become their
own ‘producers’ (Barry and Proops, 2000: 93–4). We return to this debate
in Chapter 9. In short, Green social policies seem to require a greater
degree of ‘decentralised collectivism’ and the emergence of a new welfare
citizen.
These Green critiques of social policy – focusing upon growth, employ-
ment and centralisation – are not exhaustive, but they do capture the main
criticisms of social policy implied by moderate sustainability. As to where
we go from here, well, the need is to design a doctrine that represents an
alternative to ecological modernisation that is not only desirable but also
viable. Again, I do not want to use space replicating arguments that have
been made elsewhere (Fitzpatrick with Caldwell, 2001), but it is worth
saying something here about what I call ‘ecological radicalisation’ (see
Fitzpatrick, 2003c).
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If modernisation is essentially reformist, then radicalisation is more
ambitious regarding both the means and ends of social transformation.
This does not mean that radicalisation abandons reformism, but it does
mean that reformism need not be limited to modest and relatively con-
servative objectives. Therefore, although radicalisation may overlap with
the more ambitious aspects of ecological modernisation, it regards mod-
ernisation as the beginning rather than the end of social reorganisation
(Christoff, 1996; van der Heijden, 1999). Consequently, rather than
burying welfare reform within a broader concern for economic and public
policies, social policy comes much more to the foreground. As noted in
the introductory chapter, the job of this book does not involve offering a
menu of policy reforms. Even so, given the fact that ecological radicali-
sation has to be both practical and ambitious, we perhaps need some idea
of what it translates into. There are four key proposals worth mentioning
in this context.
We have, first, already said something about BI in Chapter 2. A
BI would be received by every man, women and child periodically
(whether on a weekly, monthly or annual basis) as an unconditional 
right of citizenship, i.e. without reference to marital or employment status,
employment history or intention to seek employment (van Parijs, 1992,
1995; Fitzpatrick, 1999a). What makes it appropriate for ecological radi-
calisation is the fact that BI represents the further evolution of the exist-
ing tax and benefit systems – and so of developments within that system
towards tax credits – but also contains a potential for further social reor-
ganisation, depending upon the form that a BI would take. In Chapter 7
I will suggest why a BI should be attached to the socialisation of substi-
tutable resources and the reform of land taxation, an attachment that
could satisfy both the Green and the socialist preference for the common
ownership of, respectively, natural and social resources.
The second aspect of ecological radicalisation has already been touched
upon in Chapter 5 and involves the demand that informal exchange 
and activity play a greater role in the ways in which we conceptualise 
and utilise reproductive value. One example of informal exchange that
has attracted much attention in recent years is Local Exchange and
Trading Systems (LETS). LETS are schemes to encourage people to
exchange goods and services within their local communities (Williams,
2002). Each LETS is a non-profit-making network of local residents who
trade goods and services with each other, using a local currency. The
attraction of LETS for Greens is that local currencies encourage local
trading and therefore place less pressure upon national and international
infrastructures (J. Barry, 1999: 163–4). As with BI, then, the proposal that
government facilitates much wider systems of informal exchange has one
foot in present realities, since the informal ‘economy’ is considerably large
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already, and one foot in a future where work is no longer confused with
employment.
This is also true of the third proposal consistent with ecological 
radicalisation: for systematic reductions in working time. The post-
industrial Left are attracted to working-time reductions since, with more 
people in employment, the power of labour is enhanced (Gorz, 1989;
Little, 1998). For Greens, the attraction lies in taking the emphasis 
away from paid work (although there is an additional requirement to
ensure that the jobs which remain are made more ecologically friendly)
and so in freeing up time for the wider range of activities which, as we
noted in chapter 5, they regard as important for social and environmen-
tal well-being.
The final recommendation is for a greater reliance upon ecotaxation
(Robertson, 2002). Although the principle of ecotaxes is now widely
accepted, so long as their economic and social benefits can be demon-
strated, Greens tend to go further than the current orthodoxy allows. This
may or may not involve support for much higher levels of ecotaxation
than presently exist but, perhaps more importantly, it involves a radical
change in the source of taxation. Land is of key importance here. In a 
globalised era, many worry that the levels of taxation needed to maintain
high levels of social expenditure are not going to be sustainable. One pos-
sible solution is to shift the burden of taxation towards land, with those
who occupy the most and/or the wealthiest land having the heaviest lia-
bility; and because land does not move – although its value certainly alters
– then tax avoidance becomes less of a problem, though some form of
global agreement and coordination is still required.
To conclude, moderate sustainability goes beyond the weak sustain-
ability that governments, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and
success, have been trying to implement in recent years, but it falls 
short of the strong sustainability that many within the Green movement
argue for. My assumption is that moderate sustainability is the best we
can aim for in the near future. This does not foreclose the possibility of
moving towards strong sustainability in the longer term, but is to insist
that it is more realistic to slow down the rate of unsustainability, rather
than to attempt a premature leap into an ecological ideal that may divert
us from more immediate and threatening problems. Moderate sustain-
ability then criticises existing welfare systems in terms of their depen-
dency upon growth, employment and centralisation and recommends
what I have called ‘ecological radicalisation’. Essentially, ecological radi-
calisation involves the refusal to treat ‘reformism’ and ‘radicalism’ as
irreconcilable and involves the search for present-day trends that bear a
post-productivist potential that may go unrecognised by the productivist
orthodoxy.
TZP6  4/25/2005  4:53 PM  Page 124
The ecowelfare triangle
We have now outlined the three components of ecosocial welfare and
Figure 6.1 offers a simple model relating these together. I have made dis-
tributive justice, attention and sustainability the main nodes of this model,
though a more elaborate one would give greater prominence to the
various sub-nodes (equality of powers, etc.), multiplying the number of
relations and directional flows accordingly. However, there is a reason,
other than convenience, why I have plumped for simplicity.
One way to look at ecowelfare is from a considerable distance and do
nothing more than recognise its main features: egalitarianism, multicul-
tural liberalism, feminism and environmentalism. This bird’s-eye view is
helpful as a means of identifying the schools of thought that many have
long considered necessary to the renewal of a radical politics, but it does
skip over the details of debates with which I think we need to engage.
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Alternatively, the arguments that have been presented in Chapters 2, 5
and 6 could be regarded as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal, as if disagree-
ment with my account of recognition, or whatever, means that the whole
structure is fatally flawed. This is to focus rather too much upon the
details, though. Therefore, I want to offer a model that incorporates the
specifics of my argument without alienating those who may disagree with
certain of its features. Hopefully, Figure 6.1 does this, in that the relevance
of the main nodes can be acknowledged even if some readers will prefer
alternative accounts and descriptions of the sub-nodes. Obviously, those
who stray too far from my position will either consider it to be too radical
or else not radical enough (this being a common reaction to my confer-
ence papers!), but for others it will illustrate the broad church within
which egalitarians, multiculturalists, liberals, feminists and environmen-
talists are congregating.
The analyses of the next three chapters therefore represent a means of
applying this model to some of the key social questions we currently face,
a way of working through where you and I may agree and disagree, 
rather than a comprehensive overview that could be interpreted as the
last word, take it or leave it. Before we can proceed, though, I do need to
flesh out the main connections of Figure 6.1 to set the scene for the 
following chapters.
Sustainability and attention
To what extent do the principles of sustainability and attention orbit
around the same set of priorities and objectives? On one level the answer
is simple. Unless we can guarantee levels of well-being similar to those
we currently enjoy (and preferably higher) stretching into the foreseeable
future, then recognition and care lose their force. This is not to claim that
they become futile: just as there is value in caring for those who are ter-
minally ill, so environmental catastrophe does not erase the force of moral
obligations. However, such care work operates according to implicit
assumptions of intergenerational continuity, where caring derives its
value from the expectation that it stretches beyond the lifetimes of those
who care and those who are cared for. But if the future is one of decline,
then the moral injunction to attend to others is foreshortened and so less
persuasive. This point is obviously simplistic as attention may well be a
means of engendering the very sustainability upon which it depends for
its moral suasion. As Chapter 5 sought to establish, care is a form of emo-
tional labour that seeks to reproduce that which the productive economy
cannot reproduce for itself and so may be thought of as a source of sus-
tainability. Recognition, too, is a means of social preservation which is 
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precisely why Barry (2001: 65) is opposed to the politics of recognition,
arguing that either cultures will be preserved by those who identify with
them or, if this is not the case, there is no point in maintaining them arti-
ficially – an argument that assumes what it seeks to prove, that cultures
do not depend upon recognition.
In short, attention requires a timeline that reaches far beyond our lives
and sustainability requires that we attend to each other more effectively
than at present.
But this does not imply that these principles dovetail neatly. As the next
chapter will make clear, there are temporal conflicts involved in any envi-
ronmental ethic such that hard decisions have to be made about the allo-
cation of resources. Recognition and care are not costless exercises, even
if post-productivism revises our notions of what costs and benefits imply,
and so there may be occasions when we need to sacrifice one principle in
favour of another. I will spell out in Chapter 7 the rules that I think ought
to govern us when such occasions arise and then in Chapter 8 we will
address a specific aspect of the sustainability/attention debate. The point
to be remembered here is that even were sustainability and attention to
cohere 99 per cent of the time, there is still a residue that involves trade-
offs and the kind of context-sensitive judgements that we discussed earlier
in this chapter.
Sustainability and distributive justice
The same is true when we relate these two principles together, only more
so. In fact, Chapter 7 will concern itself primarily with the vexed question
of relating sustainability (or intergenerational justice) to distributive (or
intragenerational) justice. Although I do not want to anticipate the spe-
cific arguments that are pursued there, the general conclusion is similar
to that above: sustainability and distributive justice are consistent with
one another to some extent – and to a greater extent than is normally
recognised, in fact – but although this minimises the trade-offs that need
to be made; those are not eliminated entirely.
Attention and distributive justice
As already indicated above, Fraser (1997, 2000) has established the extent
to which these principles overlap without either being reducible to the
other (though she discusses recognition rather than care in this context).
Misrecognition will accompany maldistribution more often than not,
since denying needed resources to others is a means of lowering their self-
esteem and so of raising your comparative status. Similarly, the unfair dis-
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tribution of resources is based upon the view that some possess less moral
worth than others.8 Recognition therefore requires fair distribution as it is
counter-productive, and possibly hypocritical, to valorise a cultural iden-
tity without ensuring that the members of that group have a fair access
to the very resources without which the group may be unable to main-
tain its character. It makes no sense to celebrate ethnic difference while
denying jobs and decent incomes to the members of ethnic groups. 
Conversely, distributive justice requires a fair distribution of cultural
resources. The black household that is middle class and relatively afflu-
ent is materially better off than the black household which is on the bread-
line, but may still be subject to racism and discrimination. That the poorer
household will be subject to the double burden of material and cultural
deprivation does not mean that its oppression is only one of material
injustice; cultural injustice also matters.
Nevertheless, these principles are not going to conjoin perfectly on each
and every occasion. In a society of infinite resources and resourcefulness,
we might be able to solve each and every aspect of misrecognition and
maldistribution, but this is not our society. Therefore, there are times when
we may have to prefer recognition to distribution. For instance, when the
prosperous black household is being racially abused by its poorer, white
neighbour, then justice might demand resources being allocated to the
black household, as its need is more immediate. Poverty may be a source
of the white household’s hostility, but because racism is not only an eco-
nomic category, then it cannot be resolved with purely economic mea-
sures, e.g. by giving more money to the white household. Equally, there
are times when we may prefer distribution to recognition. For instance,
where white children from poor backgrounds are performing less well at
school than Asian children from more affluent ones, then more resources
should be targeted at correcting for those socioeconomic circumstances
than at issues of cultural recognition, even if there is an additional need
for the latter.
Fraser’s point, then, is that although recognition and distributive
justice will overlap more often than not, such that addressing the one
means addressing the other, this will not always be the case. Where I part
company with Fraser is in believing that the turn to Sittlichkeit must be
made earlier than she imagines (see above). But this turn does not 
leave us in a moral darkness, as there are still ways in which we can nego-
tiate a way through the various dilemmas carefully and systematically:
namely, by bringing the relevant groups together in a political commu-
nity of discourse and dialogue. In Chapter 9, then, I will say something
about deliberative democracy and why it offers a means of dealing with
the kind of complex issues that cannot be automatically read off from
political principles.
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Conclusion
Ecowelfare involves reference to the principles of distributive justice,
attention and sustainability. In this chapter and in Chapter 2, I have out-
lined various theories which I think are needed to make sense of those
principles, but hopefully without closing down any room for manoeuvre
on the part of those who may disagree with various aspects of the rel-
evant arguments. I have also suggested that while these principles push
towards one another, there will be occasions where this is not so. But
remember that there is nothing unusual about ecowelfare in this respect.
Any liberally minded ideology is a broad church where, as in any church,
members of the congregation often sing in different keys, a discordant
harmony of those who nevertheless share similar visions and hopes.
Notes
1 Charles Taylor (1994) makes overtures in this direction but has not, to my
knowledge, dealt with distributive justice at any length.
2 Honneth (1995: 165–6) does acknowledge that an ethic of recognition should
not replace a theory of justice, but it is not yet clear how he is to reconcile the
two without diluting his strong attachment to Hegelianism.
3 Which is not to claim that Kymlicka’s account is unproblematic, merely that it
is far more of a liberal account than Barry permits.
4 Note that although ‘care’ and ‘caregiving’ are obviously related the latter has
been, and will continue to be, used in a more gender-specific sense than the
former, i.e. to convey the (currently unfair) distribution of men and women
across the public/private spheres.
5 Unfortunately, love also involves asking the loved one to share the damage that
has been inflicted upon you by others and then unloving them when they do
so. Love must damage itself to survive and just sometimes, by doing so, the self
survives as well. We care for the damage we inflict on ourselves through others
and so also for the damage we inflict on others by caring. If we did not care for
each other, then we would have nothing and no-one to forgive.
6 For a longer account see Fitzpatrick and Cahill (2002a).
7 What follows will be fairly sketchy, as we have already anticipated many of
these arguments in Chapter 5.
8 This is an argument similar to that made by Honneth (see above), but remem-
ber that our objection to Honneth was to his general neglect of the distributive
paradigm.
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7The welfare of future 
generations
In Chapter 7 we examine one of the many possible links between sus-
tainability and distributive justice (B. Barry, 1999). For instance, we could
look at issues of international justice, i.e. between developed and devel-
oping worlds, or we could explore the extent to which the concept of
justice is applicable to the non-human world. However, despite the rel-
evance of those debates, the issues of sustainability and justice are thrown
into sharper relief by addressing the following question: what does it
mean to act with justice towards future generations and what might this
imply for social policy?
The debate concerning future generations has generated a considerable
literature in recent years, but by no means everyone is convinced that
justice towards future generations makes sense. Of the sceptics, the most
cogent recent defence has been provided by Beckerman and Pasek (2001:
14) who reduce their argument to a syllogism:
1 Future generations – of unborn people – cannot be said to have any
rights,
2 any coherent theory of justice implies conferring rights on people,
therefore
3 the interests of future generations cannot be protected or promoted
within the framework of any theory of justice.
Beckerman and Pasek are not arguing that future generations should be
ignored, merely that when we act with their interests in mind, we can only
do so out of benevolence and not as a matter of justice and obligation. The
problem with this view is that benevolence is a weak peg upon which to
hang the interests of anybody, because it is easier than justice to rationalise
away. Although it is certainly virtuous to act with charity, it may be
equally virtuous to act without it on those occasions when we convince
ourselves that charity would do more harm than good. A theory of justice
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is therefore needed to reveal such instances, and so to ground the virtues
of character in more solid foundations than a virtue ethic can provide for
itself, to distinguish between in/actions that do and those that do not
truly promote the interests of others.
That at least is the premise of the following sections within which I
offer the outline of a theory of intergenerational justice and explain what
this theory might imply for welfare reform (Fitzpatrick, 2001b, 2001c). In
the concluding section I then return to the arguments of Beckerman and
Pasek to see whether we can successfully address their main points.
Future philosophies
A theory of intergenerational justice could be constructed from within a
number of philosophical schools. Since the laissez-faire approach of liber-
tarianism is alien to this book’s stance, I will leave it to one side and con-
centrate upon utilitarian, contractualist and communitarian perspectives.
Which of these is the most convincing?
Utilitarianism
The utilitarian approach has been sketched most brilliantly by Derek
Parfit (1984: 377) who begins with what he calls the Non-Identity Problem
(N-IP): ‘If a choice between two social policies will affect the standard of
living or the quality of life for about a century, it will affect the details 
of all the lives that, in our community, are later lived. As a result, some of
those who later live will owe their existence to our choice of one of these
two policies. After one or two centuries, this will be true of everyone in
our community’. In other words, it is impossible for us to harm future
generations. Imagine two policy options: policy R will give rise to Red
people, while policy B will give rise to Blue people. If we choose policy
R, will we be hurting anybody? According to the N-IP we will not. We
cannot harm any Blue people, since they will now never exist, and we
cannot harm our Red descendents because their existence is axiomatically
preferable to the non-existence that would have resulted had we 
chosen policy B. Now think of a parallel scenario. Policy D leads to the
depletion of natural resources and so to future generations whose lives
are barely worth living; policy C leads to the conservation of resources
and so to future generations whose well-being is comparable to our own.
If the N-IP is correct, then we may as well choose policy D (because C
requires undesirable short-term sacrifices) without worrying about the
consequences. In short, if we cannot harm future generations, then we
cannot act with injustice towards them and so cannot act with justice
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towards them either. No theory of intergenerational justice is therefore
possible.
Parfit himself suspects that the N-IP can be overcome with reference to
some objective standard of assessment. However, in searching for this
standard Parfit (1984: 388) encounters the Repugnant Conclusion: ‘For any
possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high
quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population
whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though
its members have lives that are barely worth living.’ Imagine two soci-
eties. In society A, ten billion people each possess 100 utility units each
(or 1000 billion units in total); in society Z, 2000 billion people each
possess 1 utility unit each (or 2000 billion units in total). On strictly utili-
tarian grounds we ought to prefer society Z, because 2000 billion units is
larger than 1000 billion units, even though its inhabitants live lives of
unimaginable suffering. Therefore, utilitarianism seems to demand the
indefinite growth of future populations so long as total utility increases
also. Few would regard this as desirable and yet Parfit insists that
attempts to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion are inadequate (e.g. Boonin-
Vail, 1996).
Let us consider two such attempts. First, perhaps we could adopt a
principle of average rather than total utility. This would imply that we
should only permit the human population to increase to the point where
mean utility begins to peak, i.e. a point significantly less populated than
society Z. Yet Parfit dismisses this escape route, as it would prevent us
from adding to the population those individuals who, although they
would have lives worth living, would reduce the overall average. Second,
perhaps we could place a ceiling on the population’s expansion on the
grounds that, beyond a certain point, the value of additional utility dimin-
ishes at an ever-accelerating rate. Yet Parfit closes off this escape route
also, by observing that if we devalue additional utility then we are logi-
cally compelled to devalue additional disutility, i.e. the equivalent of being
increasingly untroubled at a society where there was more and more pain
and suffering.
However, there is a third argument for avoiding the Repugnant 
Conclusion, one that questions the N-IP upon which it is based, but which
Parfit himself cannot attack because of his utilitarian frame of reference.
Carter (2001: 442–8) points out that the N-IP only applies at a holistic level
that ignores more specific actions: ‘. . . even if I were able to affect the iden-
tity of every person in the distant future, it would not follow that I 
could not harm any of them. I could still harm a future person whose
identity I determined as long as one of my actions made him or her worse
off than he or she would otherwise have been – in other words, as long
as that action was not one which determined his or her identity’. In short,
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acts of identity creation are not necessarily identical to acts of harm and
so it is possible to harm those who we have brought into being, even if
there is another possible world in which they would never have existed
at all. What exists in the gap between acts of identity creation and acts of
harm? Autonomy. And so how would we harm future generations? 
By reducing their capacity or willingness to act with autonomy and 
independence.
But by collapsing ‘welfare’ into ‘utility’ and, like all utilitarians, by
downplaying the concept of autonomy, Parfit does not have recourse 
to this solution, suggesting that a utilitarian approach does not offer a 
convincing approach to the problem of future generations. If we take 
the objective of harm avoidance seriously, then our task cannot be mea-
sured by a utility index and we do not have to decide between an infinite
range of future identities. For a utilitarian like Parfit, an infinite range of
future identities is possible and therefore we cannot harm future genera-
tions. But if we recognise instead that we harm future generations by
reducing their autonomy to levels that we ourselves would not accept,
then the range of possible identities is not infinite, but is limited to those
that imply self-determination. Therefore, environmentalists are right to
suspect that we harm future generations by bequeathing to them an
unsustainable environment that would reduce their powers of self-
determination by diverting resources and energies away from autonomy-
enhancing pursuits. Of course, future generations may use their 
autonomy to wreck the environment that we will (hopefully) bequeath.
But this is a perpetual risk best overcome by principles of justice that it
would be irrational and so unjust of future generations to ignore (see
below).
If utilitarianism fails, then is there a better approach?
Contractualism
Rawls (1972: 284–93; 1999: 145–7; B. Barry, 1989: 197–201; Hooft, 1999;
Langhelle, 2000) introduces into the original position an ignorance as to
where the participants are in history, meaning that they have to determine
a savings rate that every actual generation would find to be just. In effect,
all future generations are represented in the original position and all can
expect to gain through the ‘just savings principle’, with the exception of
the first generation who shoulder the initial burden, but receive nothing
in return. However, because each generation is assumed to care for its
immediate descendants, the first generation, too, can be expected to accept
the just savings principle. This means that the task of each generation is
to realise the demands of liberal justice while contributing to an inter-
generational process of accumulation that enables closer and closer
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approximations to the just society which is contracted to in the original
position.
The notion of ‘immediate descent’ is crucial in actually determining 
the appropriate rate. Those in the original position must ask themselves
how much it is reasonable to save for the next generation, based upon
what they feel entitled to claim from the preceding generation. This
parent/child model not only enables a fair rate of saving to be deter-
mined, but ensures that no generation can envy the stock of resources pos-
sessed by either its ancestors or its descendants. Consequently, although
the members of the original position do not know where they are in time,
they do know that they are contemporaries who have sentimental ties to
successive generations. Basically, then, a contractualist theory of justice
must take into account the least advantaged of every generation: ‘Whereas
the first principle of justice and the principle of fair opportunity limit the
application of the difference principle within generations, the savings
principle limits its scope between them. . . . Saving is achieved by accept-
ing as a political judgement those policies designed to improve the stand-
ard of life of later generations of the least advantaged, thereby abstaining
from the immediate gains which are available’ (Rawls, 1972: 292–3). It
means that duties are inter- as well as intragenerational and that we harm
future generations if we bequeath to them conditions that we ourselves
would not consent to in an original position.
By giving priority to liberty and rational determination, this approach
takes harm avoidance seriously and so seems to overcome the problems
inherent within Utilitarianism. There are two main problems with Rawls’s
account, however. First, it is arguably too ambitious in its stipulation that
the participants in the original position may be located anywhere in time.
To totally exclude the particulars of our temporal situations from consid-
erations of justice would seem too abstract and formal an approach. Of
course, Rawls then inserts a discount rate, but one which is far too strin-
gent, extending across no more than two future generations. So the second
problem is that the just savings principle is not ambitious enough, having
the quality of a personal inheritance made through ties of sentiment rather
than a true cross-generational scheme of accumulation. Therefore, Rawls’s
theory of intergenerational justice is both too abstract and too sentimen-
tal. Let us begin with the second problem.
Can we resolve this difficulty by (a) including all generations within
the original position (so that the participants are not contemporaries), and
(b) eliminating the sentimental motivation? The problem with (a) is that
it runs up against a version of the N-IP. Do we include everyone who will
ever live? Yet this presupposes an advanced knowledge of the policies
and principles that we are to adopt when it is precisely those policies and
principles that we are trying to formulate. But perhaps we can include in
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the original position everyone who could ever live. Yet how would it be
meaningful to include in the original position anyone who is being called
upon to possibly legislate themselves out of existence (Carter, 2001: 440)?
Such participants may well prefer something resembling the Repugnant
Conclusion as a necessary price of their continued existence. Therefore,
critics have demanded that we fall back on (b). Brian Barry (1989) argues
that Rawls’s Humean influences must be discarded, as justice cannot be
founded upon the sentimental ties that we have for our successors and
Rawls (1993: 274) himself came to accept this. For Barry then, Rawls is for-
mulating principles to which all generations should rationally agree, what
we might call a theory of ‘meta-generational justice’.
However, this still leaves the objection that Rawls is being too am-
bitious. I think we can address this problem by acknowledging that
although it might be the case that justice cannot be founded upon senti-
ment, this does not mean passion and sentiment are irrelevant to consid-
erations of justice (see Chapter 6). In short, we have yet to consider
communitarian critiques of intergenerational justice.
Communitarianism
Avner de-Shalit (1995) has offered a communitarian account, one that
essentially depends upon hypothesising the existence of a transgenera-
tional community. If communities are spatial entities, then it seems absurd
to deny that they are also temporal entities; and if communities are the
most important source of identity and obligation, then the future must be
an important source of identity and so a referent to which I bear obliga-
tions. As Dobson (1998: 105) points out, de-Shalit is here echoing O’Neill’s
(1993: 28–38) depiction of the transgenerational self. For although I, the
being now in existence, cannot be harmed 50 years after my death, my
reputation and my legacy can be damaged. Similarly, then, not only can
the present generation harm future ones, but future generations can harm
us and we can harm long-dead generations! Therefore, there may well be a
loose reciprocity between generations that grounds the notion of inter-
generational justice after all.
The problem here, though, lies in determining the criteria by which
harm can be assessed. When past generations burned witches or initiated
pogroms they no doubt genuinely believed that their legacy would benefit
their descendants. Are we harming past generations by dissenting from
such beliefs, therefore? To believe so is equivalent to believing that our
ethical standards should be equivalent to theirs, which is nonsensical.
Instead, it seems that although past generations can harm us (intention-
ally or otherwise), we cannot harm the past by choosing to betray their
legacy. Therefore, although there is a transgenerational community that
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points into the future, there is none that points into the past; we can form
a community with our descendants but they cannot form one with us, nor
can we with our ancestors. We can harm the future, but the future cannot
harm us.
It is at this point that the critics of intergenerational justice step in and
say something like the following. Justice implies reciprocity and reci-
procity is, of its very nature, a two-way process: if the future cannot harm
us then we cannot harm it. Can this objection be met? I believe so. The
essential question concerns who is being harmed. I have already argued
that we harm the future if we do not bequeath to them an environment
that is consistent with levels of autonomy that we ourselves would accept.
But imagine that we do bequeath that environment and future genera-
tions use their autonomy to wreck it. Are we harmed by this? No, because
we are no longer around to feel harm. But this does not mean that harm
is not occurring. For if the future does wreck that environment, then they
will be harming their descendants by undermining their autonomy by
betraying not us but the principles of inter- or meta-generational justice
that we are formulating. Similarly, if we suddenly decided to abolish free
societies we would not be harming Immanuel Kant et al., but we would
be harming a future that would have to struggle to regain the autonomy
that we chose to waste.
What this indicates is that although reciprocity is a two-way process,
this process is not erased by time’s arrow (B. Barry, 1999). We often help
others without an expectation of either direct or indirect return, not as an
act of benevolence (because we are nice people) but because it is the right
thing to do (because we recognise the demands of justice, whatever the
implications for ourselves). To claim (a) that we cannot harm the future
implies (b) that we cannot have been harmed by the past and furthermore
(c) that we have not been benefited by the past. It is to claim that justice
cannot exist unless we can experience the reciprocal consequences of
acting justly. But if (b) and (c) are patently false then (a) must be false also.
Therefore, across the temporal dimension reciprocity may resemble what
Ball (2001: 103–4) calls serial or ‘punctuated reciprocity’, where each gen-
eration recognises an obligation to act with justice towards its descendants
according to the demands of inter- or meta-generational justice that it
would be irrational to ignore.
This is one of the reasons why in Chapter 2, I was so concerned to chal-
lenge the simplistic ‘rights imply responsibilities’ chant of new social
democrats. For, when applied to this debate, that insistence might imply
that we have no obligations towards the future because they have no
rights at the present time. This is the position of Beckerman and Pasek.
But if what we are doing is formulating a theory of meta-generational
justice, then this simplistic equation does not hold: rights may imply
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responsibilities, but not necessarily on each and every occasion. So, even
though future generations are not around to make claims on our energy
and resources, we might still have obligations towards them based upon
a theory of justice to which all generations should rationally assent. There-
fore, punctuated reciprocity is one facet of the kind of diverse reciprocity
that I spend the latter part of Chapter 2 defending.
For Goodin (1985: 177–8) those obligations derive from the unilateral
power that we hold over our descendants, their vulnerability in relation
to ourselves. Unlike de-Shalit, however, Goodin allows sentimental 
ties to supplement rather than replace the contractarian approach. 
Once we remember that, for Rawls (1972: 50; 1993: 3–46), the original 
position is a site of ‘reflective equilibrium’, and political rather than 
metaphysical, then our concern for the vulnerable is permitted to creep
beneath the veil of ignorance. So we find a middle way between the over-
and underambitious sides of Rawls’s just savings principle. The original
position should not be located anywhere in time since, as I argued in
Chapter 6, rational universalism must be context-sensitive (see below);
but nor are its inhabitants concerned only with their offspring since
although justice may make room for sentiment, it cannot be based upon
sentiment.
In short, a convincing theory of intergenerational justice has to balance
partiality and impartiality with reference to the particular (the established
and imagined needs of the present and future, respectively) and the uni-
versal (the just savings principle). It is a contractualist theory tempered
by elements of communitarianism and so derives from the kind of deon-
tological reasoning that I defended in Chapter 6, a reasoning that makes
room for a pragmatic turn towards context-sensitivity. And since, given
the ecological constraints we now face, sustainability must now be placed
at the heart of all such policies, then it follows that sustainability is the
principal means of effecting justice across the generations.
Discount rates
However, if we are to have a clearer idea of what intergenerational justice
means and implies, then we have to possess some idea of the relevant
timescale, i.e. the temporal context to which our theory is sensitive.
Technically, discounting refers to the means by which we gradually
devalue future costs and benefits against, respectively, present benefits
and costs (Lind, 1982; Portney and Weyant, 1999). At one extreme, we can
imagine a refusal to discount at all, so that the interests of people, say, a
million years from now would mean as much to us as our interests – we
will call this a discount rate of 0 per cent; at the other, we have a refusal
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to value the interests of any generation but our own–we will call this a
discount rate of 10 per cent.1 How are we to determine a discount rate
which, lying between these extremes, is both practical and desirable? By
and large, two answers have been given to this question.
First, there are those who favour a market discount rate. A benefit–cost
analysis focuses upon the real rate of return on investment over a par-
ticular time horizon. What this implies is the use of real interest rates in
calculating the discount rate and a ‘private time preference’ in which the
time horizon is relatively short. The problem with this method is that the
medium- to long-term future is discounted fairly heavily (Amsberg, 1995).
For instance, let us imagine that an asteroid is passing close by which,
during its next orbit in 200 years time, will hit Florida (Nordhaus, 1999:
148). If the damage is estimated at $2 trillion at today’ prices, and if we
apply a 7 per cent per year discount rate (a rate sanctioned by the US 
Government), then it is not worth us currently spending anything more
than $3 million in trying to save Florida 200 years from now!
Therefore, a second method defines a social discount rate where equity
and fairness are as important as efficiency. This ‘social time preference’
looks farther than the lifespan of individuals and so favours a lower dis-
count rate. For example, public sector projects tend to apply a social rate
because governments can borrow at lower interest rates than those offered
to private sector investors and because the risks attached to the invest-
ment are lower. The problem with this method is that the calculation of
the actual rate becomes more a matter of prescriptive guesswork regard-
ing the desirable distribution of costs and benefits across different genera-
tions (Cowen and Parfit, 1992).
The debate over discounting returned with the growth of environ-
mental economics in the 1990s. If we set a discount rate that is too high
(profligacy), then we might not be able to create and maintain a sustain-
able ecosystem; if we set a rate that is too low (asceticism), then the present
generation may be called upon to make sacrifices that are politically and
culturally unrealistic. Is there an alternative? A complication in finding an
alternative involves what we might call the ‘savings paradox’. Since mate-
rial well-being has improved throughout recorded history, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the future will be materially better off than the
present. Therefore, saving for the future by reducing present expenditure
will only increase the gross wealth of the future, at a cost to the present,
and so undermines the rationale for saving; however, if we do not save
for future sustainability by reducing present consumption, then although
the future may be materially better off, it will have to spend a far higher
proportion of its wealth on environmental protection, thus increasing the
rationale for saving. Is there a way around the savings paradox that allows
us to determine an appropriate discount rate?
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Sustainable justice
The real problem with the paradox may be it operates with too narrow 
a conception of savings, investment and consumption. If these are 
conceived in terms of resource depletion then, because resources are ulti-
mately finite, we are certainly left with a conflictual model of intergener-
ational relations: more burdens today means more benefits tomorrow, 
and vice versa (Schelling, 1995). Even if we assume a positive sum 
game, where the wealth of both the present and future can be simul-
taneously enhanced, any economy based upon resource depletion must
make trade-offs between present and future needs; technological fixes 
and the like can postpone the trade-offs, but cannot avoid the conflictual
model itself. In short, resource depletion gives rise to intergenerational
conflict. But what if we base our environmental economics less upon
depletion and more upon resource transformation? If what we consume
are finite resources, then higher savings may well imply lower con-
sumption, and vice versa; but if what we consume, i.e. enjoy as essential
to our well-being, is the preservation of resources and the flourishing 
of the non-human then higher savings might well be a condition of 
higher consumption. So, the savings paradox is avoided by replacing 
a material with non-material conception of well-being (Tacconi and
Bennett, 1995: 218), i.e. one that respects reproductive values (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). To see what this means let us return to our ascetics 
and profligates.
Ascetics favour a high–low approach, i.e. high savings plus a low dis-
count rate; profligates favour a low–high approach, i.e. low savings plus
a high discount rate (cf. Dahle, 1998; Neumayer, 1999). Since asceticism
seems to be far closer to the non-material ideal, should we choose a high-
low approach as our principle of sustainable justice? If we could instantly
transport ourselves into an economy based upon resource preservation,
that answer might well be yes. The problem is that it would be inconsis-
tent to ignore the hows and whys of transition from one type of economy
to another. To put it simply, pragmatics and political expediency might
require a more moderate principle of sustainable justice, tying in with the
arguments sketched in Chapter 6.
So an alternative is a low–low approach where the discount rate is low
but so, in the short-term at least, is the savings rate. The rationale here is
to apply a low discount rate in order to effect the ethical revaluation,
which in the course of time would alter collective notions of savings and
consumption (along the lines suggested above) and permit the economic
transition which is crucial; in the interim, we have to work within an
economy of resource depletion which may well mean not asking people
to make burdensome sacrifices. If social and environmental sustainability
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become associated with grim austerity (as anti-environmentalists hope
they will), then the case for social and environmental (or sustainable)
justice will be defeated. If, however, sustainable justice can be established
as meaning not less investment, consumption and spending but different
ways of investing, consuming and spending, then the Green argument can
become a new orthodoxy. This means that we have to both count the
future (low discount rate) and discount it (low savings rate) at the same
time.
Before misunderstanding sets in, though, let me add an important 
qualification. While I am advocating a low savings rate, the rate I have in
mind would still be higher than the one which currently prevails. So
although it is wrong to assume that the road to sustainability is paved
with the ruins of a consumer society, it is the case that Green consump-
tion implies less overall consumption than current levels.
Does a low–low approach satisfy the contractualist theory defended
above? Rawls was criticised because he (a) locates the original position
anywhere in history, and (b) specifies that participants all belong to a
single generation. By contrast, sustainable justice allows the participants
to know approximately where they are in history, i.e. their decision is
context-sensitive, while including within the original position all repre-
sentatives from within that time horizon, i.e. they hold weak ties of sen-
timent to their near contemporaries rather than strong familial ties to their
children. Let us assume a horizon of 200 years stretching from 2000 to
2200. The participants know this, and are therefore aware of what is at
stake environmentally, though none of the individuals know where they
themselves belong. Individuals are unlikely to advocate profligacy, in case
they should find themselves in an environmental wasteland of later gen-
erations; though nor is asceticism likely to be popular as this imposes 
draconian sacrifices on earlier generations. So, a low–low approach seems
like a reasonable compromise, in that all generations are valued (low dis-
count rate), but earlier generations are permitted to use and transform the
world’s resources so long as, in doing so, they improve both the condi-
tion of the ecosystem and humans’ ability to appreciate reproductive
values.
If these assumptions are correct, then we are left with principles of sus-
tainable justice that include:
1 intragenerational equity (see Chapter 2);
2 intergenerational equity (just savings, autonomy and diverse 
reciprocity);
3 the question of transition;
4 the ethic of reproductive values.
So although (1) and (2) do not necessarily lead to a conflictual model, (3)
suggests that some conflict cannot be avoided though it can be smoothed
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out over time with reference to (4). If welfare means GDP growth then,
given finite resources, there are trade-off decisions to be made regarding
the distribution of sacrifices, i.e. between (1) and (2). But if, as Chapter 5
argued, even Green versions of GDP are stages towards an ISEW, then the
issue of trade-offs become less urgent, e.g. the future’s enjoyment of the
natural environment is not reduced by our enjoyment of the same, and
vice versa. We make all generations wealthy by placing environmental
public goods at the heart of what we mean by wealth. Nevertheless, the
problem of transition means that the question of trade-offs cannot be
avoided entirely and for any theory of justice this means taking account
of the poor. Can we square the circle of assisting both the present and
future poor?
Two rules
The problem is this. Poverty, inequality and injustice currently exist at
levels that few regard as desirable. Poverty bears an environmental
dimension, since the poorest are those most likely to suffer from ecologi-
cal degradation. However, although many anti-poverty policies will be
environmentally benign, and many pro-environment policies will reduce
poverty, the conjunction between social justice and environmental sus-
tainability is by no means total. Some anti-poverty policies may need to
be environmentally damaging, e.g. a dash for GDP growth, and some pro-
environment policies may be detrimental to the poor, e.g. price rises on
scarce resources. The question is, when are such trade-offs acceptable?
In this respect, therefore, I am agreeing with Dobson’s (1998) thesis that
justice and sustainability are contingently rather than necessarily related
(cf. Langhelle, 2000). Dobson’s seminal treatment of the subject, Justice and
the Environment, will therefore be a key source for what follows. Dobson,
though, neglects the policy aspects of this subject. Although the relation-
ship between justice and sustainability may always remain contingent in
a philosophical sense, it is also true that if we manage to design policies
which strengthen that relationship, then the non-conjunction of anti-
poverty and pro-environment strategies may eventually fade to insignifi-
cance. However, in order to design such policies, we first need to
understand when poverty reduction might be allowed to trump sustain-
ability and vice versa. Of course, much will ultimately depend upon the
particular circumstances within which such judgements are made, yet
Dobson is wrong to believe that this is always a matter of empirical 
determination.
In other words, we can devise general rules which allow such deter-
minations to be made with greater assurance than otherwise. Let me state
what I consider these to be.
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The Non-Futility Rule
Principle x should not be allowed to trump principle y when, under
particular circumstances, doing so would be self-defeating.
Let us imagine ourselves making poverty reduction the priority. We
might, for instance, make efforts to vastly increase global GDP in such a
way that the developing world has access to the consumerist living stand-
ards that are still largely confined to developed nations. The problem is
that the environmental costs of an extra 2–3 billion cars, refrigerators,
computers, etc., would be so great that the advantages of that strategy
would be confined to several decades at best. Of course, we can also envis-
age technological innovations and some sustainability measures length-
ening such a time horizon, yet only an economic/technological
determinist could imagine ecological crises being forestalled forever.
According to the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) economic growth
only produces environmental deterioration in its early stages, this being
superseded by improvements in environmental quality later on 
(Panayotou, 1995). However, even if the EKC applies to some pollutants
in some geographical localities (Perrings and Ansuategi, 2000), it is dan-
gerous to generalise this hypothesis, as it takes no account of the expo-
nential deterioration of environmental quality on a global scale that can
be expected to occur before the zenith of the EKC, e.g. the greenhouse
effect. Of course, it is possible to envisage developed countries on the right
side of the curve assisting those on the wrong side (Panayotou, 1997), but
developed nations have so far demonstrated little inclination to do so.
This may be because they are not yet on the right side, obviously, but this
only returns us to the dilemma of exponential degradation. In short, those
who treat GDP growth as a panacea (e.g. Neumayer, 1999) tend to assume
that future environmental deterioration will not differ significantly from
present deterioration.
Let us now imagine making sustainability the priority. The problem is
that global inequality has doubled over the last 40 years (UNDP, 1996) to
a level that is damaging to sustainability (Stymne and Jackson, 2000). This
is first because those at the bottom overconsume resources as a means of
trying to catch the affluent and perform environmentally damaging prac-
tices as a side effect of coping with their deprivation. Of course, many
environmental-benign practices are carried out by those with scarce
resources, but it is clear that developing countries do not appreciate being
told to develop sustainable economies by affluent nations who seem
unwilling to take more than modest steps in the same direction. Second,
therefore, inequality encourages those at the top to overconsume
resources as a means of maintaining their relative position and so to
pollute in greater proportions also. Consequently, sustainability that does
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not attend to the injustice of global inequalities will not be effective,
remaining at the level of carbon sinks and tradable permits that, for the
US Government in particular, are an excuse to maintain its environmen-
tally damaging activities.
However, the Non-Futility Rule does not disallow all attempts to
permit one principle to trump the other:
The Deferred Enhancement Rule
Principle x is temporally allowed to trump principle y when, under
particular circumstances, doing so allows the objectives of principle
y to be met more effectively in the medium-term than would other-
wise be the case.
There are two circumstances to which this rule might apply. First, when
inequality is at levels so extreme that priority must be given to justice-
enhancing policies. This is obviously so when we are faced with exam-
ples of severe deprivation, e.g. famine, but it also follows in cases falling
short of such examples, e.g. when income inequality is so great that no
moral consensus regarding sustainability can be expected to emerge (or,
to put it bluntly, why should the poorest change their activities in order
to save a planet ruined by the affluent?). Second, when environmental
degradation is so acute that the ecological necessities of life are placed in
jeopardy. We can think of these two circumstances in terms of a Titanic
metaphor. If the ship is at risk of sinking because the steerage passengers
are rebelling, then this has to be the priority – no matter how many ice-
bergs are around! If the ship is about to hit an iceberg, then we had better
manoeuvre out of the way and worry about the passengers later on.
However, in both instances we are not defending a principle (either
equality or sustainability) for the sake of it, but in order to augment and
strengthen the other principle in the longer term. Where injustice is the
problem, then egalitarianism and justice enhancement are appropriate
responses only until the point where the Non-Futility Rule begins to
apply, i.e. the point at which further equality and justice without sus-
tainability would be self-defeating. Under these circumstances, it is an
initial equal weighting of justice and sustainability which would be inef-
fective, so that the latter is better served in the long run by being tem-
porarily deferred. Where the problem is ecological crises, then strategies
to enhance sustainability are the appropriate response only until the point
where such strategies would be self-defeating without greater equality.
Here again, an initial equal weighting would be ineffective, so that justice
and equality are better served by being temporarily deferred. Therefore,
the Deferred Enhancement Rule is the means by which we create cir-
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cumstances in which the Non-Futility Rule begins to apply; or, to put it
more simply, justice can only trump sustainability, or vice versa, if the
objective is to allow the two principles to eventually converge. So, we can
see that although there is no necessary relation between justice/equality
and sustainability, such that we cannot realise one just by realising the
other, the contingent relationship is very close nevertheless.
However, we are still left with the problem mentioned earlier: should
we prioritise the needs of the present poor above those of the future poor?
Are we any nearer to answering this question? Well, yes and no. The Non-
Futility and Deferred Enhancement rules both suggest that we cannot ulti-
mately have greater justice/equality without greater sustainability and
vice versa. If so, then the policies which are most suitable for the present
poor will closely resemble those most suitable for the future poor, i.e. poli-
cies that come under the heading of sustainable justice. As such, the real
conflict may not be between present and future but as always between
Left and Right. If we decide that we want a Leftist approach, then deci-
sions over the temporal distribution of benefits and burdens, while impor-
tant, are of secondary consideration. In short, to characterise the debate
in terms of irreconcilable interests between present and future is to reify
it and overlook the fact that the main division remains ideological, what-
ever the precise time horizon involved. Indeed, to neglect the idea that
the present and future poor are part of the same moral community might
only hand the theoretical initiative to the Right by encouraging the Left
to ignore the temporal dimension of social justice. By contrast, the Left
must recognise that the road to intergenerational equity is through intra-
generational equality.
Ecosocial property
Having brought ourselves to this point then, we are obliged to say some-
thing about what the most appropriate policies might be and how 
present and future can be woven into a non-zero sum game. What kind
of welfare policies synergistically serve the interests of both present and
future poor? A useful entrance into this debate is provided by Dobson
(1998, 1999). According to Dobson, we can identify three main concep-
tions of environmental sustainability, each of which engenders its own
unique account of social justice and the relationship between justice and
sustainability.
Conception A (Dobson, 1998: 41–7) is concerned with sustaining the
most critical aspects of natural capital, i.e. those aspects which are essen-
tial for the perpetuation of human life – the ecosystem, for instance (cf.
Benton, 1999). Conception A incorporates an anthropocentric rationale, in
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that ‘critical natural capital’ is to be preserved for the instrumentalist
reasons of protecting human welfare. How might such preservation
occur? First, through processes of renewal, e.g. reforestation; second,
through the substitution of non-renewable critical natural capital, e.g. sub-
stitutes for oil; third, through the conservation of critical natural capital
that is non-renewable and non-substitutable. Conception A states that the
needs of future generations must override the wants of the present genera-
tion, a prioritisation which allows the interests of the non-human to be
accounted for also.
Conception B (Dobson, 1998: 47–50) is concerned with sustaining those
aspects of the natural world whose loss would be irreversible. In short,
while conception B acknowledges the importance of human welfare, it
also wants to preserve those elements of non-human nature which risk
disappearing forever, even when this loss might not impact upon human
welfare at all. Therefore, conception B states that renewability is far less
important than substitutability and conservation, since once a species is
extinct it cannot, by definition, be renewed. However, there are also limits
to the extent to which human-made capital can substitute for natural
capital, e.g. an extinct species cannot be artificially recreated. Conse-
quently, this conception gives priority to the needs of present generations
of non-humans over the needs of future generations of humans, on the
grounds that the loss of a non-human species cannot be justified in terms
of the potential benefits of that loss to future generations.
Conception C (Dobson, 1998: 50–4) identifies an intrinsic value to
nature, the sustainability of which cannot therefore be measured in terms
of human welfare. Of course, the former may enhance the latter, but
enhancing the latter cannot be the motivation for the former. Conception
C abandons renewability and substitutability, since intrinsic natural 
value is lost in both instances, and concentrates upon conservation as 
the main instrument of sustainability. So although conception C does not 
necessarily want to abandon the prioritisation of human needs, it does
want the profile of non-human needs to be raised within the calculus of
policy-making.
Each of these conceptions corresponds to a broad ‘menu’ of ideas relat-
ing to social justice. These correspondences are too complex to summarise
here, but we can outline the main features. Conception A (Dobson, 1998:
87–164) seems to require the just distribution of critical natural capital, i.e.
distribution according to universal needs. This means that critical natural
capital cannot be sustained simply by attending to just social relations, as
such justice might require the depletion of critical natural capital. There-
fore, both the existing pattern of ownership and our ideas about property
rights need to alter, perhaps around some notion of environmental space,
the distribution of which would have to be global and egalitarian. Con-
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ception B (Dobson, 1998: 165–215) points in the direction of a Green com-
munitarianism, such that justice must involve a broader interpretation of
the moral community than that permitted by anthropocentrism and one
moreover which is concerned with a single definition of the good (the 
sustainability of irreversible nature) rather than procedural neutrality
between competing definitions. Conception B though is less clear than A
regarding the just distribution of natural resources since distribution is
functional for sustainability. With conception C (Dobson, 1998: 216–39),
however, the link between environmental sustainability and social justice
possibly breaks down altogether. At best, sustainability demands what-
ever pattern of distribution is most likely to produce benign consequences
for the environment, and if this ever required social injustice, then so be
it. Intrinsic natural value cannot be interpreted as a distributive resource
precisely because it is intrinsic. Dobson (1998: 242–67) concludes with a
discussion of whether there can be a theory of social justice that incorpo-
rates notions of environmental sustainability from across the three 
conceptions. He accepts the argument of Norton (1991) that a ‘future gen-
erationalism’ might be the means of producing consensus across the
Green movement and between Greens and those non-Greens who are con-
cerned with justice to others.
I am not convinced of the merits of this approach however, due to a
possible criticism that Dobson himself raises. The problem with future
generationalism is that it focuses upon generalisable human interests and
neglects distributional conflicts between rich and poor. Unless we operate
some kind of discount rate, then we may leave present generations vul-
nerable and unless we have some notion of distributional justice, then we
leave the present poor especially vulnerable. For Dobson then, future gen-
erationism must give precedence to those generations closest to us in time.
While agreeing with this prioritisation, it seems to me that it fatally
weakens future generationalism as conceived by Norton and revised by
Dobson. For if we must possess some principle of social justice in order
to resolve both intra- and intergenerational distributional conflicts over
resources, then conception C must be omitted, due to its biocentric empha-
sis upon intrinsic value, since this emphasis seems to rule out a close link
between justice and sustainability. We are therefore returned to the point
made earlier (that the future generations debate is a debate between Left
and Right long before it is one about present and future), contradicting
the idea that focusing upon future horizons enables ideological conflicts
to be resolved.
Sustainable justice as I have outlined it therefore maps onto concep-
tions A and B of Dobson’s framework, but that framework does not cur-
rently offer a way forward due to its neglect of political ideology. Can we
therefore find a way of proceeding which is more profitable than future
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generationalism, i.e. one that enables us to answer the earlier question
about serving the needs of both the present and future poor?
Neither conception A nor B seem to be entirely satisfactory (cf. Rogers,
2000). The problem with conception A is its exclusive focus upon critical
natural capital, for although this may cover a large part of the natural
world, it instrumentalises the relationship between human and non-
human. Now, to some extent an instrumentalism is appropriate, e.g. we
need to repair the ozone layer for our benefit first and foremost, yet it
would not seem appropriate to regard the natural world purely in such
terms. Since the future well-being of humanity is in no way dependent
upon the survival of the blue whale, then the latter cannot be regarded 
as critical. Of course, it might be that we would lose the pleasure of co-
inhabiting the earth with such a creature if it became extinct, but this too
would hardly be a critical loss and so points beyond an instrumentalist
ethic toward conception B.
On the other hand, the irreversibility thesis of conception B is too strin-
gent. Although 3–30 species are made extinct every day (Beckerman and
Pasek, 2001: 185–6), the disappearance of most of them probably does not
affect our survival or sense of well-being at all. Obviously, there comes a
point at which the loss of biodiversity is crucial, but biodiversity does not
require us to maintain the existence of each and every species, even if this
were possible! Therefore, we need to develop guidelines helping us to dis-
tinguish between those species whose irreversible loss would and would
not be acceptable. This sends us back in the direction of conception A.
I am therefore going to leave open the question as to whether we
should prefer A or B, or whether there is another theory of sustainability
and justice which we could develop incorporating elements of both. 
For our purposes, it seems clear that for policies to be consistent with 
sustainable justice, the principle of substitutability (which both A and 
B embody) is crucial.
Neither renewability nor conservation imply any major, direct impacts
upon social redistribution, though they obviously bear implications for
the environmental conditions of future generations. Substitutables are dif-
ferent, however. Take fossil fuels. There is a very good case for using up
the earth’s supply of fossil fuels, albeit at a lower and less damaging rate
than at present. First, because doing so helps to improve social welfare,
at least as measured in a material sense. Second, because despite the aeons
it took to create them, fossil fuels have no intrinsic or aesthetic value: there
is little point in just having them lie in the ground. Of course, pollution
is an undesirable side effect of using fossil fuels, but their conservation
would have no value in itself. In short, a substitutable is a good whose
utilisation is acceptable, because the sum total of human welfare is raised
as a result, but only if an environmentally benign replacement can be
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eventually found that does not reduce those levels of welfare. As noted
in Chapter 5, substitution is potentially valuable, though only as a
medium-term measure.
However, the process of substitution is not only a technological ques-
tion, it is also a question of who benefits, i.e. the distributive pattern of the
welfare thereby created. Fossil fuels are subject to private ownership across
a relatively limited range of countries. This means that the direct benefits
of their depletion flow into the bank accounts of a lucky few. I would like
to add the following principle to the above definition, therefore:
Goods should only be substituted if the welfare thereby created is
subject to an egalitarian distribution.
The logic is simple: the depletion of a substitutable has implications for
everyone, therefore everyone should be able to benefit from it on a scale
that current property rights do not permit (Sathiendrakumar, 1996: 159).
This means initiating as wide a system of ownership as possible, but 
does this imply egalitarian private ownership or egalitarian collective
ownership?
There are those who abhor any suggestion that nature can be com-
modified (Naess, 1989), i.e. subject to either private or public ownership.
For others, commodifying nature, e.g. through a cost–benefit analysis, is
the only way of ensuring that scarce resources are preserved (see O’Neill,
1993: 44–82; Sagoff, 1988) and a pricing mechanism is the best means for
signalling when and where a resource is undersupplied. But, as argued
in Chapters 5 and 6, the ultimate decision is less between commodifica-
tion and decommodification and more about whether these imply pro-
ductivist or post-productivist values. So if collective ownership facilitates
post-productivism, then it is desirable, whether or not this represents 
the commodification of nature. More accurately, the commodification of
nature through collective ownership is permissible if this is part of a long-
term strategy to transform our values away from the productive towards
the reproductive and, we might add, any such strategy succeeds or fails
depending upon its implications for poverty.
Therefore, the question of deciding between private and collective
ownership also becomes less relevant. Think of the property regimes
envisaged by John Roemer (1993) and Roberto Unger (1987), i.e. a system
of rights where a certain good is held in common, but each individual
possess a right to that dividend which is yielded by the utilisation of the
good. In what I shall call an ‘ecosocial’ property regime, individuals are
therefore not able to trade or sell the good itself, but they are entitled to
a ‘rent’, i.e. an equitable share of the value produced by the good trans-
lated into a monetary income, a share that reverts back to the commons
on the death of the individual. This then is a social dividend system of
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which BI would be an initial version (see Chapter 6), a property regime
based upon the socialisation of substitutable goods. What this would
require is a sophisticated taxation system where destructive utilisation is
taxed at a higher rate than those activities which raise the level of sus-
tainable welfare, as measured on an appropriate index. Such taxes (as we
argued in Chapter 6) would need to be based upon an ethic of steward-
ship, for if natural resources are collectively owned, then policies must
recognise our role as being that of trustees who have a duty to bequeath
to the future a level of critical natural capital that we ourselves would be
willing to live with. In effect, this means internalising that which is cur-
rently externalised, so whereas GDP growth takes no account of hidden
environmental costs, a sustainable welfare index would ensure that these
are made fully visible. Green taxes and an ecosocial property regime are
therefore dependent upon one another: without the latter, the former
simply encourage taxpayer revolts; without the former, the latter would
not necessarily be any more conducive to sustainability than the current
system of capital accumulation.
To illustrate this second point, we might identify similarities between
an ecosocial regime and what Blackburn (1999, 2002) calls the ‘new col-
lectivism’ (Aglietta, 1998; Self, 2000). Blackburn, like Druker (1994, 1996)
before him, spies a radical potential in the shift to pension-fund capital-
ism, with pension funds now totalling some $13,000 billion. If such funds
were democratically controlled by the policyholders themselves and
invested in equities and bonds, then substantial portions of the economy
could be brought under some form of social control. What this represents,
of course, is an alternative version of the Meidner plan for wage-earner
funds, against which the Swedish bourgeois parties mobilised so effec-
tively in the late 1970s. However, pension-fund reform is a necessary but
not sufficient condition of socialisation and a new fiscal and legal frame-
work for the political economy, e.g. global capital controls, would also be
required in order to prevent financial globalisation from undermining the
trend towards socialised accumulation. Similarly, all citizens would need
to be covered by such funds, requiring pension reforms much more far
reaching than those introduced by New Labour, for instance (Ward,
2000).2 If this were to occur, of course, then ‘pension fund’ might become
a misnomer with ‘endowment fund’ being a preferable alternative 
(cf. Unger, 1998: 205). Nevertheless, with such reorganisations in place,
Blackburn envisages that a proper system of stakeholder welfare would
emerge, one less vulnerable than the welfare state to capital flight and tax-
payer revolts. Blackburn (1999: 63) represents this as a synthesis of private
and collective property rights.
So, in answer to the obvious and legitimate question ‘How do we
wrestle control of substitutables from private hands?’, the most obvious
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solution is through the investment and gradual takeover of the compa-
nies and trusts who presently control such assets by democratically-
controlled endowment funds. However, unless the new political economy
that Blackburn mentions also incorporates Green taxes, then there is no
incentive for the fundholders to be any more environmental then existing
pension-fund managers. The ideal to work towards would be something
like the following. Field X has been earmarked for the development of a
Conservation Park that would charge for research into natural habitats;
field Y has been earmarked for the construction of a car park. In the
absence of Green taxes, the investment decision will flow in the direction
of whichever plan promises the greatest returns. But with Green taxes,
globally regulated, that take full account of all externalities, then the taxes
on field Y’s development will have to be high enough to subsidise the
lower taxes on field X’s development, making the former less attractive
to investors. So, an ecosocial regime (i.e. the shift towards socialised
capital through pension-fund reform) requires Green taxes if it is to be
sustainable, and Green taxes require an ecosocial regime in order to secure
their legitimacy and ensure that they are not interpreted as statist intru-
sions into the sphere of private accumulation.
Of course, the system of taxation is likely to alter depending upon 
the nature of the sustitutable in question. In the case of fossil fuels, 
for instance, taxation could fall most heavily on those activities which,
while being dependent upon fossil fuels, are in no way concerned 
with their eventual substitution. This is what would distinguish an 
ecosocial property regime from, say, the dividend scheme operating in
Alaska where oil from Prudhoe Bay is distributed to all Alaskan residents
on an annual and egalitarian basis (Fitzpatrick, 1999a: 147–9). Although
the Alaskan scheme combines some of the benefits of both collective 
and private ownership, it is not based upon a sustainable welfare index
and so has few ecological credentials. Nevertheless, the same principle
could be made to serve more sustainable objectives if the political will
were in place.
In conclusion, the essential point of this long argument can be stated
as follows. Helping the present poor requires something much more
ambitious then the tax-and-spend redistribution usually favoured by
social democrats. It requires a property regime based upon the socialisa-
tion of substitutable goods and Green taxation that yields a social divi-
dend representing the private return on the collective ownership of the
environment. This regime would assist in the transformation towards a
post-productivist ethic of reproductive values that helps to create higher
levels of sustainability than at present and so to reduce (and hopefully 
to eventually eliminate) the numbers of the future poor. Therefore the
problem of transition is less between the present and future and more
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between those who do and do not support the current concentration of
wealth in relatively few hands.
Conclusion
We began by arguing that a theory of intergenerational justice should be
based upon contractualism, though with some reference to the notion of
an intergenerational community. This yielded a low–low approach that
treats future generations seriously, but which permits the utilisation of
resources if the long-term aim is the transformation of our sources of
value. Four principles of what I called sustainable justice were outlined
and two rules (the Non-Futility and Deferred Enhancement Rules) were
introduced as means of guiding the convergence of sustainability and 
distributive justice over the course of time. I concluded by suggesting 
that the ultimate conflict is less between the present and future than
between those who do and those who do not recognise the claims of social
justice, whether intra- or intergenerationally. To this end, I argued that 
the problem of present and future poverty can be addressed by exploring
the prospects for an alternative property regime based upon the 
socialisation of substitutable goods, the ISEW, Green taxes, global regula-
tion and the democratic control of endowment funds. BI and pension-
fund reform might be regarded as more short-term policies conducive to
these ends.
So, have we countered the arguments of Beckerman and Pasek? Let us
revisit their syllogism, mentioned at the start of the chapter.
1 It is probably true that future generations cannot be said to have any
rights with respect to ourselves, since they do not yet exist to claim
such rights. We could imagine ourselves making claims on their
behalf, but if we did so by applying a discount rate of 0 per cent, then
this requires us to a weight to their rights equal to ours; a discount
rate of less than 0 per cent implies that their rights count for less than
ours, which seems to contradict the meaning of a ‘right’.
2 However, although a theory of justice implies rights, rights do not
have to inhabit each and every aspect of that theory. Justice also
implies obligations and obligations can derive from the power we
hold vis-à-vis the vulnerable. Future generations are vulnerable with
respect to ourselves because we can harm them by bequeathing levels
of autonomy to which we ourselves would not assent. To argue that
we cannot harm (or benefit) the future is like arguing that we have
not been harmed (or benefited) by the past. Certainly, it is difficult to
determine the criteria of harm, but we can say with some confidence
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that harm is performed when demonstrable principles of justice, to
which all rational and autonomous beings should agree, are ignored.
Nor is it impossible that we would harm future generations by
leaving them a pollution-free and resource-plenty environment – our
equivalent of burning witches with good intentions – but the current
evidence (on ecological degradation and its implications for human
well-being) suggests otherwise.
Beckerman and Pasek therefore object not so much to future gen-
erations lacking rights, but to their inability to reciprocate any bene-
fits that we bequeath. Yet this is a narrow view of reciprocity that
neglects deontological conceptions of justice where we ought to
perform certain acts because it is right, irrespective of whether those
who receive the consequences of those acts can pay us back or not.
Justice is concerned with the distribution of benefits and burdens but,
as argued in Chapter 2, this does not mean that benefits and burdens
have to balance exactly on each and every occasion. The present gen-
eration cannot be expected to carry all the burdens (since the discount
rate ought not to be 0 per cent), merely those that facilitate a future
level of autonomy to which all generations, across a given timescale
would contract in the original position.
3 Therefore, the second premise fails and so the interests of future gen-
erations can be protected or promoted within the framework of a
theory of justice.
This by no means exhausts the full range of Beckerman and Pasek’s argu-
ments, but it is enough to suggest that sustainability and distributive
justice possess far stronger implications for one another than they and
many others seem to imagine.
Notes
1 For simplicity’s sake I am using a 0–10 scale and I am assuming no overlap
between generations. Nor am I going to discuss whether the discount rate is
constant or non-constant.
2 Though Blackburn is certainly not suggesting that these could ever substitute
for an adequately financed basic state pension.
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The next link in the ecowelfare triangle concerns attention and sustain-
ability. Again, there are many ways in which these two principles might
connect. Of particular importance is the debate concerning genetically-
modified organisms (GMOs) and biodiversity. Does sustainability require
the acceptance of the GMOs or their rejection in favour of organic pro-
duction? How can we recognise and ensure the maintenance of biodiver-
sity without losing the potential benefits of genetic technology? These are
all worthwhile questions that others have begun to address over the last
few years (Shiva, 2000a, 2000b) but, having concentrated upon ‘external’
nature in the preceding two chapters, I now want to concentrate upon
‘internal’ nature, since it is here that the implications for social policy are
perhaps most pronounced. This chapter therefore refers back to Chapter
3, where I argued that, in keeping with the advent of a security state, New
Labour conceives of information as asocial, as commodified and as a
source of surveillance. This chapter will discuss genetic information
rather than information per se, but the aim is to construct an approach that
resists these kind of priorities.
Some expect biotechnology to supplant the petrochemical and nuclear
industries as the industry of the twenty-first century (Rifkin, 1998). If so,
then before we can begin to yield the benefits of this technology we must
prepare to avoid the accompanying dangers. Yet what are those dangers?
For welfare egalitarians, the key danger is that the biological reduc-
tionism which often seems to be driving the technology shifts attention
away from social explanations of human behaviour. In the present ideo-
logical climate, this means that biotechnology might help to consolidate
the moral and market fundamentalisms of the Right (Knapp et al., 1996;
Nelkin, 1999).
As such, this chapter takes issue with two recent interventions by
prominent authors of the Right, Charles Murray and Francis Fukayama.
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The next section critiques Murray’s position and the chapter then pro-
ceeds to argue that in order to prevent the emergence of ‘laissez-faire
eugenics’, we must implement policies based upon a ‘regulated 
eugenics’, defending the contentious use of the term ‘eugenics’ along the
way. The chapter then proceeds to examine the principles upon which a
theory of regulated eugenics may be said to depend. We conclude by dis-
tinguishing regulated eugenics from the position taken by Fukayama.
The new sociobiology
Taking his cue from the sociobiology of Wilson (1998), Murray (2000; cf.
Fukuyama, 1999: 97–101, 160–7, 227–30) contends that the new genetics 
is beginning to prove that the Right’s view of human nature (as self-
interested, competitive, status-seeking, gendered and rule-governed) is
the correct one. Consequently, the Right’s prescriptions for social policy
will also be shown to be accurate because, ‘. . . debates over social policy
within the democratic west have also been underlain by conflicting under-
standings of human nature . . . The positions we adopt are based on
assumptions about innate differences between men and women. The
welfare state makes sense – or doesn’t – depending upon underlying
beliefs about how human beings achieve satisfaction in life’ (Murray, 2000:
29). Since it will be demonstrated that men are innate hunter–gatherers
and women are innate carers, one of the casualties of the new genetics
will be the egalitarianism of the Left. In addition: ‘. . . when we know the
complete genetic story, it will become evident that the population below
the poverty line in the US has a configuration of the relevant genetic
makeup significantly different from the configuration of the population
above the poverty line’ (Murray, 2000: 30). If humans are genetically dif-
ferent and unequal, then the case for social equality and distributive
justice is fatally undermined. However, although the egalitarian Left will
vanish, Murray anticipates a revival of the eugenic Left (cf. Singer, 1998).
Invoking the legacy of Shaw, Goldman, Wells and the Webbs, Murray
fears that dirigiste genetic engineering will offer the greatest threat to per-
sonal liberty in the twenty-first century, driven (once their interpretation
of human nature has been disproved) by little more than the Left’s
propensity to interfere in the natural order.
Murray can be criticised on any number of grounds (cf. Kohn, 2000). It
could be argued that the new genetics will not prove or disprove human
nature to be one thing or another. Murray’s faith in the innateness of 
femininity and masculinity is based upon a conceptual confusion: he talks
of the interaction of biology and environment, but also of how human
nature produces social and political institutions. Yet if biology and envi-
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ronment interact, then institutions must also be said to produce human
nature to some degree. There is an even more invidious confusion. Murray
proposes that the revelation of genetic differences between groups
(men/women, white/black, English/French) is relatively insignificant: 
‘so what?’, he proclaims, and ‘vive la différence’. Yet how does this square
with Murray’s declaration that the poor are genetically different from the
non-poor, especially in the light of his previous observations that the large
parts of the poor constitute a semi-criminal underclass (Murray, 1984,
1990)? Either those genetic differences are innate, in which case Murray’s
‘vive la différence’ attitude contradicts his infamous condemnations of
welfare dependency, or they are the product of the welfare state gradually
undermining the work ethic of the poor, in which case (whether you agree
with that view or not) human nature must be an historical and environ-
mental construct, according to Murray’s own logic. And if a large propor-
tion of the ‘undeserving poor’ are black, then Murray’s confusion quickly
shades into academic racism (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994).
As such, egalitarian and social explanations of human behaviour are
not disproved by the new genetics per se (although there is a risk of their
being drowned out by an alliance of biotechnology and biological reduc-
tionism) and Murray’s distinction between market individualism and
Leftist state eugenics (with the former defending us from the latter) is
revealed as being a crude distortion. Indeed, Murray himself states that,
‘The popular voluntary uses of gene manipulation are likely to be ones
which avoid birth defects and ones that lead to improved overall physi-
cal and mental abilities. I find it hard to get upset about that prospect’
(Murray, 2000: 31). But Murray does not seem to realise that there are two
prospects here: avoiding birth ‘defects’ (and who is to decide what a
defect is?) may improve abilities, but what if the improvement of abilities
is the direct aim of affluent parents and profit-driven biotechnology com-
panies? Presumably, if the wealthiest can afford the genetic enhancements
and medicines that will be unavailable to those on low incomes, then
social and genetic inequalities may feed into each other in a vicious down-
ward spiral, a new race to the bottom. If, like Murray, the Right are gen-
erally unmoved by this possibility, then we have reason to believe that
the main danger comes not from any statist eugenics of the Left, but from
a ‘laissez-faire eugenics’ (Kitcher, 1996; Duster, 1990) of the Right.
Murray’s analysis is therefore potentially useful in at least two senses.
First, he is correct to note the importance of human nature, although it
might be more accurate to claim that human nature and social policy
underpin one another; for if biology and environment really do interact,
then human nature is as much a product of social policy as the latter is a
product of the former. Identifying a single causal flow from one to the
other may be an impossible exercise to perform. Second, Murray’s dis-
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torted analysis nevertheless opens up a conceptual space that needs to be
filled. If laissez-faire biotech commercialism and statist eugenics lie at the
extremes of the genetic spectrum, rather than, as Murray would have it,
at adjacent points on the compass, then there is a middle ground that we
urgently need to debate and define.
Eugenics
How then might welfare egalitarians resist laissez-faire eugenics? The
premise of the following argument is as follows. If genetics deals with
heritable characteristics, then eugenics denotes the attempt to determine
what should and should not be heritable from one generation to the next.
The eugenics which flourished in the first four decades of the twentieth
century was the misguided attempt to impose order upon what was per-
ceived as genetic chaos and contingency. In a world of Empires, scientific
materialism and aristocracy, the idea that ‘chance’ prevailed over ‘choice’
was unbearable to many on both Left and Right. Far easier to distinguish
between the degenerate and the non-degenerate and to recommend the
sterilisation of the former and the selective breeding of both groups.
Although hardly anyone now wishes to revive these kinds of assumptions
and policies, it is also the case that, due to the advent of biotechnological
innovations, we cannot avoid making difficult choices about the genetic
characteristics of future populations. Even if we today erased our knowl-
edge of genetics for all time, we would still be making a choice, i.e. that
the genetic characteristics of future populations should be shaped through
complete non-intervention. Therefore the real decision we have to face is
not between eugenics and non-eugenics, because we cannot choose not 
to choose, but between a eugenics of the free market (where it is the un-
intended outcomes of voluntary exchanges that shape future populations)
and a eugenics that is set within regulatory frameworks. In short, a regres-
sive eugenics (whether based upon the centralised state or the free
market) is one that elevates choice over chance, whereas a progressive,
regulated eugenics makes room for both choice and chance in its values
and criteria.
Before defending my use of the word eugenics, let me illustrate this
point with what is at the time of writing a recent example. In April 2002
it was revealed that a couple in America were planning to conceive a baby
who like them would be born deaf. They did so on the grounds that the
deaf community had formed a distinct cultural identity and that any child
they had would therefore be impoverished unless it too shared that iden-
tity. To those who objected, they countered that just as it would be racist
to condemn a black couple for conceiving a black baby so it was disablist
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to condemn a deaf couple for conceiving a deaf baby. I do not want to
discuss the rights or wrongs of this case (though I personally believe such
decisions to be immoral), but to observe that such bioethical dilemmas are
likely to become more and more frequent and that, whatever solution we
prefer, we cannot avoid the eugenic implications. If we allow such couples
a free choice, then we are effectively permitting a laissez-faire eugenics
along the lines that Murray seems to countenance. If we ban them, then
we either have to rule out all forms of genetic manipulation (including
those that may improve well-being) or we have to distinguish between
moral and immoral uses, which means making some difficult decisions
about future generations. If we prefer leaving it to nature, then we are in
effect disinventing the technology and so making a decision under the
cover of a non-decision. In short, whichever way we turn we cannot avoid
the necessity of making a choice. And when ‘choice’ joins ‘chance’ in
determining future generations’ characteristics, then we are dealing with
eugenics.
Now, while acknowledging the dilemmas, we will increasingly face,
many will understandably quail at this use of the term. Surely it is far
easier and safer to associate eugenics with the fascistic attempt to purge
the human population of ‘biological impurities’. Those with whom I 
have debated these issues often prefer a term such as ‘genetic justice’.
Unfortunately, in occupying the moral high ground in this way, we do 
not thereby avoid the difficult decisions that need to be made. Tom 
Shakespeare (1998: 668), for instance, defines eugenics as ‘the science of
improving the population by control of inherited qualities’ and goes on
to argue that, ‘In those rare cases where impairment causes inevitable neo-
natal death or permanent lack of awareness, it might be more appropri-
ate to screen out such conditions prenatally. Absolutist positions – abort
all impaired foetuses, or ban all termination on the basis of impairment –
are equally unhelpful to women and men making very difficult decisions
about reproductive choices’ (Shakespeare, 1998: 670). This is certainly true
and seems to invite policies based upon ‘weak eugenics’ as opposed to
the ‘strong eugenics’ of state coercion (cf. Glover, 1999: 104). And although
they would permit far more genetic engineering than Shakespeare,
Buchanan et al. (2000) come to a similar conclusion: ‘. . . just as the state is
the principal agent acting in the interests of future generations in such
fields as land and resource management, so too does a eugenic role for
the state, if needed, fit into the standard categories of legitimate areas of
concern for government’ (Buchanan et al., 2000: 337). All of which is both
to agree and disagree with Diane Paul (1998: 94–111) when she insists that
the distinction between eugenic and non-eugenic policies is fading. For
Paul, this means that those who embrace and those who reject the concept
are both missing the point as to how we can now learn from the past. If it
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were possible to apply a substitute concept that (1) confronted the moral
dilemmas of biotechnology and (2) avoided the negative connotations of
‘eugenics’, then I believe we should do so. To my mind, ‘genetic justice’
satisfies (2) but not (1), since it allows us to keep our moral hands clean
in an area where, like Lady Macbeth, our hands promise to be both very
clean and very dirty indeed (Kitcher, 1996; Glannon, 1998).
So if the avoidance of extreme impairment leads by definition to the
improvement of social welfare, then although we can run away from the
word ‘eugenics’, we cannot run away from the responsibility of deciding
which reproductive choices are and are not acceptable. Indeed, if we run
away from the word, then our genetic practices may be more likely to repli-
cate the abuses of the past – as happened with the Scandinavian sterili-
sation programmes of the 1930s–1970s (Broberg and Roll-Hansen, 1996).
This means that, whatever our decision, we can now intervene in that
biology–environment interaction more directly than ever before (Dickens,
2000: 116). Social policy is no longer just about fulfilling needs from cradle
to grave, it is also about deciding which needs are to exist in the first place
by either intervening or deciding not to intervene before the cradle. It is no
longer a question of simply fitting social policies to human nature, but of
using social policies as a way of determining what human nature will be
(Engelhardt, 1996). In the biotech age, we must peer deeper into history’s
hall of mirrors and recognise the eugenic reflections that are staring back.
Therefore, the essential choice is not between eugenics and non-
eugenics, nor between free markets and statist eugenics (as Murray
believes), but between a laissez-faire eugenics and the ‘regulated eugenics’
supported by Kitcher (1996; Glannon, 1998: 204–6). Regulated eugenics
allows the elimination of those genetic conditions the experience of which
does not allow the bearer to enjoy a minimal quality of life and formulate
a sense of him or herself. This means that there are some conditions that
should be eliminated, e.g. Hurler syndrome and Tay-Sachs, but others
which should not, e.g. Down syndrome limits but does not eliminate self-
development. Of course knowing where to draw the line is the dilemma.
Can regulated eugenics guide us through this dilemma? This chapter 
now argues that regulated eugenics rests upon three ‘supports’: a multi-
dimensional conception of human nature, a principle of differential 
egalitarianism and the precautionary principle.
Social policy and human nature
If a regulated eugenics is to shape those many social policies that will
relate to biotechnology and the new genetics (hereafter known as ‘biopo-
licies’), it stands to reason that we must elaborate an appropriate view of
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human nature. To date, the subject of social policy has worked with four
main conceptions of human nature.
The ‘unidimensional’ conception proposes that human nature is largely
defined by a single characteristic, i.e. altruism or self-interest. Social
democrats have often believed individuals to possess a fundamental
altruism that is suppressed by market capitalism, but which would flour-
ish once appropriate social and economic reforms were in place (Titmuss,
1970: 209–24; cf. Baldwin, 1990). In the post-classic era by contrast, we
have been exposed to new versions of those doctrines that stress 
individualistic self-interest in the form of a strange blend of market 
libertarianism and moral conservatism.
Second, there have been constructivist conceptions which challenge the
belief that there is any pre-social human nature. For post-structuralists
(Foucault, 1984), the relevant question is not ‘What is human nature’, but
‘Why do some groups believe human nature to be x, others y and others
z, and how do the prevailing conceptions change over time?’ This
genealogical approach looks beyond the liberal humanist self to the dis-
courses and practices that constitute the field of the self’s construction.
Lying between these two conceptions is a ‘multidimensional’ concep-
tion which identifies human nature as to some degree an extra-historical
condition that is founded upon a plurality of subject positions and which
can take any one of a series of forms depending upon the social proper-
ties of the historical context. For instance, Hewitt (2000) argues that four
models of human nature are identifiable from the social policy literature
– the atomistic, the organic, the basic needs and the mutualist models –
and that these have been ‘sutured’ together in a variety of ways depend-
ing upon the institutional principles and practices that prevail.
The final conception is agnostic, recommending that we bracket the
debate and take a practical approach to social reform that addresses spe-
cific objectives without reference to the metaphysical foundations of social
policy. Le Grand (1997, 2000) has recently argued in favour of a creative
ignorance regarding human motivation as a means of leap frogging the
sterilities of the selfishness/altruism debate. Such creative ignorance can
then give rise to robust welfare strategies that can appeal to a host of
human motivations and ideological prescriptions.
Which of the above should we prefer? If laissez-faire eugenics is what
we ought to avoid, and if Murray’s biological reductionism (where human
nature ‘produces’ institutions) opens the door to such eugenics, then
perhaps the regressive consequences of biotechnology can be best resisted
by a conception of human nature that challenges biological reductionism.
Biological reductionism is an umbrella term for a series of similar dis-
ciplines – sociobiology, evolutionary biology, behavioural genetics, evo-
lutionary psychology – that share some basic premises and methodologies
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(cf. Rose, 1997: 280–95). First, self-replication and reproduction are re-
garded as the goal to which all lifeforms are driven. For Dawkins (1989),
organisms or phenotypes are vehicles and survival machines through
which genes copy themselves into the next generation. Second, therefore,
not only are genes treated as biological atoms, distinct entities that can 
be abstracted from the genome, but they are programmed to be self-
interested: the function of a gene is to give birth to other genes that will
outlive it.1 Finally, organic processes consist of endless adaptation to the
environment as natural selection carves away those features of the phe-
notype that are biologically redundant.
The attraction of biological reductionism is that it offers a simple expla-
nation of life that nevertheless takes account of life’s complexity: the 
environment is treated as an important dimension of species evolution.
However, those such as Gould (1978: 231–67), Rose et al. (1984), Rose
(1997) and Lewontin (1993) warn us against the reductionism of those
such as Wilson (1975, 1998), Dawkins (1982, 1989), Pinker (1995), Dennett
(1996) and Ridley (1996, 1999) in what has become known as the Darwin
wars (Brown, 1999).
For ‘Critical Darwinians’ such as Gould, biological reductionism rep-
resents an undesirable shift away from environmental explanations of life,
all the more so because it comes at a time when politics and economics
have been blowing in the same direction, towards pathological explana-
tions that neglect interactionist processes and invite biotechnological fixes
to social problems. They argue that we cannot assign explanatory prior-
ity to either genes or the environment, as they are inseparable both physi-
cally and conceptually. Biological reductionism invites either a passivity
in the face of social injustice, e.g. patriarchy is often attributed to innate
biological differences, or simplistic approaches to genetic engineering,
and often both at the same time (Ridley, 1999: 217–18, 253). The Critical
Darwinians therefore draw our attention to the superficial ways in which
reductionism deals with environmental factors; genes, in Wilson’s (1978:
172) famous phrase, ‘hold culture on a leash’ and Dawkins (1989: 189–201)
went as far as proposing that there is a cultural equivalent of the gene,
the ‘meme’ (Blackmore, 1999). Reductionists also treat altruism as 
equivalent to nothing more than reciprocity, i.e. a product of enlightened
self-interest (Axelrod, 1984).
This takes us to the central problem (Rose, 1997: 213–14): biological
reductionists usually want to have it both ways. They want to identify
self-interested genes as the determining foundations of human behaviour
(Watson, 1998); yet, in order to avoid the charge that reductionism 
legitimates the selfish status quo, they also propose that we can rebel
against our genes if we desire (Pinker, 1995). But how is this possible? If
genes really are that important, then how can we rebel against them? On
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the other hand, if we can rebel against them, then this means either that
it is the genes themselves that permit such rebellion, implying that they
are not purely self-interested, or that they are not so important after 
all and that some other factor is at work. In short, if genes are (1) self-
interested and (2) the key determinants of human behaviour, then we
cannot rebel against them, whereas if we can rebel then either (1) or (2)
must collapse.
If biological reductionism is caught on the horns of a contradiction,
then what might this ‘other factor’ be? According to Critical Darwinians
it has to be culture (cf. O’Hear, 1997). The reductionists tend to interpret
culture in terms of its biological origins and so neglect the specificity of
cultural history: the reflexive learning processes of civilisation; but for
Gould and other Critical Darwinians culture cannot be reduced to its 
biological origins because it is a space of cooperative interdependency
through which humans transcend their genetic endowments and con-
struct themselves as free beings who determine the conditions of their
own future development. Humans have created their own freedom as cul-
tural cooperativists, meaning that the structure of human freedom has
long since floated free of its biological base. This brings us neatly back to
social policy and human nature.
In what ways can social policy help to resist the siren voices of bio-
logical reductionism? What might a criticalist perspective suggest? It is
unlikely that the unidimensional conception can do so. Indeed, those who
subscribe to the view that humans are inherently selfish might well
welcome biological reductionism; and although an appeal to inherent
altruism is laudable (Page, 1996), ‘pure’ altruism is undoubtedly less fre-
quent than the ‘reciprocal altruism’ that the reductionists profess to
explain with constant reference to genetic self-interest. The construction-
ist conception is of little help either, as this rejects the notion of a pre-social
human nature altogether and offends against the commonsense view that
there must be something over and above the social constructions out of
which the particular self is woven. The robust strategy is also redundant.
To suggest that policies can be detached from their metaphysical founda-
tions is at best wishful thinking and at worst a surrender of the academic
subject’s traditional task of combating injustice.
Therefore the multidimensional conception which is perhaps of most
assistance in resisting biological determinism. Its strength is that it inter-
prets human nature and motivation as unsettled, as hovering in an inde-
terminate ‘liminal’ space between a number of plausible narratives. So
although both self-interest and altruism may be invoked, this conception
adopts an overdetermined reading of these and other coherent narratives
so that human nature is an ‘emergent property’ that constantly evolves
beyond the sum of its immediate parts (Schwartz, 1997). The multi-
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dimensional theory acknowledges that there is a pre-social metaphysical
ground to human nature, but argues that because we understand this
ground through a constructivist kaleidoscope of interpretivist narrations,
then we can only ever possess an indistinct grasp of what that pre-social
nature might actually be. Therefore we can recognise the importance of
our genetic endowments without assigning the excessive weight to them
that is promoted by the reductionists.
The first ‘support’ is therefore in place. If laissez-faire eugenics is based
upon a biological reductionism, where the social environment matters
little, then any viable alternative must derive from an epistemology which
is both realist and constructivist. Yet if regulated eugenics is based upon a
multidimensional conception of human nature, then how does it begin to
translate into actual social policies? This is a question that we can only
answer fully once we have addressed the following: what is the relation-
ship between eugenics and the welfare state?
Eugenics and the welfare state
The final two supports depend substantially upon the kind of values that
have long motivated the most progressive and humane aspects of social
policy, e.g. equality, liberty, welfare. However, these values are not, in
themselves, sufficient and at least two additions must be made: difference
and precaution. To illustrate why this is the case, we need to briefly review
the relationship between eugenics and the welfare state.
While it would be facile to regard state welfare as an essentially eugenic
institution, eugenic beliefs formed the background to the early years of
modern social policies to such an extent that it seems equally facile to
downgrade their importance in influencing reform (Thane, 1996: 60; cf.
King, 1999: 51–96), though eugenics undoubtedly had fewer direct affects
upon British legislation than upon that of other countries (Drouard, 1998).
So what influence did eugenics have upon the early formation of British
state welfare? There are two axes in Figure 8.1. The horizontal line is the
descriptive axis that refers to the possible strength of the eugenic influ-
ence upon the welfare state; the vertical line is the normative axis which
articulates the fact that eugenics was supported by both egalitarians and
inegalitarians. This leaves us with four quadrants into which we can fit
six theoretical interpretations. (Note that this taxonomy is not intended to
distil the history of early modern social policy; it is merely establishing
that a case can be made for identifying a eugenic influence upon that
history.)
Interpretation (1) articulates the view that eugenics exerted only a weak
influence because its doctrine of social inequality contradicted the egali-
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tarian commitments of state welfare (Kevles, 1985: 99; Thomson, 1998:
29–35). This interpretation corresponds to the theory of social Darwinism,
where the welfare state represents a successful but regrettable counter-
reaction to eugenics that was to make ‘biological degeneracy’ appear
normal and acceptable. Therefore the welfare state’s regulation of 
the economy and deregulation of sexual mores reverses the social 
Darwinist’s commitment to laissez-faire economics and the state control of
reproduction.
Interpretation (2) states that the influence was strong because both
eugenics and the welfare state promote social equality. The most appro-
priate theory here is a ‘reform eugenicism’ that favourably identifies a
convergence of welfare state and eugenic principles. The recruitment
experience of the Boer War (Searle, 1976: 22–4, 34–44) inspired some to
believe that a combination of state welfare and eugenic assumptions was
required to avoid national deterioration (Kevles, 1985: 91–2). Of relevance
in this respect is the rarely-cited analysis of Marshall (1953: 85; cf. Oakley,
1991) that the egalitarian citizenship of the welfare state would underpin
the social inequalities that reflected the natural inequalities which eugenic
science had successfully identified.
Interpretation (3) substantially agrees with (2), but is more a theory of
‘population eugenicism’. Restrictive Victorian morality, it was argued,
meant that many spouses were mismatched, so that the children they pro-
duced were genetically less fit than they might otherwise have been
(Kevles, 1985: 65–6). Therefore eugenic improvement required the sexual
liberation of women and/or an army of stay-at-home mothers who would
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ensure their children’s genetic fitness (Searle, 1976: 86–90). From here, it
is a short leap to the view that systems of birth control, family planning
and family allowances are needed to encourage low-income women not
to breed excessively (Thomson, 1998: 64–6).2
Interpretation (4), however, regards the eugenic influence upon the
welfare state as weak, because the former is more egalitarian than the
latter. Here we find theories of ‘statist eugenicism’ which argue that,
although distinctions should be made between the genetically inferior and
superior, these do not correspond to that between the lower and the upper
classes (Kevles, 1985: 86–7): biological inferiority appears at all levels of
the social scale. For many early socialists, state welfare was only the first
step towards the classless, egalitarian society that was needed if human
evolution was to proceed without the burden of the undeserving rich
(Thomson, 1998: 200–1). This second step has never been taken however,
so that the eugenic influence has ultimately been negligible.
Interpretation (5) expresses the view that the eugenic influence has been
strong because both it and the welfare state are based upon a fundamen-
tal social inequality. The theory of ‘statistical eugenics’ states that mental
tests can distinguish between the genetically superior and inferior (Gould,
1978), and it is such mental tests that have worked their way into signi-
ficant quarters of the welfare state (Eysenck, 1998; Mensch and Mensch,
1990; Selden, 1999).
Finally, interpretation (6) concurs about the joint inegalitarianism of
eugenics and state welfare and corresponds to the theory of ‘penal eugen-
ics’. Some argue that both eugenics and state welfare constituted twin
strategies of disciplinary control. Garland (1985: 130–55) insists that we
need to identify substantial continuities between the nineteenth-century
minimalist state and the post-Victorian ‘penal–welfare’ state. He under-
lines the extent to which eugenics inspired the modern system of social
security, so that the latter is the institutional embodiment of the genetic
endowments we are assumed to possess. According to this interpretation,
social policy prods the genetically unfit into labour colonies, workfare and
social assistance schemes (King, 1999) and designs labour exchanges and
social insurance systems for the genetically fit.
Taken individually, none of the above interpretations is entirely satis-
factory, yet, when taken together, they point to a conclusion that is diffi-
cult to dismiss: that eugenics had only a weak influence upon state
welfare directly but arguably a stronger indirect influence that was partly
egalitarian and partly inegalitarian. To some extent, then, the welfare
state’s traditional concern with liberty, equality and welfare may have
been based upon reductive conceptions of human nature, e.g. Marshall’s
view that genetic inequality requires tripartite and selective education. As
such, a regulated eugenics must make certain additions which correct that
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reductive emphasis. We are now in a position to outline the remaining
two supports of a regulated eugenics.
Towards progressive biopolicies
According to the multidimensional conception, human nature displays
pre-social origins which must be interpreted with social perceptions,
meaning that our knowledge of human nature will always be partial and
open-ended. Politically, this means supporting the principle of ‘differen-
tial egalitarianism’ which underpins the discussions of recognition and
care in Chapter 6 and of deliberative democracy in Chapter 9.
A respect for difference and diversity is required as a reflection of the
imperfectability of our knowledge, e.g. we must avoid overprescriptive
views of what a meaningful human life involves in order to avoid
assumptions regarding normality that invoke homogeneous notions of
what it means to be human – with misogynist, disablist and homophobic
notions being especially dangerous. Some degree of social equality is also
required in order to ensure that that respect for difference is substantive
rather than merely formal, i.e. justice requires not only the just distribu-
tion of material resources, but also the just distribution of cultural recog-
nition. The principle of differential equality is far from straightforward
for, as we saw at the end of Chapter 6, although distribution and recog-
nition/care overlap, neither can be reduced to the other. A progressive
biopolicy therefore requires an application of biotechnology which avoids
reductionism by allowing difference-respecting discourses and practices
to circulate within socially egalitarian environments. Ultimately, the aim
of progressive biopolicies is to maintain the multidimensionality of human nature;
the rationale for, and the objectives of, progressive biopolicies therefore
resemble one another: the need to avoid the closure of the human condi-
tion around homogeneous norms.
This implies that, in addition to the usual values upon which social
policy is based – welfare, equality and liberty – a respect for difference
demands the addition of a fourth: precaution, i.e. do not institute change
for the sake of change, but only if good enough reasons can be found.
However, because change can be justified under certain circumstances, 
the value of precaution is ordered into the following lexical sequence 
(cf. Suzuki and Knudtson, 1990: 334–5):
Precaution
1 If it isn’t broke, don’t fix it. In other words, establish that there is a
problem deserving of attention. So much technological innovation
involves the construction of problems ex post, i.e. something is defined
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as a problem atavistically in order to justify the time and expense of
producing the innovation. We might ask the question recommended
by Postman (1993): what is the problem to which this technology is
the solution?
2 If it is broke, establish whether the problem is predominantly social
or natural.
3 If the problem is social, fix society. In short, we must avoid becoming
addicted to technological fixes, as this confers power and responsi-
bility in the hands of scientific, economic and political elites, and may
malfunction in ways that require more technological fixes ad infini-
tum. If the problem is natural, and if a biotech solution seems feasi-
ble, then establish a moratorium.
4 Do not end the moratorium without reference to:
(a) Welfare Will the biotechnology fulfil basic needs more effec-
tively? Does a risk assessment reveal that both short-term and
long-term risks are at an acceptable minimum?
(b) Equality Will the biotechnology benefit all individuals 
equivalently?
(c) Liberty Will the biotechnology enhance the liberty of the indi-
vidual and will it be implemented with the democratic approval
of most individuals?
5 If a case is established, then initiate the biotechnology slowly.
6 Initiate more rapid and radical reforms only if (5) is shown not to be
working and with additional reference back to (4).
These, then, are the three criticalist supports upon which regulated
eugenics rests: multidimensionality, differential egalitarianism and the
precautionary principle. Having outlined it in the abstract, and for reasons
explained later on, perhaps the best way of understanding regulated
eugenics is by contrasting it to the laissez-faire approach in the light of
three key social policy issues.
Three dilemmas
Genetic screening
The dilemma is simple (Rothstein, 1997; O’Neill, 1998). If people are
required either to disclose the results of genetic screening, or to take a test,
before receiving health and/or life insurance, then the genetically disad-
vantaged may be denied cover, or be required to pay excessively high pre-
miums, or deny themselves cover by refusing to take tests that may
benefit their health (Rifkin, 1998: 160–9). However, if people are not
required to disclose, then insurance companies will suffer from adverse
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selection and the genetically advantaged may have to pay higher premi-
ums than otherwise (Pokorski, 1997).
For the advocates of laissez-faire economics there is no dilemma. In a
free market, there is no essential difference between genetic information
and the other forms of information that those offering and those seeking
insurance exchange in order to gain the best deal for themselves. Com-
panies should be free to require the disclosure of relevant genetic infor-
mation, setting whatever premiums they see fit, and individuals should
be free to either disclose that information or to take their business else-
where. So long as both insurance providers and insurance seekers act vol-
untarily in full knowledge of the likely consequences of their actions, then
it is not for the state to ‘buck’ that market.
For those on the Centre-Left, however, such laissez-faire economics
engenders a laissez-faire eugenics, where those who are both materially and
genetically poor will be doubly disadvantaged. The use of genetic infor-
mation in a free market will exacerbate inequalities between the most
privileged and underprivileged groups that offends against the Centre-
Left’s conception of social justice, and so it follows that we can longer
debate social justice without also debating genetic injustice.
However, genetic screening cannot simply be prohibited, as there are
sound medical reasons for its use. Yet we already have an insurance
system that permits both adequate, egalitarian cover and genetic screen-
ing: social insurance. In a social insurance system, the problems of 
inadequate coverage and adverse selection disappear because these are
non-exclusionary schemes where premiums are uniform and returns are
on the basis of need. The solution, then, is either to socialise health insur-
ance where it is still in private hands or at least to require private insur-
ers to behave as if they were social insurers – as is the case in Germany
(Wiesing, 1999: 54). The medical benefits of genetic screening may then be
utilised, so long as insurance-related problems are dealt with socially and
we avoid the complete individualisation of health care that the new genet-
ics could otherwise herald (Hubbard and Wald, 1997). Therefore, we are
still engaging in eugenics (because we are making de facto decisions about
future generations), but in a regulatory and socialised framework.
A similar contrast between laissez-faire and regulated eugenics can be
made in respect of life insurance and employment law.3 McGleenan and
Wiesing (1999: 116) do not regard the socialisation of life insurance as real-
istic. If so, we might still require private life insurers to behave as if they
were social ones. With some measures against fraud in place, the insur-
ance industry can be left to absorb the potential costs of adverse selection,
so long as these costs are moderate, since this is a lesser evil than the risk
of genetic discrimination and could be thought of as a sumptuary tax paid
by insurers as a necessary side effect of allowing a private market in social
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welfare. Therefore the debate regarding both health and life insurance
proceeds no further than principle (3), above (cf. Reilly, 1999). If genetic
screening creates problems for the insurance industry, then they are social
ones requiring social solutions and not natural ones requiring a biotech-
nological fix (McGleenan, 1999).
Similar considerations apply to employment (Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, 1999). There is a risk that job applicants may either be required
to take a test or disclose the results of past tests as a condition of employ-
ment. Employers may therefore be tempted to: deny jobs to those who 
are vulnerable to a slight occupational hazard; only employ those who 
are less likely to require sick pay and leave entitlements; de-emphasise
healthy and safe working conditions. However, employers can argue that
screening helps everyone by avoiding the possibility of placing certain
workers in jobs to which they are, or may become, unsuited.
What happens if we avoid the laissez-faire approach which in effect
means giving employers a free hand? To a large extent, principle (3) is suf-
ficient here also and implies that employers should be required by law to
minimise risks that are environmental in origin. However, there may be
exceptional cases where the minimisation of environmental risks is still
not enough. For the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (1999), this refers to sit-
uations where the working environment is inherently dangerous to those
with certain genetic conditions, and situations where the welfare of third
parties is involved. As such, limited and carefully proscribed forms of
screening may be permissible, so long as the values of welfare, equality
and liberty are observed. However, screening programmes can only be
allowed with substantial reference to principles (4b) and (4c), i.e. those
who refuse to be screened and those who, on being screened, are found
to possess a potentially dangerous condition, cannot be fired, coerced or
refused employment on either of those grounds, unless the interests of
third parties are demonstrably at stake. As the BMA (1998: 171) puts it,
individuals ‘. . . should be free to accept certain risks, providing they are
informed of the implications and the decision does not put others, who
have not consented, at risk’. This also offers protection to the employer
whose liability is reduced in those circumstances where genetic screening
would have benefited the individual who refused to be screened, or where
individuals accepted the risks associated with a revealed genetic condi-
tion (Knoppers, 1999: 53).
Gene therapy
By and large, commentators regard somatic cell therapy as acceptable and
germ cell therapy as unacceptable (Suzuki and Knudtson, 1990: 183–91),
because whereas manipulation of the former bears implications for the
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individual alone, manipulation of the latter bears implications for the
individual’s descendants as well. Yet a laissez-faire approach questions this
distinction. If I am free to influence and even determine my children’s
future by providing them with a private education and other social advan-
tages, then why should I not be able to influence/determine their future
through genetic intervention as well, whether somatic cell or germ line
(Harris, 1998: 173)?
Here the challenge posed by laissez-faire advocates is more substantial
than was the case with genetic screening. It is difficult in practice to dis-
tinguish fully and adequately between the social and the biological, and
between the needs of present generations and the needs of future ones. 
At present, the consensus seems to be that somatic cell therapy should 
be permissible for non-cosmetic reasons, i.e. to relieve suffering. Yet, 
since the lines between the cosmetic and the non-cosmetic and between
somatic cell and germ cell therapy are often blurred, it might be that
somatic cell therapy could be used to ‘improve upon nature’ and that 
gene cell therapy could be permitted were the risks to be calculable. For
instance, the BMA (1998: 197–9) supports the consensus view, but allows
for the possibility that the terms of the debate may need to alter once genetic
technology improves. In short, it recommends the precautionary principle,
but allows for the possibility that, once technological advances are in place,
the promise of improving individuals’ welfare overrides precaution so
long as, we might add, the principles of liberty and equality are also closely
observed.
However, even if this were to be the case, this does not imply that the
relevant decisions should be left to individuals alone. Indeed, it could be
said that the engineering of the genetic characteristics of future genera-
tions is only permissible in the context of international agreements that set
the enforceable limits of individual freedom in this respect. In a free
market, predominantly affluent individuals would be able to buy what-
ever was being offered by private biotechnology companies, leading to
the ghettoisation of genetic privilege and underprivilege: the biological
equivalents of gated communities and interiorised spaces of private sur-
veillance. If the blurring of the line between the social and the biological
demands a consistency on the part of policy-makers, then rather than
granting a social and genetic free-for-all, within which affluent parents
will come out on top, regulated eugenics requires that the virtue of indi-
vidual freedom be measured in terms of the effects of free acts upon social
equality. In a regulated market, the purchase of genetic advantage would
be severely curtailed and largely prohibited, with biotechnology compa-
nies being prevented from privatising the human genome through ‘life
patents’ and from monopolising the market in genetic pharmacology. In
short, principle (4b) suggests that a laissez-faire market in gene therapy is
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undesirable, even if we one day decide that the somatic/gene cell dis-
tinction cannot hold.
Reproduction
Reproductive freedoms and social diversity are on a collision course.
Biotechnology represents a quantum leap beyond existing technologies in
its capacity to enhance our control over the reproductive process. Such
control can involve the filtering out of undesirable qualities (certain 
diseases and syndromes) and possibly the ‘filtering in’ of qualities that
are regarded as socially desirable (height, attractiveness, intelligence) –
though this is a much more remote possibility. At the speculative extreme
lies a debate about full human cloning. Full cloning would not involve
the creation of armies of automatons, but of individuals who would be
genetically identical to their ‘nuclear mothers’. For some, this is no more
objectionable than the existence of identical twins and test-tube babies; for
others, it represents a threat to human identity.
The supporters of laissez-faire genetics/eugenics (Harris, 1998, 1999;
Silver, 1998; Beyleveld and Brownsword, 1998) argue that if people wish
to have cloned children then, if and when the technology becomes avail-
able, why shouldn’t they? There are a number of hypothetical situations
where the cloning of children can seem fairly unproblematic: (a) to save
the life of a dying child by cloning him or her a genetically identical
sibling, (b) to allow a lesbian couple to bear a biological child, (c) to allow
a single women to have a child without donor insemination. However
critics (Putnam, 1999; Wilmut et al., 2000) allege that even these appar-
ently benign examples suggest intractable problems. In scenario (a), the
cloned sibling is being treated as a means rather than as an end; in sce-
nario (b), there may be identity problems, e.g. the child might have two
biological mothers (a nuclear mother and an egg/womb mother); in sce-
nario (c), the identity problem may stem from the child being both the off-
spring of the mother and her genetically identical twin. Indeed, if we allow
cloning under these circumstances, then why not the cloning of designer
babies – a possibility that some laissez-faire advocates view as desirable
and unpreventable (Silver, 1998: 141–5)?
It would be easy to relegate this issue to the future until such a time as
the technology is either available or has proved to be unrealistic. Unfor-
tunately, even if cloning technology proves to be an unscientific fiction,
history shows that bad science does not prevent the design of bad poli-
cies and so the ethical debate cannot be sidelined until such time as sci-
entists agree that there either is or is not something real to worry about.
Would full cloning be available to all or would the affluent have greater
access to this service? In an egalitarian society, we would be faced with
TZP8  4/25/2005  4:56 PM  Page 170
the above ethical dilemmas only, but in an inegalitarian society we are
also faced with the prospect of creating a genetic overclass and under-
class.4 As Silver (1998: 264) observes: ‘If it is within the rights of parents
to spend $100,000 for an exclusive private school education, why is it not
also within their rights to spend the same amount of money to make sure
that a child inherits a particular set of their genes?’ If such rights are
absolute and if social equality is not a consideration, then full cloning may
be inevitable; however if, as was argued above, regulated eugenics sets
limits on market-based liberties, then biotechnology is as much of an issue
for redistributive politics as education, etc. In short, a moratorium is called
for because there is a question mark over whether full cloning would
satisfy principles (4b) and therefore (4a): cloning should either be avail-
able to everyone or to no-one.
However, a moratorium may not be appropriate in all circumstances.
Since we may soon have the ability to eliminate certain conditions at the
genetic level, do we not have a duty to do so? If we can prevent suffer-
ing by eliminating syndromes that offer their bearers only a low quality
of life, then why hesitate? The problem is, who is to decide what consti-
tutes a ‘low quality of life’? If we allow physical and mental disabilities
to be wiped from the human genome, then is this vastly different from
the ‘designer babies’ that so many find distasteful?
There are convincing arguments on both sides. Critics like Shakespeare
(1995, 1998) invoke the spectre of Nazism and argue that the new genet-
ics may lead to the following. First, a decline in support for all disabled
people, as genetic disabilities become rarer. Second, the inference that
those who are born bearing such disabilities have lives less worthwhile
than the non-disabled. Third, an increase in ‘wrongful life’ and ‘wrongful
disability’ suits as children sue their parents for the inheritance of condi-
tions that could have been eliminated. Fourth, a reduction in human
diversity as ‘genetic correctness’ becomes the norm. Finally, the possibil-
ity that genetic engineering starts with the elimination of medical defects
and ends with the elimination of ‘social defects’ (criminals, homosexuals,
etc.). Therefore biotechnology represents a quantum leap beyond existing
forms of selective abortion. However, supporters like Buchanan (1993,
1996; Harris, 1998; Buchanan et al., 2000) raise a number of counter-
arguments. First, avoidable suffering should be eliminated whenever pos-
sible – if we ban genetic engineering then should we not ban non-genetic
techniques on the same grounds? Second, parents should have the right
to know the genetic characteristics of their children and make appropri-
ate decisions. Third, eliminating genetic disabilities need not lead to the
devaluation of disabled people. Finally, if social justice requires the redis-
tribution of undeserved social advantages, then does it not also demand the
elimination of undeserved genetic disadvantages?
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How can we decide between these positions, when ‘difference’ implies
a respect for social diversity yet ‘equality’ requires us to reduce suffering?
There would appear to be three basic options. First, we could ban prena-
tal testing in almost all cases. This means that there should be no inter-
vention into the genetic characteristics of future generations. The problem
with this option is that we already interfere with nature in attempting to
reduce suffering. If our genetic natures are interdependent with our social
environments, then the injunction to ‘not interfere’ might imply that we
are no more allowed to manipulate the latter than the former. In fact, this
option is a kind of ‘naturalist laissez-faire’, where the price for our occu-
pying the moral high ground of non-interference will be paid by those
experiencing debilitating genetically-related conditions.
Second, we could adopt the other form of laissez-faire whereby we allow
parents to make whatever commercial decisions they wish based upon
whatever information is technologically available at that time. As we have
already argued though, this is to ignore the end-states of market exchange
and to invoke an anti-social libertarianism that is reminiscent of Nozick
(1974). Given the prejudices that too many people hold, this ‘anything
goes’ approach might open the floodgates to the casual holocaust that
those such as Shakespeare warn us against.
Finally, we could apply a regulated approach. This attempts to both
reduce suffering and respect the diversity of human experience. 
Achieving both goals involves a balancing act so difficult that we 
may never get it quite right. In fact, unlike the above options, this
approach can only be partly formulated in the abstract, prior to its 
application in the real world. The principles of regulated eugenics only
become meaningful and fully comprehensible through their application.
Therefore the establishment of a regulatory framework requires a perpet-
ual, deliberative debate: a reflective, democratic discourse between scien-
tific and policy experts and the lay public. That said, my own suspicion
is that we should err on the side of caution (the precautionary principle):
just as pleasure does not necessarily denote the presence of a minimal
quality of life, so pain does not necessarily denote its absence. This places
regulated eugenics far closer to Shakespeare’s position than to that of
Buchanan and implies that certain limits should be placed on reproduc-
tive rights, e.g. if it were possible to reveal sexual orientation through 
prenatal testing, then the continuance of homophobic prejudice suggests
that testing should not be used for this purpose (Stein, 1998). Second,
reproductive decisions should not be a substitute for social justice. Even
the slightest suspicion that biotechnology will be used against the poor
and/or against social diversity means that its use should be internation-
ally banned.
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Whose posthuman future?
Because his eyes do not swivel half as rapidly as Murray’s, there is prob-
ably much in the above with which Francis Fukayama would agree. For
all of the usual simplicities into which his analysis falls, (Orwell is treated
as a soothsayer who ‘got it wrong’ apparently) Fukayama (2002: 99–100)
wishes to resist the libertarian drift towards posthumanism and to defend
an international regulation of biotechnology. Nevertheless, Fukayama’s
position rests upon foundations that are weak in two critical senses.
First, his is a sort of ‘reluctant collectivism’ in which regulation is
treated as the least-worst option: ‘The inefficiency of any scheme of reg-
ulation is a fact of life’ (Fukayama, 2002: 184). But if the default position
is assumed to lie always with deregulation and if the burden of proof
weighs heavily upon those who would regulate, then Fukayama is effec-
tively undermining the very case that he seeks to make. By introducing
premises that emphasise the costs rather than the social benefits of regu-
lation, Fukayama trips over his own feet. From a European perspective,
those benefits are much more visible (Hutton, 2002).
Second, and more importantly, Fukayama adopts a form of conserva-
tive naturalism that dichotomises the debate while claiming to avoid the
extremisms of others:
There are good prudential reasons to defer to the natural order of things
and not to think that human beings can easily improve on it through casual
intervention. (Fukayama, 2002: 97)
. . . human nature is the sum of the behaviour and characteristics that are
typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmen-
tal factors. (Fukayama, 2002: 130)
But even if we accept that for instance IQ is determined by genetics by a
factor of 40 to 50 per cent (Fukayama, 2002: 137), then this means that
environment would still outweigh it by a factor of 50 to 60 per cent. So
even according to the research which Fukayama favours, we have little
reason to define human nature in such reductionist terms or to ‘defer to
the natural order of things’.
Therefore although Fukayama demands the regulation of biotechnol-
ogy his underestimation of the social and of the benefits of social goods
means that his bias is always in favour of the status quo. His is a kind 
of ‘evolutionary communitarianism’ where, ‘Human beings have been
wired by evolution to be social creatures who naturally seek to embed
themselves in a host of communal relationships’ (Fukayama, 2002: 124).
Regulation is needed so that we avoid excessive interference with human
nature and so preserve the future for liberal democratic capitalism. This
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differs from the regulated eugenics defended above for two reasons. First,
because if we accept the concept of emergent properties where the later
stages of evolution are more than the sum of the earlier ones, then culture
cannot be treated merely as an evolutionary effect of nature. This means
that ‘the social’ is more important than Fukayama can admit. Second, we
do not have to believe that humans are ‘infinitely plastic’ to advocate
greater intervention than Fukayama (2002: 13–14) allows; nor is it the case
that excessive intervention is necessarily due to an anti-naturalistic bias:
the communist experiment that Fukayama abhors occurred not because
human nature was ignored, but because the commissars believed that
they, and only they, truly understood the nature of nature, a conceit
remarkably close to that held by the Right.
Therefore, although his support for regulation is welcome, Fukayama
misses the Left’s central contention: that biotechnology is permissible if
and only if it serves the goals of attention, sustainability and (we may as
well add) distributive justice. The Left does not have to advocate genetic
engineering as a form of redistribution, nor does it have to abandon 
its preference for explanations that favour the social over the natural
(Fukayama, 2002: 159–60); it simply has to challenge the biological reduc-
tionism upon which the Right’s case is ultimately made as unfortunately
is Fukayama’s. So although the politics of biotechnology does not fall
neatly into familiar political categories, those categories are rendered
nowhere near as redundant as Fukayama (2002: 211) imagines.
Conclusion
The conclusion then is this: we should only be allowed to improve human
well-being through biotechnology if we are also prepared to improve it
through the implementation of policies based upon distributive justice
and attention (the recognition of and care for diversity). This is the central
insight that social policy has to offer the biotechnology debate: just
biopolicies require the maintenance of just welfare systems. The recent
history of welfare reform therefore gives cause for concern and suggests
that biopolicies are currently more likely to follow a regressive path that
we have all too often been down before.
Since this path is arguably one down which New Labour have been
leading us, as Chapters 2 and 3 argued, then it is necessary to conceive of
alternative routes. So whereas they have interpreted information as
asocial, commodified and as a source of surveillance, this chapter has
sketched a different approach. Here, information is regarded as embed-
ded in the complexities of social relations, as a feature of the mediated
interaction between human nature and its environment, as that which
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cannot be abstracted from its context into commodified forms of exchange
without alienating the beings to whom the information belongs, as that
which should not be used for the purposes of surveillance (especially in
the field of health care) unless the information is itself subject to surveil-
lance and control by social equals through open, accountable institutions
and systems of discourse.
Notes
1 ‘Self-interest’ is a more accurate term than ‘selfishness’ because, as Mary
Midgely (1995: 91) observes, the latter attributes motivation to bits of goo. The
metaphor though shows no signs of fading and has landed Dawkins in 
well-deserved trouble on numerous occasions.
2 Note: this is not to claim that such systems have not been also inspired by other
motives.
3 Long-term care is also relevant in this context (Lenaghan, 1998: 113–14), but this
is here left to one side as the regulatory solution is substantially the same as for
health and life insurance.
4 As a means of avoiding this, Steiner (1994, 1999) recommends that the geneti-
cally advantaged pay a ‘genetic tax’ into a global fund for redistributive 
purposes.
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9Democratising welfare
Finally, we turn our attention to what I call welfare democracy and, in the
account that follows, I argue that this is a means of bringing together the
principles of attention and distributive justice. In Chapter 6, we saw that
the principles overlap without either being reducible to the other and,
although these ideas will no doubt continue to be discussed by social the-
orists in years to come, there is a need to debate the possible policy impli-
cations of these principles, a need that is generally being neglected. Our
aim in this chapter is not to establish the full range of these implications,
since they span a much wider intellectual terrain than we are required 
to explore in this book. However, I do want to examine one aspect of that
terrain: welfare reform. I will suggest that dialogical institutions and
systems are the best means of achieving recognition, care and distributive
justice while allowing the relevant tensions to be aired and discussed 
creatively, albeit in a way that never permits a final resolution. This 
means engaging with ideas of deliberative (or discursive) democracy and
relating them to the field of social policy.
We begin with social citizenship and I will argue that conservatives
were able to grab the initiative partly because social rights were detached
from the need to further advance the democratic project. We then contrast
aggregative democracy and deliberative democracy and I observe that a
reconciliation of ‘procedure’ and ‘pluralism’ is even more crucial for the
latter than the former. We then apply these arguments to social policy 
and I sketch a theoretical outline of a welfare democracy. Essentially, the
democratisation of welfare must represent a political alternative to con-
servatism and we spend much of the chapter analysing the obstacles in
the path of that alternative and how they might be surmounted. This leads
into a discussion of social movements and why such movements might
offer an alternative to conservatism if they can build new constituencies
with social democratic parties. We finish by exploring associative democ-
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racy and concluding that association and deliberation are invaluable
aspects of a new, progressive politics.
The political deficits of social citizenship1
Traditional forms of state welfare have been on the defensive since the
1970s, often by those opposed to, or critical of, universalism. The Right
are opposed to the practice of state universalism, since they believe that
universal services and benefits waste resources by being inefficiently 
targeted upon low-income households and by encouraging dependency.
However, while this requires the transformation of state welfare into a
selectivist and punitive system, the principle of universalism (to which
they are not necessarily opposed) can be embodied in market relations,
because markets treat everyone the same. Conversely, some on the Left
have been critical of universalism in theory, but not necessarily in 
practice. They allege that universalism has either neglected or even 
suppressed a spectrum of social identities, categorical boundaries and cul-
tural boundaries by implicitly treating white, heterosexual, able-bodied
men as the normative ideal (Butler, 1990). This does not mean that uni-
versal services should be abandoned, merely that universality should be
much more sensitive to the particular differences of diverse social groups
(Thompson and Hoggett, 1996).
For some this assault adds up to the same thing: the abandonment of
class-based social justice (Taylor-Gooby, 1994, 1997). But my view is that
such traditionalism is too defensive, too quick to confuse the Right’s rejec-
tion of state practice with the (cultural) Left’s suspicion of crude univer-
salism (Fitzpatrick, 1996). For, whereas suspicion towards materialist 
and distributive paradigms undoubtedly increased in the 1970s and 1980s,
often under cover of postmodernist and post-structuralist critiques, the
1990s brought a greater spirit of rapprochement that may yet translate into
a new form of radical politics. Therefore there has emerged a ‘post-
universalism’ that may supply the resources capable of rebuilding wel-
fare systems on a ground that is more immune to attacks from the Right
than traditional state-centred collectivism. This is because what post-
universalism offers is a means of repairing the democratic deficit that
assisted the crisis of universalism in the first place.
For post-universalism, the essential problem lies in the tendency to
regard liberal democracy as the final stage of modernity, rather than as a
key but transitional stage in the democratisation of society. This assump-
tion is latent within Marshall’s famous account, where social rights are
thought to complete the journey towards full citizenship such that the
conjunction of market, democratic and welfarist institutions represents
Democratising welfare 177
TZP9  4/25/2005  4:57 PM  Page 177
178 After the new social democracy
the summit of the modern project (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992). 
Whatever the specifics of Marshall’s theory, he articulates the confidence
of post-war social democrats that laissez-faire capitalism had been routed
once and for all, a confidence that had been shattered by the mid-1980s
and from which social democracy is still trying to recover. Of course, the
idea that liberal democracy is not the end of modernity was widely shared
on the Left and tracks back as far as Marx in the 1840s. Unfortunately,
with the discrediting of political radicalism (whether your baseline is
1956, 1968, 1979 or 1989) two options have dominated; some have hung
on to the dream of modernity by settling for liberal democracy, others
have wanted to go beyond liberal democracy by transcending modernity
also, hence the fashion for postmodernism and the cultural turn. A third
option – of regarding the radicalisation of the democratic project as a
project of modernity – is still struggling for intellectual space.
But if this third post-universalist option is worth exploring, then what
does it imply for democracy and for the greatest achievement of social
democracy, the welfare state?
To some extent the Right were correct to identify the failure of state
welfare to empower the powerless. For a variety of reasons (not all of
them bad) post-war governments settled into a mean of complacency,
where a Man-from-the-Ministry-knows-best attitude prevailed and when
paternalist collectivism seemed to succeed more often than it failed. 
Consequently, there was usually an administrative gulf between those
who produced and those who used welfare services, with the latter often
feeling that they did not really own the welfare state. The enduring ambi-
guity of the traditional welfare state is that it both empowered and
disempowered, laying in the social soil only shallow roots that would
struggle to replenish the conditions of its own continuation.2 Unfortu-
nately, the Right were wrong to imagine that disempowerment was due
to the association of ‘rights’ with ‘social’ as, in truth, social rights carried
this ambiguity because they were detached from the category of the 
political. Social rights were vulnerable, not because they were too radical,
but because they were not radical enough and failed to carry forward 
the democratisation of the economy and society. So, rather than seek to
replace welfare clients with welfare citizens, the Right sought to redefine
us as welfare consumers: the lack of empowerment was interpreted as a
lack of market choice (exit) rather than a lack of democratic input (voice).
In short, social democrats like Marshall had taken one version of 
citizenship – where civil, political and social rights are semi-detached
from one another in a ‘hyphenated’ society – and interpreted it as the final
version. In retrospect, it was depressingly easy for conservatives to unpick
this conception and adapt welfare institutions to an ethic within which
social rights and entitlements play a diminishing role. This ethic of market
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individualism, authoritarian populism and coercive obligations has in
turn infiltrated the social democratic vocabulary, though especially that
of the NSD, even as the high-water mark of conservatism has passed.
Social citizenship therefore continues to compel, but it currently emptied
of a determinate content, whether conservative or anything which is
recognisably social democratic.
So we have experienced three stages of post-war social policy.3
First, the one-size-fits-all assumptions of state collectivism offered some
measure of security to individuals defined as worker-clients, but little
actual control over welfare institutions. Second, the Right interpreted
empowerment in terms of market consumerism and social duties, ignor-
ing democracy altogether. Third, the NSD has not broken away from the
Right’s hegemony in its expectation that people should be socially active
(in employment), but politically passive. We are not condemned to this
third stage, though. If the democratic deficit left the social dimensions of
citizenship vulnerable to the simplistic analyses of the Right, repairing
that deficit may make social rights less vulnerable to any further assaults
from the Right in the future. However, this would seem to demand more
than the simple recreation of state-centred collectivism, as traditionalists
imagine, since it was collectivist paternalism which helped create the
deficit in the first place.4
Imagining deliberative democracy
For post-universalists, the problem is not democracy per se, but aggrega-
tive democracy. Aggregative democracy treats citizens largely as voters
whose preferences are already given and merely need to be aggregated
through the mechanisms of electoral representation. The problem with
aggregative democracy is that, by treating citizens as little more than
voters, it both distances the state from civil society and allows the former
too great a control over the latter. Aggregative democracy therefore engen-
ders a distorted public sphere: one that is too attenuated to be popularly
accountable and yet too congested upon political parties to replicate the
transparent agora of ancient democracy. For these and other reasons,
many now call for deliberative reforms that stress voice as well as exit and
vote (Dryzek, 1990, 1996, 2000; Phillips, 1995; Gutmann and Thompson,
1996; Benhabib, 1996; Elster, 1998; Cooke, 2000; Warren, 2002). Whereas
aggregative democracy merely counts preferences, deliberative democ-
racy enables preferences and beliefs to be transformed through discursive
interaction with others; whereas the former is instrumentalist, the latter
takes account of ends as well as means; and whereas the former is re-
presentative, the latter introduces participatory elements that seem more
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practical and realistic than calls for direct democracy. Of course, the dis-
tinction between aggregative and deliberative democracy is not hard and
fast and, unless we were to aim at a thoroughgoing participative democ-
racy (an option that seems too remote), the representative mechanisms 
of aggregation would have to be incorporated within a deliberative
context, if for no other reason than that a deliberative democracy cannot
emerge sui generis. However, many insist that deliberative democracy
would represent a considerable advance on aggregative representation,
with demands for citizens’ juries and parliaments (Smith and Wales,
2000), policy panels, frequent referenda and electronic public spaces 
(Tsagarousianou et al., 1998) of increasing interest.
But if this is how aggregative and deliberative democracy basically
contrast, then why has the latter recently become so popular among social
theorists? What is the problem to which deliberative democracy is the
potential solution?5
We find ourselves in a curious situation. Never in human history has
democracy been so popular, and yet never has it so clearly failed to engage
and animate the electorates who benefit from it. Apathy has infected the
polity across a number of countries (though by no means all), indicated
most obviously by low voter turnouts, as government elites manage from
distances ever more removed from the spaces that their managerial
actions affect. Occasionally something happens to stir this apathy away
and for a time the blood of politics flows more rapidly through democ-
racy’s veins, yet these have largely been temporary moments that have
not yet revived the social body in full. What political energy there is 
has tended to be re-active, and the re-awakening of the European Far
Right in recent years has only compounded this. Whatever its abstract
popularity as an idea then, democratic practices and institutions have
begun to atrophy.
In this respect, society resembles human psychology in that both
subsist upon the sound of different voices. But whenever a consciousness
merely talks to itself in different voices, all that emerges are replicated
echoes of what is essentially the same sound. What follows is isolation,
breakdown and a drift into silence. Contrast this with the situation where
genuinely different voices talk to each other in a cacophony of sound,
where consciousness becomes another in a conversation of others. Here,
consciousness no longer feeds merely on itself, but has a wider world on
which to nourish. The job of democracy is to conduct this cacophony, to
make sense of the noise which it encourages, to maintain the health of
unity and difference. Unity searches for difference because it cannot do
anything else; it has nowhere else to go. But the relationship between
unity and difference may be either well or ill. Unity may seek a new
context or it may set out to blame difference for itself; it may embrace
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itself within a network of differences or try to uncritically assimilate 
difference within itself; it may become what is affirmable or simply try to
affirm what already is; it may exteriorise itself or else make everything
into an interior that has no outside with which to converse. Democracy is
therefore an ordered yet chaotic conversation in which sameness comes
to consciousness of itself through the voices of difference.
It is here that existing democracies are failing. It is not as if there is not
enough sound; indeed, the ‘noise from below’, from the shadows and
corners of civil society, has rarely been louder. Yet this noise is not con-
necting with the body politic for two reasons. First, because although the
noise can sound political, it searches for a new politics that traditional
systems and institutions have little desire to hear; second, because the
noise is often not being given a political voice at all. The fault is therefore
similarly twofold. Those elites who will not listen for the new sounds are
equally culpable with those within civil society who reject the political,
whether old or new. The future of democracy therefore depends upon
repairing this connection, upon transforming the noises from below into
institutions capable of hearing them. This is the central rationale for 
deliberative democracy: to repair the hearing of political institutions by
opening them to the discursive sounds of civil society. (And increasing
social capital is not enough (Putnam, 2000). Democracy requires social
capital, but not a social capital whose purpose is simply to plug the com-
munal gaps of market individualism. For although we must trust those
with whom we converse, we must be as busy talking to those we would
not want to go bowling with as those with whom we would.) Yet here is
the dilemma.
Democracy depends upon both procedures and pluralism. By ‘proce-
dures’ I mean the constitutions, laws, conventions, rules and systems
through which democracy runs, the machinery of politics; by ‘pluralism’
I mean the clamour, spontaneities, reflectiveness and dreams that provide
meaning, the messiness of social life, of the lifeworld. If there is too much
emphasis upon procedure, then pluralism is stifled, has no air to breathe;
if there is too much emphasis upon pluralism, then procedures are poten-
tially destabilised as chaos overwhelms the borders within which it must
be contained to be socially valuable. Achieving this balance is the per-
manent problem of democracy. Yet the problem is particularly acute in the
case of deliberative democracy precisely because the purpose of delibera-
tion is to break procedures open to the discursive noise that they have
been keeping at bay. How then is this to be done? How can democracy
deliberate while still being recognisably democratic?
As Borjeson (2002) pointed out in response to an earlier version of these
arguments (Fitzpatrick, 2002b), there is no easy solution, but some cause
for optimism. After all, because the trajectory of deliberative democracy
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is not to replace its aggregative predecessors but to revitalise them, the
former has much to learn from the latter, specifically, the ways in which
pluralism can itself be an aspect of procedural mechanisms. For the most
part, pluralism is written into procedure in the form of elections and
written constitutions that allow for their own reformation under particu-
lar, carefully controlled circumstances. Moreover, there are examples from
the history of aggregative democracy that inspire deliberative reform by
anticipating it. Think of the repeal of prohibition in the USA, for instance,
when a more mature approach to civil society was forced upon the gov-
erning elite by the noisy, ridiculing non-compliance of civil society itself
(even if this non-compliance had its darker side in the form of organised
crime). Therefore, it is possible to envisage pluralism-sensitive procedures
that build upon the systems already available to us. But whereas aggrega-
tive democracy treats elections merely as a vote for the take-it-or-leave-it
packages of parties, deliberative elections would need to intervene in the
agenda-setting process much earlier than our top-heavy political parties
currently allow. In short, we need to envisage a much more creative inter-
face between parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms of politics and
I will have more to say about this later.
Beforehand, let me say something briefly about one sphere that will be
absolutely crucial if this balancing of procedures with pluralism is to be
effective and if the deliberative citizen is to emerge.6
The links between substantive democracy, active citizenship and 
effective education have long been noted (e.g. Enslin et al., 2001). To this
mixture, Gutmann has added social justice because beyond a certain
threshold (Rawlsian perhaps) inequality renders the practices of democ-
racy, citizenship and education increasingly meaningless. Therefore: ‘We
must rely on our imperfect democratic politics to generate demands for
better living and working conditions and more democratic political insti-
tutions. What conceivable change in our economic or political institutions
is likely to generate these demands more effectively in the future than
improving the education of children today?’ (Gutmann, 1987: 286). As you
will see below, I concur with this analysis, even if I think that Gutmann’s
prescription is fairly complacent. The problem is that education is itself a
site of political contestation, as conservatives have spent over 30 years
demonstrating in their repeated assaults on trendy liberal teachers,
methods and theories. Therefore, we cannot improve the education of
children without understanding the democratic and social objectives that
we want an educational system to serve and since those objectives will
always be subject to struggle, so will our ideas as to what educational
improvement actually involves.
In the UK the introduction of ‘Citizenship’ into the National Curricu-
lum (as of September 2002) is one potential counter-assault to the Right
TZP9  4/25/2005  4:57 PM  Page 182
(Crick, 2000: Chs 7–9; Pring, 2001; Schuller, 2001) since it makes room for
the kind of reflective discussions that chalk-and-talk conservatives dislike.
The problem is that the ‘light touch’ it applies (to avoid accusations that
lessons could represent indoctrination into one version of citizenship)
may still not do enough to encourage in pupils the kind of critical facul-
ties that are anathema to the capitalist need for energetic, moderately
intelligent and skilled workers.
In a sense, what I have in mind here is a version of Macintyre’s (1982:
219) statement that, ‘. . . the good life for man is the life spent in seeking
for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are
those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the
good life for man is’. For what Macintyre envisages here is an ‘education
in the virtues’, i.e. in the ability to recognise, value and enjoy the ‘prac-
tices’, i.e. the internal, non-instrumental qualities of activities. This kind
of education therefore pulls away from prevailing conceptions where 
citizenship implies wage earning and so education shrinks towards the
sphere of employment. But Macintyre’s is ultimately a strong communi-
tarianism for which the nature of virtue resides within tradition and
within the accepted canons. It treats the virtues as given and so its ethics
is conservative and hierarchical, out of step with the modern, reflexive
self.
Yet Macintyre’s injunction to search for the good life is compelling and
leads us towards a deliberative idea of welfare. This would be grounded
in received notions of well-being (the realisation of socially-relative basic
needs), but would also go further. For deliberative welfare is ultimately
about a collective, democratic quest whose value resides in the fact that
the expedition is endless. At its highest level, well-being arrives through
the search for well-being, a search that is rooted in a democratic delibera-
tion that does not seek its end. Thus welfare is given an Aristotelian spin
that we can call self-referential well-being. Well-being is not a thing, a 
condition, nor even a set of fulfilled needs, but a performative process of
becoming. As noted in Chapter 2, we improve the sum of social welfare,
not by promoting a single version of the good, but by expanding indi-
viduals’ capacities to improve the available range of meaningful goods.
Therefore, a welfare democracy is that which would give institutional
form to this notion of self-referential well-being. A welfare democracy
requires the deliberative citizens that only it itself can properly educate.
Not ‘education for employment’ nor ‘education in the virtues’ but ‘edu-
cation for discourse’, for the arts of speaking and listening that are at 
the heart of democratic interaction. Here we find the deliberative citizen
capable of following procedures, without allowing them to ossify into
ineluctable authorities, and of playing with plural discourses, without
allowing them to overwhelm.
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Education for discourse therefore implies that social time (time spent
by autonomous citizens in sociable and justice-enhancing activities) 
can only be fully emancipated by citizens who are capable of sharing 
it. Freed time loses meaning without self-referential well-being, and 
self-referential well-being requires the freeing up of social time so that we
are no longer squeezed between the reinforcing grips of employment and
consumption. And for time to be emancipated as social time, employment
activity must not only be reduced, but new civic spaces of discursive 
interaction opened up. And it is within these spaces that deliberative 
citizens can most effectively maintain the balance of procedures and 
pluralism.
So although there are many examples of educational practice along 
the lines I have suggested, e.g. those that use Socratic methods to nur-
ture the autonomy, creativity and sociability of children, these practices 
are currently trapped in an economic context where ‘education for 
productivism’ is the overwhelming priority. Hopefully, this chapter 
supplies deliberative citizenship with a new context, one where discourse 
is at the centre of democracy rather than being subservient to market 
relations.
A welfare democracy
We therefore have two premises. First, that post-war welfare reforms
assumed that the democratic revolution was over, such that social citi-
zenship rights did not need to question the nature and operation of politi-
cal citizenship. Second, that aggregative democracy has gone as far as it
can go, leading to the atrophy of democratic institutions and practices that
do not connect with the discursive noise of civil society. If we now put
these premises side by side, we begin to suspect that repairing the welfare
state’s democratic deficit requires far more than the introduction of more
democracy into social policies, e.g. elections, consultation exercises, con-
stitutions, welcome as these would be. Instead, a different type of democ-
racy is required, one in which the producers and consumers of welfare
services move as close together as is feasibly possible, and procedural
mechanisms such as elections express the democratic conversation rather
than substituting for it. In short, a ‘welfare democracy’ would be the insti-
tutional equivalent of deliberative democracy (Ellison, 1999), an extension
of discursiveness to welfare systems without which the deliberative
project is likely to stall. I have already given some indication of what this
might imply for education. The big question is, how might be begin to
engineer a welfare democracy? To answer this question, we have to be
aware of the main obstacle that lies in our path.
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Essentially, a welfare democracy would need to challenge the hege-
mony of conservatism. Why? Because a substantive democracy requires
a greater degree of social equality than over two decades years of 
free market capitalism has been able (or willing) to create (Gutmann and
Thompson, 1996).7 Without social equality, some voices are inevitably
more powerful than others, able to access and mobilise resources faster
and more effectively than the relatively powerless – this does not mean
they are the poorest communicators (Dryzek, 2000: 172), merely the most
disadvantaged ones. So, although capitalist markets may be able to 
live with massive inequalities (and, of course, to require them), democ-
racy breaks down beyond a certain point. Indeed, democracy has suffered
most in those countries which have applied a free-market logic with the
greatest fervour, with knock-on effects for civil liberties and the quality 
of public life. Therefore, since laissez-faire capitalism undermines crucial
aspects of democracy (Dahl, 1985; Bowles and Gintis, 1986), and hinders
the further democratisation of society, then any attempt to democratise
welfare systems that is not based upon social equality would barely
empower the disempowered, no matter what constitutional safeguards
were in place (Ellison, 1999: 78).8
So, the obstacle that lies in the path of a welfare democracy is both
political (how to discredit conservatism in a manner that the NSD has
failed to achieve) and intellectual (how to ensure that deliberative democ-
racy and social equality conjoin at the theoretical level). Let us take the
intellectual component first, for if we can work this out, then we may be
able to build the resources needed for a political challenge. Three dimen-
sions of social equality can be identified as essential in this respect.
First, the equalisation of material resources is important, for the reasons
just stated. Evidence suggests that some welfare states can redistribute
income fairly successfully (Goodin et al., 1999) but that the redistribution
of other resources, such as capital, has rarely been on the political agenda.
The democratic deficit of state collectivism could be partly attributed 
to this reluctance to address the property relations that underpin welfare
capitalism, for it is in reconfiguring these relations that political control of
the economy is ultimately ensured, rather than in applying measures such
as Keynesianism and nationalisation, neither of which engenders the
required decentralisation of power. Democratisation therefore requires
some kind of socialised property system as its condition (Krouse and
McPherson, 1988) – see Chapter 7 and again below.
Second, welfare democracy requires the equalisation of care, a gender
equality which ensures that the public sphere is dominated neither 
by men nor by those who represent the interests of employees and em-
ployers. This means transcending the distinctions between producers and
recipients, independence and dependence (White, 2000: 164). As we have
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seen in a number of previous chapters, these distinctions facilitate an insti-
tutionalised paternalism that gives priority to wage earning and under-
mines the status of ‘the dependant’. Traditionalists will object that there
are essential needs that some (especially children) will always be unable
to provide for themselves. Yet the objection is not to paternalism, but to
the institutionalisation of paternalism around an axis of needs-experts and
non-experts. This is why, in advocating her universal caregiver model,
Fraser (1989, 1997) demands room for oppositional vocabularies that can
challenge expertise, on the grounds that needs do not exist in themselves,
but are always located in a discursive context. A welfare democracy
would seem to require the equalisation of vocabularies such that many of
the ‘cared-for’, including children, can enter into the means of their care
as discursive and often as equal participants. Such has been the aim of the
disability movement for many years now.
Finally, and as already indicated, an equalisation of time is also impor-
tant (Gorz, 1999; Beck, 2000; Fitzpatrick, 2003b). If western societies 
(especially conservative ones) currently suffer from ‘time poverty’, i.e.
overwork and stress, and if this is related to social inequality, where rela-
tively few achieve a desirable balance between employment and non-
employment time, due to the imperatives of a ‘free’ labour market, then
both the motivation and the goal of deliberative competence are one and
the same: the freeing up of social time (cf. Gershuny, 2000). I have sug-
gested that more time is crucial if time is to be meaningful and that only
deliberative citizens are fully equipped to render such meaning. A welfare
democracy therefore requires much more than those who have only been
trained for earning and shopping, it needs the communicative participa-
tion of ‘time-rich’ discursive actors across a range of deliberative domains.
So the number of social forms that are compatible with a welfare
democracy are not infinite and are biased towards institutional reforms
that correct the imbalance of resources, care and time that presently lie 
at the heart of social injustice. This is why a welfare democracy is not 
compatible with free-market capitalism.
At this point, critics will allege that there is a contradiction to my 
argument. For if democracy implies pluralism (see the discussion above
and in Chapter 1), then how is it possible to exclude from a deliberative
welfare democracy the discourses of conservatism? I should first point out
that the intention is not to exclude conservatism from the discursive con-
versation, partly because aspects of conservatism may be true (even if we
reject the whole), partly because conservatism may be help to ‘disclose’
society (see Chapter 1) whenever Left principles ossify into dogma, as
happened in the Soviet Union for instance, and partly because that 
conversation is necessary if conservatism is to be challenged and disen-
tangled from the egalitarian politics of social democracy. However, if 
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a welfare democracy implies egalitarianism, then it would have to both
accommodate and marginalise those whose political philosophy is non-
egalitarian.9 Although democracy requires basic procedures upon which
all participants can agree, these procedures will always be subject to
subtle but important revisions, due to the very contestation over 
the desired outcome which is the lifeblood of democratic interaction. 
So although deliberative democracy’s emphasis is upon procedure – in
contrast to, for instance, epistemic democracy’s emphasis upon ‘correct
answers’ (Estlund, 2002) or republicanism’s emphasis upon public reason
(Pettit, 2001) – there is no such thing as pure proceduralism; procedures
are themselves subject to democratic contestation. So I am not advocating
that conservative parties and groups be deprived of rights and opportu-
nities, but certainly greater action is needed than hitherto against that
which has unduly skewed the influence over social and economic agendas
in a conservative direction, e.g. political donations and lobbying, media
bias and cross-media ownership, business monopolies, corporate 
influence, public-sector managerialism. Chapter 1 made the point that,
whereas pluralism is valuable, what ultimately drives pluralism is a battle
between those wish to steer liberal democracy in the direction of their
favoured principles and values.
But if this criticism falls, then have we surmounted the intellectual
obstacle mentioned a sort while ago, i.e. the need to show how and why
deliberative democracy and social equality conjoin? Not quite. For what
we have done is indicate why democratisation requires the equalisation
of resources, care and time; what we have not done is to explore the 
converse: why equality requires democracy. The problem is that social
egalitarianism has been under sustained attack since the 1970s, despite
occasional victories, despite the examples of the Nordic welfare states and
despite what electorates tell pollsters and social scientists. This attack has
been driven by conservatism, but may ultimately be attributed to the
bureaucratic, rigid and uncreative equality that welfare states created and
which still seems deficient compared to the dynamic freedoms market
capitalism allegedly creates. We face a paradox, then. If democratisation
requires greater social equality, then social equality cannot be created
without democratisation. For in order to create social equality, people
must first be persuaded of its merits, yet they cannot be persuaded
without the kind of deliberation of which social equality is a necessary
condition. If we could transport ourselves to an ‘original position’ then
the paradox might not arise. Unfortunately, in the real world we are faced
with the problem of transition, and the kind of cooperative activity and
interactive reflection envisaged by Rawls has to emerge from within cap-
italist societies where egalitarian politics continue to lack much support.
Therefore, distinguishing between the political and intellectual compo-
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nents of the obstacle in the way of a welfare democracy only gets us to
far. In truth, we cannot discuss theory without giving some thought to
strategy and so to the actors who are to advance that strategy.
Given the fact that ecowelfare draws upon a variety of egalitarian, 
feminist and environmental ideas, this suggests that our analysis should
centre upon social movements and their ability to counter the conserva-
tive hegemony and to radicalise social democracy. Before proceeding, two
points need to be made. First, I will not delve into the details of social
movement theories, namely how, why and under which circumstances
social movements emerge and mobilise. This will divert us too far from
our main task, which is to examine whether a welfare democracy could
reconcile the principles of attention and distributive justice. Second, I will
assume that the distinction between old and new social movements is
unhelpful, overemphasising discontinuities and putting in question the
relevance of a class analysis. Again, there is no time to go into detail, but
I will be assuming that, in the developed societies, social movements
operate against the background of societies that have to be described pri-
marily as capitalist (rather than patriarchal, colonialist, homophobic, etc.,
even if all of these things), albeit societies that crack along a number of
discursive fractures. This means – and here we anticipate our conclusion
– that we can never create economic equality without addressing 
forms of discrimination and injustice that are more specific to gender, eth-
nicity, etc., nor can we create gender equality, ethnic equality etc., without
tackling economic inequalities. In other words, a social movement can
only be fully understood in its relationship to others within a hege-
monic/counter-hegemonic field that is to be understood in terms of the
inequalities that free market capitalism can moderate, but either cannot
or will not eliminate.
Social movements and the prospects for democracy
The history of ideas is littered with attempts to derive moral norms from
ontological foundations that always crumbled when they were examined
in retrospect. And with the destruction of those foundations so the moral
superstructure topples over, leaving philosophers to salvage whatever
they can from the ruins and try again. It was impatience with this endeav-
our which led many in the twentieth century to design philosophies that
could float free of foundations and essences and so remain immune from
disintegration. Wittgenstein and Foucault were only ever the godchildren
of Nietzsche. This impatience was validated by the final discrediting of
Marxism and so began a series of the long marches towards recon-
ciliation with ‘the real’ (allowing capitalism immunity from the forensic
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analyses that discredited Marxism), towards a desire to play among the
ruins rather than reconstruct them into grand narratives, and towards
high theories that do not have to get their political hands dirty. Critical
theorists have found themselves pushed and pulled between these 
three convoys, raiding from each what they might need to restart a new
procession of their own. The attempt has been to devise moral (and so
political) norms, without loading them with too many ontological
assumptions. This has been the project of Habermas, to mention one
among many others, in his search for a communicative rationality that
could be spoken by the post-metaphysical self.
Why is this story relevant to social movements? Because if social move-
ments do represent an alternative to conservative capitalism, then how
we think of them and how they think of themselves makes a difference.
A social movement that interprets itself as ‘playing among the fragments’
offers an alternative potential to that which sees itself as progressive in
the traditional sense. As indicated, we are not going to run through each
and every aspect of social movement theory, but there is one question we
cannot avoid: do social movements carry within them the potential for
universal emancipation?
Those who have questioned the aim of universal emancipation have
gone under a number of different names but ‘radical democrats’ seems
most appropriate in this context (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1996;
Mouffe, 2000). For radical democrats, power (as both production and
repression) is inescapable and so social movements relate to one another
through discordant lines of friend/enemy antagonisms and discursive
conflict over meaning and identity. Indeed, social movements are them-
selves only transitory and conflictual formations. Everything is infused
with democratisation, and deliberation always refers back to the context
of the deliberators, since we have no recourse to an extra-contextual frame
of reference; democracy is always entwined within relations of power. The
trick is to ensure that enemies are ‘democratic enemies’ in that they do
battle upon a space that both agree to maintain. This space, though, is not
a universal ground, for universalism is not a pre-existing source of iden-
tity and rationality, but a constructed denominator that surfaces occa-
sionally through a contingent, hegemonic alliance of particularisms
(Butler et al., 2000). Because the subject is never complete, closed or iden-
tical to itself, then this makes democracy an ineluctable part of identity
and association. Democratic consensus, then, is always open-ended and
disputable. In short, radical democrats do not reject universalism per se,
merely those principles that are presented as final, universal truths
exempt from contestation. Social movements and democracy are therefore
emancipatory but this is not a universal emancipation, if by universalism
we mean ‘true for all people at all times’.
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A longer critique of radical democracy is given in Fitzpatrick (2002b),
but here all we need point out is that radical democracy is somewhat par-
asitic upon the critical theories that it eschews. They represent radical
democracy as incommensurable with the kind of universal rationality the-
orised by Habermas and yet also insist that a democracy cannot survive
without a ‘plurality of competing forces’ (Mouffe, 1999: 51). Does this
mean that they are recommending we reject Habermas’s ideas or not? If
so, then does this not contradict their support for democratic plurality? If
not, then what status in a radically democratic society would those ideas
possess? Presumably, we cannot say that universal rationality has some
persuasiveness after all, since this fundamentally contradicts the philos-
ophy of radical democracy. Or is it that the idea of universal rationality
should be considered both objectionable, but also necessary for the main-
tenance of democratic plurality, the equivalent of stating ‘I disagree with
what you say, but defend your right to say it’? But whereas this is nor-
mally taken to imply that even ideas you believe to be wrong may contain
some grain of truth (on the lines established by Mill (1989)) radical democ-
rats cannot make such an appeal, given the contrast they set up between
a universalism that is a hegemonic construction (radical democracy) and
a universalism that is true for all people at all times (critical theory).
In short, radical democracy speaks the language of pluralism, but
without reference to an extra-discursive realm, debates and disagree-
ments about the nature of which is precisely what gives democracy both
its plurality and its meaning. By treating everything as contextual, radical
democrats leave democracy hollow and without intellectual force. This
does not mean that universal rationality determines the content of democ-
racy, because the extra-contextual realm can never be fully transparent to
us, but it does imply that some universals, true for all people at all times,
can be discovered.
It therefore follows that to spy a potential for universal emancipation
within social movements and within democracy properly conceived is not
as difficult as those such as radical democrats imagine. What might the
basis of that potential be? Let me state bluntly that it consists first and
foremost in opposition to oppression, for oppression stifles the ability to
articulate claims and so enter into democratic discourse in the first place.
The exact nature and circumstances of oppression (and therefore of anti-
oppressive strategies) are certainly contestable. In South Africa prior to
1990, for example, the anti-Apartheid movement had to articulate the link-
ages between the economic and racial dimensions of oppression, and then
rearticulate as transformation of its own identity once Apartheid fell. 
But what is not contestable, what is a universal and not merely a hege-
monic truth, is that democracy is only ever incomplete in the presence of
oppressive relations. Democracy must therefore aim itself towards the 
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creation of non-oppressive social relations, and so the democratic project
requires the reconfiguration of actually existing democracies. How?
Through social movements committed to non-oppression and therefore
to the democratisation and equalisation of power.10
But what this universal potential does not imply is the idea either that
each social movement must universalise its aims, i.e. attend to all forms
of inequality and oppression, or that social movements should formally
unite under one heading, the equivalent of Marx’s world historical class.
Radical democrats are correct to resist such suggestions. However, what
social movements must do is make connections between struggles and
carry those connections around with them, i.e. be ready to challenge other
forms of oppression when they impact upon their more direct concerns.
For example, this means that although trade unions will be mainly con-
cerned with workplace relation, this should not exclude from their
purview other relations that affect the workplace, even when these do not
appear to be directly connected, e,g, domestic violence. Similarly,
women’s groups will be mainly concerned with issues of distributive and
cultural justice that pertain to women, but will also recognise other
matters that relate to reproductive value, e.g. the health implications for
their children of an unsustainable environment.
(Before I am accused of stating the obvious, let me acknowledge here
that I am fully aware of the extent to which social movements already
practice this kind of ‘grounded universalism’. They are often much
smarter than the social theorists who deign to lecture at them, and 
Walby (2001) is correct to underline why it is the theorists who must 
catch up with the practitioners rather than the other way around! 
Nevertheless, what social theory can do is provide practice with an his-
torical and conceptual context, and I will indicate why this is important
in a moment.)
In short, the universal potential of social movements lies in creative yet
never complete reconciliations that they achieve between the principles
of distributive justice and attention (see Chapter 6). To protest and strug-
gle against oppression is to demand a form of equality that even several
hundred years of progress has still not achieved. But struggling against
one form of oppression is redundant without the recognition that oppres-
sion is a relation, a web of dominative power, requiring the additional
recognition of one’s position in a network of counter-oppression. It is to
care for all forms of oppression, including those that are not one’s imme-
diate business, to acknowledge the presence of everyone in the network,
even though alliances will bring some closer than others. The first reason
why social theory is important is because social movements sometimes
get it wrong. Eyes fixed on the proximity, they can forget to take stock of
the wider battle; understandably focused upon one form of domination,
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they sometimes imagine that it can be corrected through a new oppres-
sion rather than by dispelling the dominative impulse. Social theory can
remind us that domination is not the solution to itself. To put it simply
then, oppression is organic and, just as there is little point in healing only
one part of an ailing body, so there is little point in resisting one form of
domination to the exclusion of others. The potential of social movements
is therefore for an organic universalism, a potential that they often realise
but sometimes do not.
What this suggests in turn is that we must be able to read the traces of
the disease that we are trying to cure. The interplay of distributive and
attentive concerns does not occur naturally; it requires the identification
of common enemies, the principal obstacles blocking the paths of eman-
cipation. In short, agency is meaningless without a strategy and there can
be no strategy without something to resist. Organic universalism implies
not only a network of movements, but strategic orientation towards a
common goal. So we have another balancing act to perform. Counter-
oppression implies the coordination of the non-coordinable: too 
much coordination and social movements collapse into each other; too
little and they fly apart and fail to recognise themselves within each 
other. The second reason why social theory is justified, therefore, is as a
means of balancing forces whose value lies in their tendency to resist
balance. What this boils down to is the observation that social movements
require deliberative democracy as much as deliberative democracy
requires them, for, without the former, the noise of civil society is 
muted and without the latter, the noise may never fully connect with the
democratic process.
And if deliberative democracy refers both to welfare democracy and to
social movements, it follows that social movements are also vital to the
democratisation of welfare. In other words, the paradox which I sketched
earlier (concerning democratisation and social equality and the idea that
each is the condition for the other) is potentially resolved through forms
of collective action and political mobilisation that aim to reform social
policies and welfare systems in such a way that equality is democratised
and democracy is made more egalitarian. If the link between democracy
and equality was noted two centuries ago by Tocqueville (1990), and if
liberal democracy is not necessarily the final stage of the democratic rev-
olution, then a more thorough convergence of the two principles is called
for and state welfare may be the most effective instrument currently avail-
able to us if this ‘democratic equality’ (Levine, 1998: Ch 5) is to be
achieved. How? By social movements paying more attention to welfare
issues and egalitarian parties, policy-makers and political groups taking
greater account of social movements. If social movements really do rep-
resent the ever-partial reconciliation of distributive justice and attention,
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then the mutual learning of social movements and social policy can only
strengthen these principles and offer a counter-hegemonisation to the
inequalities and cultural myopias of conservatism. We therefore have
prima facie reason to believe that a welfare democracy could reconcile the
principles of attention and distributive justice.
But what might this ‘democratic welfare equality’ actually look like?
The convergence of association and deliberation
As before, I do not want to be accused of reinventing the wheel and I am
aware of the extent to which social movements – the labour and women’s
movements particularly – have successfully influenced the development
of social policy. Indeed, it could be said that social democracy has flour-
ished most where it has relied as much upon social movements as upon
politicians and bureaucrats (Moschonas, 2002: 156–8). Where this has not
been the case (in the UK for instance), where they have been less firmly
rooted in the lifeworld, then conservatives have found it easier to detach
social democratic institutions from those they were originally designed to
assist. What has changed is the context. The free market capitalism of the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is a response to this very
interaction of social democracy parties and social movements that was
itself a reaction to the laissez-faire liberalism of nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century capitalism.
Therefore, social democracy and social movements have to relearn one
another. The former has to hear the new noises that are coming from
below, the latter has to speak to those who fight for equality in other
forums – rather than condemning all parties and politicians as ‘just the
same’.11 As Maschonas (2002: 236) observes, social democrats have been
adept at following the trends and formations of social movements but
much less skilful at anticipating and shaping them. And although it is true
that social movements lack the grounded solidarity of the industrial
working class (Moschonas, 2002: 256) – the traditional source of social
democracy’s strength – this only reinforces the need for social democrats
to construct new collective identities, rather than trying to discover soli-
darities that it can then comfortably ‘borrow’. In short, social democracy
has to remobilise itself from within the fissures of civil society, to abandon
the passivities of its golden age (when it could recline upon working-class
support) and the conservatisms of the NSD (an endless adaptation to the
existing mainstream), to rediscover the energy of the nineteenth century,
when social democracy was as much the labour movement’s normative
antecedent as its political consequent. Therefore, I am arguing not for the
abandonment of class politics, but rather for its renewal within a politics
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of social movements, not the pursuit of single-issue causes that can be
spliced uneasily together, but the articulation of diverse solidarities
around key principles (distributive justice, attention, sustainability), not
the rejection of middle-class ‘insecurities of affluence’, but their renarra-
tion in terms of an egalitarian ethic.
This is what I meant earlier when I mentioned the need for a more 
creative interface between parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms of
politics. The disconnection (the deafness of formal systems to the discur-
sive conversations taking place around them) from which developed,
aggregative democracies currently suffer cannot be set right by cutting
the parliamentary and the non-parliamentary sectors adrift. This is the
dream of many within both elite and non-elite organisations. For the
former, democratic consultation can be limited to focus groups, news-
paper letter pages, stage-managed rallies and media events; for the latter,
the new politics bears no resemblance to the old and so consists of gesture,
symbolism and violence for the sake of violence. Perversely, the spin
doctors and the rejectionists both use the very same argument in order to
despise the other: government is for insiders only. Fortunately, most citi-
zens have not stopped talking to government just because the governing
classes are reluctant to listen.
However, it is not my task to sketch what this more creative interface
between the parliamentary and non-parliamentary might resemble as a
whole. Instead, I want to say something about it with specific reference
to welfare democracy. The point of a welfare democracy would be to
empower and so help to reverse the experiences and feelings of power-
lessness that are creating the pathologies of contemporary society. For,
when people do not feel in control of their lives, they tend to reach for
scapegoats and simplistic solutions; extremism and fanaticism do
empower, if only in a destructive way. Yet the new extremism (ethnic
nationalism, religious fundamentalism, xenophobia) represents less the
unravelling of the mainstream as its negative image. By being unwilling
to carry the democratic revolution forward, by facilitating economic and
social forces that wash away the fixed grounds needed for ontological
security, by crowding into the Centre and favouring an elitist, gridlocked
politics, the new spaces of extremism have been opened by a mainstream
betraying its own legacy.
Yet it is not as if the mainstream has been unaware of the dangers that
it has engendered. It would not be inaccurate to characterise social democ-
racy during the post-communist era as the search for a reconciliation
between deregulated capitalism and a civic rootedness that would 
re-socialise global forces. This explains why a number of ‘big ideas’ have
proliferated. ‘Stakeholding’ was a big idea that ultimately foundered on
the disagreement between those who saw it as an alternative to deregu-
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lated capitalism (Hutton, 1995, 2002) and those for whom it meant limited
inclusion against a background of inequality (Blair, 1998). ‘Stakeholder
welfare’ has therefore come to possess little meaning, other than the
attempt to lever poor households into the private welfare market. ‘Social
capital’, too, has enthused the policy wonks, tying in nicely with the fash-
ionable emphasis upon employment and community. The very title gives
the game away, sadly. For rather than suggest a new form of economics,
much of the literature of social capital has been designed to shore up the
spaces of stability, the informal networks and the civic trust that post-
Keynesian economies can only undermine (Fukayama, 1996): it is a band-
age for the wounds of global capitalism. And EU integration holds to the
ideal of a social Europe that will accommodate citizens and not just
market actors. Yet this ideal is constantly impaired by a confusion of
‘citizen’ with ‘worker’ and by the EU’s tendency to follow the liberalis-
ing agenda of the IMF, World Bank and WTO.
The social democratic mainstream has therefore pinned itself to a con-
tradiction: it has committed itself not to a globally regulated capitalism,
but to a reregulation of the social spaces that laissez-faire economies con-
stantly destabilise. This contradiction is more in evidence where the NSD
has taken hold (see Chapter 3) but could be said to describe the contem-
porary dilemma of social democracy per se. However, this period has also
seen new ideas emerge from within the academy that could help to renew
social democracy. Take the debate concerning ‘associative democracy’ for
instance (Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Carter, 2002).
The aim of associative democracy would be to create new forms of col-
lective and communal forms of association that would mediate between
state and civil society, without allowing either the state to become too big
(so dirigisme would be avoided) or imposing a unitary identity upon civil
society, i.e. the way in which communitarians overcompensate for the
fragmentations of market economics. Associative democracy is therefore
something of a middle way between state socialism and market capital-
ism, but one that, unlike the Third Way, does not remain complacent about
the social detritus that the market revolution has left in its wake. Its
purpose is to re-empower by bringing the spaces of economic and social
production and consumption as close together as feasibly possible. It
could represent a more creative interface between the parliamentary and
the non-parliamentary by not confusing the former with state collectivism
or the latter with market individualism; associative democracy would try
to democratise each by democratising both.
Although associative democracy therefore bears implications across
the economic, political and social spheres, I want to take a particular look
at the work of Paul Hirst, since it is Hirst who has come closest to apply-
ing these ideas to social policy (Fitzpatrick, 2002a). Hirst (1994, 1997, 1998)
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argues that large parts of government can and should be devolved to self-
governing, voluntary, publicly-funded and publicly-accountable associa-
tions, whose members would have varying degrees of control over public
systems of provision. An associational welfare system would maintain an
emphasis upon distributive justice, but would be less collectivist than the
classic welfare state. Self-governing associations would deliver and/or
purchase many of the services that are currently provided either by the
state or the market, yet play a more systematic role in the welfare of
society than the traditional independent sector. Hirst envisages that we
would all become members of these associations, with rights to vote and
to exit if we choose, and that the associations will have to meet certain
criteria if they are to receive public funds via some form of formula-
funded voucher system.
The attraction of associational welfare is that it would empower the
users of public services more effectively than either state collectivism or
a Third Way approach. Those who defend the former (Stears, 1999) tend
to overestimate the paternalistic virtues of the welfare state and to under-
estimate the extent to which any inability that citizens now possess to take
greater control of their lives is a regrettable effect of paternalism, rather
than a justification of yet more paternalism (cf. Hirst, 1999a). Those who
defend the latter overemphasise both the importance of globalisation and
the declining validity of older versions of social democracy (Hirst and
Thompson, 1996; Hirst, 1999b).
However, there are three main problems with Hirst’s formulation of
associative welfare (cf. Carter, 2002). First, he places too much stress upon
exit and not enough upon voice. His associations would be representative
democracies in which the main constraint upon associations’ leaders
would be the withdrawal of their members and the consequent loss of
public funds (Hirst, 2000: 289). This fails to break away from today’s con-
sumerist ethos, where voice is only ever an individualistic prelude to exit
rather than a cooperativist strategy. This is not to argue that a welfare
democracy would have to limit the right of exit; instead, it is to recognise
that it is the market system which limits the right of exit whenever public
goods are concerned. Therefore, the point is to regard voice and exit as
compatible, if they are both conceived in cooperativist and mutualist
terms. It is here that social movements could be particularly relevant,
since if they were to embody the organic universalism mentioned above,
then social movements would need to disperse themselves across associa-
tions (rather than congregate upon particular associations as a form of
single-issue politics) in order to promote the aims of democracy and social
equality. Social movements would encourage the voices of associative
deliberation.
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The second problem, then, is that whereas he once regarded it as a
means of renewing socialism, Hirst came to present associative democ-
racy as politically neutral. This is similar to Offe’s (2000) mistake in imag-
ining that working out the proper civic mix between state, market and
community can be done without reference to ideological schemes. What
this ignores is the fact that any associational welfare worthy of the name
would have to be egalitarian (otherwise the practices of exit and voice
would do no more than mirror existing patterns of inequality) and so
subject the current meanings of ‘state’, ‘market’ and ‘community’ to chal-
lenge, challenges that could not occur without ideological orientations. As
I argued above with reference to deliberative democracy, this need not
mean that a welfare democracy would exclude non-egalitarians from the
conversation, but it would have to directly confront and present alterna-
tives to the conservative hegemony. The classic welfare state shifted the
political battleground to the Left and associational welfare would have to
possess a similar goal.
The final problem is that Hirst does not pay enough attention to the
centralised state, insisting that the methods of governance would flow
from the state to associations. Yet here, again, we are presented with an
either/or logic which treats the state and associations in exclusivist terms.
Any shifts in the loci of governance must aim to enhance the democrati-
sation of the state, rather than merely sublimating democratic governance
to the civic sphere. It may be that Hirst confuses collective ownership with
state ownership, such that if the latter is no longer credible, then the
former has to be abandoned also. What remains underexplored, then, is
the extent to which an associative democracy could facilitate economic
democracy along the lines sketched in Chapter 7. Some associations could
control socialised firms and funds, channelling the investment strategies
of their members towards socially and environmentally desirable goals.
But if this were to be the case, then some state action would be needed to
regulate this system, as well as helping to maintain parity between asso-
ciations, and a considerable amount of state action would be needed at
the regional and global levels to bring about the socialisation of produc-
tive assets. This is obviously a daunting and long-term task, but Hirst
(among others) does the debate no favours by ignoring it.
In short, although Hirst’s associational system approximates to what a
welfare democracy might look like, the latter would have to give far
greater emphasis to voice, it would need to draw upon egalitarian con-
ceptions of cooperative mutualism and it would need to reconstitute the
welfare state around an egalitarian politics (of socialised ownership),
rather than merely devolving it to voluntary associations. It is possible to
envisage welfare associations (Fitzpatrick, 1999c) – mutuals, cooperatives
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and not-for-profit social enterprises – acting as the conduits for such
reforms. Without these kind of revisions to the basic blueprint, then were
it ever translated into the political reality, associative democracy would
risk the same fate as befell stakeholding, i.e. of shoring up a conservative
system. Unless association and deliberation converge around an egalitar-
ian social democracy then associative democracy may fail to hear the
democratic noise and deliberative democracy may lack an institutional
form that transcends experiments with citizens’ juries and policy panels.
Similarly, unless social democracy rediscovers itself at the interface of
state and civil society, then its traditional rationale may continue to lose
its hold on the social imagination: how to collectively control a market
economy without giving too much power to a state that would allow civil
society to wither.
Empowerment therefore requires both association, deliberation and
equality, and so a welfare democracy would need to be founded upon
both new forms of governance (procedure) and discursiveness (plural-
ism). And ultimately, the creative interface of parliamentary and non-
parliamentary politics requires that social democrats and social move-
ments begin to learn from one another more effectively than has been the
case during the detour towards the NSD. This leads us back to the
problem mentioned earlier, the problem of transition and how to trans-
late these ideas into political reality. With parties traditionally seeking to
institutionalise social movements and movements both welcoming and
resisting such institutionalisation, then what can be done to encourage the
more creative learning processes that I have presented as vital to deliber-
ative democracy? There is no easy answer to this and I return to it in the
concluding chapter. For now, let me make the simple point that so far as
deliberative democracy is concerned, we do not talk about it and then
create it, we begin to create it by talking about it. The problem of transition
is a problem for those who recognise the need for transition; and if both
egalitarian social democrats and non-oppressive social movements recog-
nise that need and each other’s recognition, then the problem of transition
may lie as much behind us as before us.
Conclusion
We began with a post-universalist account of social citizenship and 
the view that social rights had become discredited because they were
detached from the need to advance the democratic project further. We
then contrasted aggregative democracy and deliberative democracy to see
what this advance might resemble and I noted that a reconciliation of ‘pro-
cedure’ and ‘pluralism’ is of key importance. I then sketched a theoreti-
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cal outline of a welfare democracy and characterised it as an egalitarian
alternative to conservatism. However, this alternative cannot be imagined
without reference to questions of actors and strategies, suggesting that the
universal potential of non-oppressive social movements should make
common cause with social democratic parties, despite the fact that many
within those parties have fallen under the conservative sway. We con-
cluded by exploring associative democratic ideas and I suggested that
association and deliberation are both essential components of an egali-
tarian politics.
This brings our analysis of the ecowelfare triangle to a close. In Chapter
6, I observed that its main principles should not be collapsed under a
single heading, since it is facile to imagine that they always and every-
where cohere. Instead, ecowelfare ought to be regarded as diverse set of
ideas that nevertheless revolve around the same set of objectives: to renew
social democracy and turn it away from the NSD. The last three chapters
give some illustration of just some of the theoretical debates with which
this post-productivist social democracy might engage. And as I stated in
Chapter 6, whether you agree with most, some or little of what I have said
is not important, what is crucial is that you recognise there is something
important to be disagreed with. If that is the case, then alternatives to the
NSD have already been sighted.
Notes
1 For a longer account of the following argument, see Fitzpatrick (2002b).
2 Though the ‘shallowness’ of those roots differs from country to country; see
Chapter 4.
3 These stages apply most directly to the UK but could, with some effort, be
applied to other developed nations.
4 I should here add that I have also discussed the links between environmen-
talism and democracy elsewhere (Fitzpatrick, 2002d) and so suspect that
democratisation is a means of linking together the ecowelfare triangle’s three
principles with greater coherence than is being suggested in Part II. However,
not having worked out the full implications of this, I do not want to spend
time on ill-formed speculations, nor do I wish to suggest that deliberative
democracy is a panacea (see below). Therefore, all I can do here is to indicate
a direction for future work.
5 I will not be offering a systematic critique of deliberative democracy and
believe that it should not be seen as a panacea for the ills of western democ-
racy. In particular, deliberative democracy can be accused of neglecting non-
rationalistic forms of voice, of underemphasising the inequalities of voice, of
not always specifying the necessary limits to democratic debate and of failing
to get to grips with the problem of social scale, i.e. how can small-scale delib-
Democratising welfare 199
TZP9  4/25/2005  4:57 PM  Page 199
200 After the new social democracy
erative fora provide large, complex societies with the legitimacy they require?
These issues are discussed in Dryzek (2000, 2001), Young (2000, 2001), Weeks
(2000) and Thompson & Hoggett (2001).
6 For reasons of limited space, I will leave to one side another important sphere,
which is that of the media and ICTs. However, I acknowledge that these are
absolutely crucial to future of democracy and are relevant to the discursive
education that I am about to defend.
7 In contrast to her earlier work, Young (2000: 92–9, 105) now makes room for
the importance of economic structures and inequalities that are not reducible
to the cultural (see Chapter 6). However, she has yet to grapple with the dif-
ficult implications this bears for deliberative democracy.
8 However, I leave open the question of how much equality is required. I will
simply be assuming that the post-1970s lurch towards greater inequality must
be reversed and so the economic philosophy of conservatism finally over-
turned. However, I suspect that unless we revisit an issue that I am about to
mention (concerning property relations) then any inroads into social inequal-
ities will be modest and short-lived.
9 And remember that such decisions are inescapable within any liberal and
democratic society, including unequal ones; how does a society live with those
who would undermine it?
10 Note, then, that I am not claiming that all social movements are non-
oppressive. Obviously, this is not the case. Instead, I am deploying the 
universal truth of non-oppressiveness to distinguish between those social
movements which are progressive and those which are not. It is the former
who might constitute the basis of an deliberative politics.
11 In this respect, the experience of environmentalism is salutary. Green move-
ments and parties have undoubtedly constituted a welcome addition to poli-
tics and yet the intellectual gulf between Greens and social democrats remains
largely wide and uninspiring, caught in the same old pincer movement
between realists and idealists.
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Conclusion
Chapter 1 argued that although it is simplistic to equate New Labour with
conservatism, both it and the NSD which it represents fail to offer a real
alternative to the conservative hegemony. The NSD has inserted itself 
into a mainstream agenda where being tough on problem individuals is
thought to be more moral than being tough on social problems. This has
helped to consolidate what I called the ‘age of mainstreams’, a shrinking
of the social imagination around the extremist Centre. However, rather
than cause us to abandon social democratic thought, we should detect
within it a genuinely radical potential.
This potential can be viewed in contrast to the philosophy of justice
preferred by New Labour. For whereas this philosophy is built around a
combination of ‘weak equality’ and ‘strong reciprocity’, I argued in
Chapter 2 for an alternative that favours ‘strong equality’ and ‘diverse 
reciprocity’. This alternative version of distributive justice constitutes 
the first principle of ecowelfare as explored in Part II.
Chapter 3 continued the critique of New Labour, arguing that it should
be interpreted as both an effect and perpetuation of the security state, a
state within which the attempt to realise basic needs for all has been
replaced by the attempt to assuage the basic fears of some. But this trans-
formation is not merely of theoretical interest and we saw how and why
it has influenced New Labour’s conception of information and its policies
towards ICTs.
Chapter 4 proposed that the ‘old’ social democracy is not as discred-
ited as new social democrats would have us believe. Social democracy
undoubtedly faces some very real challenges, but it is far from clear that
the NSD is any better equipped to address them than the old. As such, I
suggested that social democrats should explore post-productivist values
and ideas as a means of reconnecting social democracy to radical roots
that the NSD seems to have abandoned.
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Ecowelfare was therefore defined as ‘post-productivist social democ-
racy’ and the meaning of post-productivism was sketched in Chapter 5.
Essentially, post-productivism recontextualises growth, productivity and
well-being in terms of reproductive values, values that refer to the eco-
logical and social conditions of a productive economy, the very underly-
ing conditions which that economy is increasingly unable to replenish. I
contended that economic practice has to be assessed in terms of ‘repro-
ductivity’, meaning that labour has to refer less to waged work and more
to the kind of emotional and ecological labour that economic orthodoxies
continue to neglect.
Chapter 6 provided a basic model of ecowelfare as based around three
principles: that of distributive justice as defined and defended in Chapter
2; the principle of ‘attention’, which I theorised in terms of both recogni-
tion and care; the principle of sustainability which I discussed in terms 
of what I called moderate sustainability and ecological radicalisation.
Chapter 6 therefore set the scene for the next three chapters, where the
links between these principles were further explored.
Chapter 7 outlined a theory of intergenerational justice and concluded
that the ultimate conflict is less between present generations and future
ones as between those who would and those who would not favour a
more equitable distribution of natural and social resources. I tried to show
that intergenerational justice engenders a series of implications for social
policy that are as radical for ourselves as for the future.
In Chapter 8 we turned our attention to the new genetics and I pro-
posed a multidimensional conception of human nature, where the main-
tenance of diversity through social (rather than technological) solutions
should be the main priority. However, since we are also obliged to prevent
harm whenever it is possible and desirable to do so and since we cannot
disinvent biotechnology, we have some difficult decisions to make regard-
ing the genetic characteristics of future generations. Chapter 8 therefore
argues for a ‘regulated eugenics’ as an alternative to the ‘laissez-faire
eugenics’ which free market capitalism might engender.
Finally, Chapter 9 considered the meaning and significance of deliber-
ative democracy and of the welfare democracy which would need to be
at its heart. We saw that a welfare democracy could offer an egalitarian
alternative to both conservatism and the NSD by encouraging new forms
of political association and debate. Yet for a welfare democracy to emerge,
we need to start creating a much more democratic conversation between
parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms of politics and so between
social movements and social democratic parties also. The chapter con-
cluded with an analysis of associative democracy and welfare proposals,
finding that a combination of both associative and deliberative ap-
proaches is required.
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In the year it has taken to plan, research and write this book, the world
has never looked so different and yet also so horribly familiar. A new age
of innocence and safety was created, the world before our world. Before
arms pointed upwards shielding eyes from the morning glare, before the
last call home and too many words for those to whom no words need be
said, after the calls were silenced and before the noise began. And now
innocence may never be available to us ever again. America isolates the
rest of the world from itself, bullying those whose grief is any less, attack-
ing that which is other, failing again to hear the sounds to which 
only empires are deaf, of new enemies born weeping beside the craters 
of Freedom and Democracy. The Middle East finds ever new circles of 
hell into which to descend. The Judeo-Christian and Muslim traditions
sweep by in confused alarms of struggle and flight, failing to recognise
themselves in one another, finding common ground only in the rock-
strewn graveyards of bereavement and hate. Civilisations clash not
because they must, but because anti-liberal extremists within both worlds
desire it; prophets who march their followers to the very wastegrounds
of pain and death that they foretold would bury only their enemies. The
fundamentalists of power that can only ever stare inward and the funda-
mentalists of the powerless, those who spent patient decades watching
the skies, waiting for two glints of metal to arc out of the cloudless air.
The West and the Rest. Each seeking to destroy that which it has exiled
from itself.
In Europe too, many are trying to rebuild the walls of suspicion and
fear. The days of limitless possibility that followed 1989 have long since
darkened. The more the space of Europe has grown, the smaller the shel-
ters of identity have appeared and so the greater the desire for the reas-
suring interiors of stability, the havens of sameness. White ethnicity risks
recoiling upon itself, rejecting the homelessness that it fears may come to
it without the soothing arms of nationhood. The symphony of European
integration is conducted at a distance from those it affects, populations
who are called upon to play their instruments in tune to a music that they
have had little opportunity to compose. So in the absence of public spaces
that are properly European, the project finds a passive acceptance at best.
And as we struggle to find distinctness within commonality, those who
would abandon the search altogether and reinvent the familiar have
found a new audience. The resurgence of the Right and far Right derives
from a common source: the difficulty of imagining a post-national society.
So racism wears a suit and becomes respectable again. Is it convenient
that the obsession with crime and immigration has coincided with a new
mistrust of the diasporic other, whether Jewish or Muslim or both? Or are
they both signatures of the same insecurity: the struggle for control on the
part of those who feel that they do not really control their lives?
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For this is the essential problem and the reason why social democrats
have borne the brunt of the new insecurities (Moschonas, 2002: 108–9). It
could be argued that there is no real crisis of social democracy, that the
electoral victories of 1997–98 and the defeats of 2001–2 are coincidental
and have to be read in terms of each nation’s particular context. If this is
the case, then social democrats need do no more than plan and wait for
the next electoral cycle to roll around, for the doors of government to
reopen and permit access to the Left’s agenda once again. Yet we do not
have to talk in messianic terms of a ‘crisis of social democracy’ to recog-
nise that something has gone wrong. Given the opportunity to vote for
the Left in 1997–98, the electorates of Europe took it; and given the oppor-
tunity to vote against the Left in 2001–2, the electorates of Europe also
took this option. Why? A common response is that while it may success-
fully create an economic context for egalitarian solidarity, the Left has
neglected the cultural aspects. It has failed to demand enough of the
socially excluded and it has not addressed the real and very widespread
concerns about the social fabric being destabilised from the outside. In
short, it has ignored fears about crime and immigration and the cultural
insecurities that they bring. The case for the NSD is therefore strength-
ened rather than weakened, because only the NSD fully recognises the
lifestyle politics through which feelings of either security or insecurity are
woven (Giddens, 2002b).
Yet if insecurity is the problem, manifested as fears about crime and
immigration, then is the Left really to blame for neglecting the moral and
cultural aspects of social solidarity? Or is it that what both old and new
social democrats have really ignored is a deeper cause of insecurity? For
what the above explanation conveniently avoids are other sources of inse-
curity that the NSD, far from closing off, has actively promoted! In an
economy where the shareholder is king, where skills are less about doing
something tangible and more about the skill to acquire further skills,
where relationships are ephemeral and entitlements become portable,
where we are expected to give companies a loyalty that relatively few
return, where flexibility is defined largely in terms of the needs of employ-
ers, where competition with anyone and everyone around the globe is the
highest virtue, where we have portfolios rather than careers, where the
retirement age seems to ratchet upwards every few years, where in other
words we live to work instead of work to live, then it is little surprise that
the sense of self and of belonging begins to splinter. (Apologists for the
contemporary labour market assert that it actually provides more secu-
rity than is often perceived (Reeves, 2001), but this is to ignore the effects
that the ideology of flexibility has on workers treated increasingly as dis-
posable commodities.) And once this fragmentation reaches a critical
point, is it any surprise that we will reach for scapegoats, those who cause
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our insecurity and whose punishment will resolve it, or rebuke those who
either patronise our fears when they are not ignoring them altogether?
This is not to suggest that insecurity is always and everywhere economic
in origin (especially since the economics of insecurity are more evident in
some countries than others), but it is to suggest that without a substan-
tial rethinking as to what we mean by economic value, then social democ-
racies may simply be at an earlier stage of social disintegration than
conservative nations (Hutton, 2002: Ch. 11).
So the old social democracy cannot be absolved either. For whereas it
has been very good at nourishing the material aspects of solidarity, it has
been less effective at encouraging the democratic ones. Nordic corpo-
ratism (the idea of social partnership) is integrative, but only at a very
high level, the level of representative democracy. What it has been less
effective at doing is decentralising control of both society and economy,
perhaps out of concern that this will cause the consensus upon which its
high levels of social equality are built to crumble. But if fear and insecu-
rity, from which the Left is currently suffering a political backlash, is pro-
duced when people do not possess and know that they do not possess
enough control over their lives, then although social equality is much it
is still not enough. Without the democratisation of institutions, systems and
practices, then equality may simply represent the European equivalent 
of American consumerism; a bread-and-circuses compensation for the
infantilisation of the populace. Therefore, the Left has to ask itself anew
some apparently simple questions. How do we maximise the control 
that people have over their lives? How do we increase levels of self-
determination? How do we empower people to empower themselves?
In order to answer this question and translate it into a new politics, we
do not have recourse to the answers that conservatives, communitarians
and new social democrats have given in recent decades. For conserva-
tives, self-determination is delivered through the permanent revolution
of market forces, for communitarians it implies status and familism, for
new social democrats it implies wage earning, aspiration and duty. For
reasons that this book should have made clear, each of these answers
offends against the egalitarianism that is, and should be, at the heart of
the social democratic tradition. Social democrats therefore need to stress
not inequality nor even equality per se, but the kind of participative equal-
ity that we began to explore in the last chapter and which, as Note 8 of
Chapter 9 indicated, may be crucial to the future prospects of the Left.
Democratic equality means that freedom cannot be expressed, as conser-
vatives would wish, simply as mobility and choice within a market since
both democracy and equality are principles that markets may assist, but
can never replicate. It means that freedom cannot be expressed, as com-
munitarians would wish, in terms of hierarchy and obedience to received
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norms since democracy’s aim is to question those social forms by facili-
tating participation between social equals.1 And it means that freedom
cannot simply be expressed, as new social democrats wish, as inclusion
within an employment society, since wage earning is only one form of
valuable social activity and democracy requires a temporal and spatial
politics that is squeezed out when people have to spend most of their
waking lives ‘labouring for another’ (Fitzpatrick, 2003b).
Participative equality therefore implies a new form of civic engagement
and public space, one which subjects public issues, debates and decisions
to the kind of democratic gaze that is presently threaded through a limited
range of pressure groups, protest groups and lobbying organisations, all
of which specialise in one area of concern. Philosophers from Arendt to
Habermas have claimed that this kind of public participation was, at least
for a segment of the population, more current in the past than in the
present, before the public sphere became a remote territory into which
most of us fail to venture most of the time. The politics of representation
breaks that public sphere open from time to time and often quite effec-
tively, yet also confirms its remoteness and impenetrability, a citadel that
like Kafka’s castle shimmers and fades away from us the closer to it we
seem to get. There is therefore an urgent need for ‘counterpublics’ that
will not only break the public sphere open more effectively, but also allow
it to be reconfigured as a network of spheres within the associative rooms
and dwellings of civil society, transforming civil society in the process. In
short, public space needs a greater degree of civicness and civil society a
greater degree of politicisation.
In itself, there is nothing stunningly new about these ideas as they have
been discussed and exchanged for many years now, a means of counter-
ing a newly resurgent Right, while seeking to reconstruct the Left. But
what has been lacking is a convincing means of translating them into a
new politics, one that avoids the statism of the old Left while rejecting the
expediencies of the NSD. The aim of this book has been to apply the lan-
guage of social philosophy to this problem of translation and has outlined
various principles around which a new constituency could be built. One
that regards material equality as essential to any serious conception of 
reciprocity and responsibility, one which recognises the value of care 
and cares for those whom we recognise, one that regards sustainability as
crucial to human well-being (now as much as in the future), one that 
relocates the desire for productivity, affluence and growth on the site of
reproductivity and the values of emotional and ecological labour.
What kind of constituency would this resemble? Not simply a ‘rainbow
coalition’ as this idea, given its American origins, implies the kind of 
cultural separatism that liberal egalitarianism eschews; nor a class war, 
as any class-based politics has to acknowledge the lines of social fracture
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along which classes run; nor simply a middle-class politics where 
we chase the elusive few in the electoral middle ground, because 
while we should not ignore popular misconceptions (‘the courts are too
soft’, ‘we’re a soft touch for asylum seekers’), and one aim of counter-
public spaces is to confront them, we must not repeat the NSD mistake of
pandering to them either. As noted in the last chapter, this is to call not
for a politics of class or of non-class, but a politics of social movements
that comprehends both the generality and specificities of oppression. And
if oppression is only ever universal and particular, then anti-oppressive
mobilisations have to follow suit. Therefore the point of this book has not
been to group the members of the constituency under a single heading,
but to reiterate the simple but incredibly important point that the usual
suspects (socialists, egalitarians, feminists, social liberals, environmental-
ists) may talk to the favoured principles and priorities of others in the
course of talking to their own.
And are perhaps doing so. For although the major events of the last
year offer many reasons for pessimism, we have to be optimists despite
ourselves. The Global Social Justice movement (the loose affiliation of
those who have gone under a number of names since the mid-1990s) is
one such source of optimism in a pessimistic world. By challenging the
hegemony of corporate capitalism, by arguing for fair trade rather than
free trade, by opening the closed doors of international negotiations, by
intervening in a variety of social and military conflicts, the movement has
given flesh to the idea of a global civil society and has allowed counter-
public spaces to flicker here and there into life. Yes, as many smug jour-
nalists have observed, it often lacks intellectual rigour and political
coherence, but that is as much a potential strength as a weakness, a sign
of creativity and plasticity that can recreate itself in any number of social
settings. And if the movement lacked real force and direction, then the
Right would not have spent so much time since 11 September 2001 trying
to establish a link (guilt by association) between ‘anti-capitalists’ and 
anti-Western terrorism, the kind of political capital that makes the Right
what it is, an organised hypocrisy.
If social democrats therefore accept my arguments that we need new
alliances as a means of bridging the gap between the parliamentary and
non-parliamentary, then here is one opportunity for the creative learning
process that I mentioned in Chapter 9. If there is a pressing need for a
global regulatory system that embraces criteria and objectives different to
that of the IMF, etc., then both the International movement and social
democrats have a mutual interest in trying to construct that system. If
there is a democratic vacuum within the EU, then here also they have a
mutual interest in trying to strengthen forms of democratic governance.
In 10 or 20 years the opportunity may be different in character, though in
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10 or 20 years there may be no opportunity if we fail here and now. Social
movements have to learn how to institutionalise themselves (as many
movement organisations have already learned to do) without disappear-
ing into the hollows of formal politics; social democratic parties and trade
unions have to learn to become less respectable, less deferential to the
mores of established politics, more receptive to the messy sounds of civil
life. And both sides have to learn how to be both inside and outside the
established order, contributing to the maintenance of that order, while also
engaging in new forms of civic experimentation and discursive challenge
that subject the order to a constant critical review.
But there is no manual that can teach this; the students are the teach-
ers. And the ultimate destination is no less important than the aim: to
topple the economics of insecurity and the culture of fear and blame, to
remember that each individual controls their life only in so far as they
enable others to control theirs, to evoke the common project upon which
we are all engaged whether we like it or not. We are individuals only in
so far as we belong to one another. We are free only if we can democrati-
cally and collectively begin to reverse the tides of conservative dogma and
shift the political Centre back towards a progressive agenda. We live fully
only in those parts of our lives to which we refuse entry to quantitative
criteria and statistical indicators.
There is a world to change. What else is there to do and how else but
together can we do it?
Note
1 This is at least true of those communitarians who swing towards the con-
servative end of the spectrum.
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